Virus

Anything related to viruses, Trojans and backdoors.

CyberSec Tips: Malware – advice for the sysadmin

This is possibly a little out of line with what I’m trying to do with the series.  This advice is aimed a little higher than the home user, or small business operator with little computer experience.  Today I got these questions from someone with an advanced computer background, and solid security background, but no malware or antivirus experience.  I figured that this might apply to a number of people out there, so here was my advice:

 

> Question 1: What is the best way to obtain some good virus samples to
> experiment with in a clean-room environment?

Just look for anything large in your spam filters  :-)

> What I see doing is setting up a VM that is connected to an isolated
> network (with no connection to any other computer or the internet except
> for a computer running wireshark to monitor any traffic generated by the
> virus/malware).

VMs are handy when you are running a wholesale sample gathering and analysis operation, but for a small operation I tend not to trust them.  You might try running Windows under a Mac or Linux box, etc.  Even then, some of the stuff is getting pretty sneaky, and some specifically target VMs.  (I wonder how hard it would be to run Windows in a VM under iOS on ARM?)

> Also, any other particular recommendations as to how to set up the
> clean-room environment?

I’m particularly paranoid, especially if you haven’t had a lot of background in malware, so I’d tend to recommend a complete airgap, with floppies.  (You can still get USB 3 1/2″ floppy drives.)  CDs might be OK, but USB drives are just getting too complex to be sure.

> Question 2: What products are recommended for removing viruses and malware
> (i.e. is there a generic disinfector program that you recommend)?

I wouldn’t recommend a generic for disinfection.  For Windows, after the disaster of MSAV, MSE is surprisingly good, and careful–unlikely to create more problems than it solves.  I like Avast these days: even the free version gives you a lot of control, although it seems to be drifting into the “we know what’s best for you” camp.  And Sophos, of course, is solid stuff, and has been close to the top of the AV heap for over two decades.  F-Secure is good, although they may be distracted by the expansion they are doing of late.  Kaspersky is fine, though opinionated.  Eset has long had an advantage in scanning speed, but it does chew up machine cycles when operating.

Symantec/Norton, McAfee, and Trend have always had a far larger share of the market than was justified by their actual products.

As always, I recommend using multiple products for detection.

> I assume the preferred approach is to boot the suspect computer from USB
> and to run the analysis/disinfection software from the USB key (i.e. not to boot
> the infected computer until it has been disinfected).

A good plan.  Again, I might recommend CD/DVD over USB keys, but, as long as you are careful that the USB drive is clean …

> Question 3: How/when does one make the decision to wipe the hard drive and
> restore from backup rather than attempt to remove the malware?

If you have an up-to-date backup, that is always preferred when absolute security is the issue.  However, the most common malware is going to be cleanable fairly easily.  (Unless you run into some of the more nasty ransomware.)

Pushing backup, and multiple forms of backup, on all users and systems, is a great idea for all kinds of problems.  I’ve got a “set and forget” backup running to a USB drive that automatically updates any changes about every fifteen minutes.  And every couple of days I make a separate backup (and I have different USB drives I do it to) of all data files–which I then copy on to one of the laptops.  I just use an old batch file I created, which replaces any files with newer versions.  (Since it doesn’t delete anything I don’t change, it also means I have recovery possibilities if I make a mistake with deleting anything, and, by using multiple drives, I can rotate them for offsite storage, and even have possibilities of recovering old versions.)

> Question 4: Any recommended books or other guides to this subject matter?

Haven’t seen anything terrifically useful recently, unfortunately.  David Harley and I released “Viruses Revealed” as public domain a few years back, but it’s over ten years old.  (We released it about the time a vxer decided to upload it to http://vxheavens.com/lib/ars08.html  He probably thought he was hurting our sales, but we figured he was doing us a favour  :-)

BadBIOS

In recent days there has been much interest in the “BadBIOS” infection being reported by Dragos Ruiu.  (The best overview I’ve seen has been from Naked Security.)  But to someone who has lived through several viral myths and legends, parts of it sound strange.

  • It is said to infect the low-level system firmware of your computer, so it can’t be removed or disabled simply by rebooting.

These things, of course, have been around for a while, so that isn’t necessarily wrong.  However, BIOS infectors never became a major vector.

  • It is said to include components that work at the operating system level, so it affects the high-level operation of your computer, too.
  • It is said to be multi-platform, affecting at least Windows, OS X, and OpenBSD systems.

This sounds bit odd, but we’ve had cross-platform stuff before.  But they never became major problems either.

  • It is said to prevent infected systems being booted from CD drives.

Possible: we’ve seen similar effects over the years, both intentionally and un.

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using Software Defined Radio (SDR) program code, even with all wireless hardware removed.

OK, it’s dangerous to go out on a limb when you haven’t seen details and say something can’t happen, but I’m calling bullshit on this one.  Not that I don’t think someone couldn’t create a communications channel without the hardware: anything the hardware guys can do the software guys can emulate, and vice versa.  However, I can’t see getting an infection channel this way, at least without some kind of minimal infection first.  (It is, of course, possible that the person doing the analysis may have made a mistake in what they observed, or in the reporting of it.)

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using the speakers on an infected device to talk to the microphone on an uninfected one.

As above.

  • It is said to infect simply by plugging in a USB key, with no other action required.

We’ve seen that before.

  • It is said to infect the firmware on USB sticks.

Well, a friend has built a device to blow off dangerous firmware on USB sticks, so I don’t see that this would present any problem.

  • It is said to render USB sticks unusable if they aren’t ejected cleanly; these sticks work properly again if inserted into an infected computer.

Reminds me somewhat of the old “fast infectors” of the early 90s.  They had unintended effects that actually made the infections easy to remove.

  • It is said to use TTF (font) files, apparently in large numbers, as a vector when spreading.

Don’t know details of the internals of TTF files, but they should certainly have enough space.

  • It is said to block access to Russian websites that deal with reflashing software.

Possible, and irrelevant unless we find out what is actually true.

  • It is said to render any hardware used in researching the threat useless for further testing.

Well, anything that gets reflashed is likely to become unreliable and untrustworthy …

  • It is said to have first been seen more than three years ago on a Macbook.

And it’s taken three years to get these details?  Or get a sample to competent researchers?  Or ask for help?  This I find most unbelievable.

In sum, then, I think this might be possible, but I strongly suspect that it is either a promotion for PacSec, or a promo for some presentation on social engineering.

 

A virus too big to fail?

Once upon a time, many years ago, a school refused to take my advice (mediated through my brother) as to what to do about a very simple computer virus infection.  The infection in question was Stoned, which was a boot sector infector.   BSIs generally do not affect data, and (and this is the important point) are not eliminated by deleting files on the computer, and often not even by reformatting the hard disk.  (At the time there were at least a dozen simple utilities for removing Stoned, most of them free.)

The school decided to cleanse it’s entire computer network by boxing it up, shipping it back to the store, and having the store reformat everything.  Which the store did.  The school lost it’s entire database of student records, and all databases for the library.  Everything had to be re-entered.  By hand.

I’ve always thought this was the height of computer virus stupidity, and that the days when anyone would be so foolish were long gone.

I was wrong.  On both counts.

“In December 2011 the Economic Development Administration (an agency under the US Department of Commerce) was notified by the Department of Homeland Security that it had a malware infection spreading around its network.

“They isolated their department’s hardware from other government networks, cut off employee email, hired an outside security contractor, and started systematically destroying $170,000 worth of computers, cameras, mice, etc.”

The only reason they *stopped* destroying computer equipment and devices was because they ran out of money.  For the destruction process.

Malware is my field, and so I often sound like a bit of a nut, pointing out issues that most people consider minor.  However, malware, while now recognized as a threat, is a field that extremely few people, even in the information security field, study in any depth.  Most general security texts (and, believe me, I know almost all of them) touch on it only tangentially, and often provide advice that is long out of date.

With that sort of background, I can, unfortunately, see this sort of thing happening again.

 

Lest you think I exaggerate any of this, you can read the actual report.

The death of AV. Yet again.

And in other news, Gunter Ollman joins in the debate as to whether Imperva’s quasi-testing is worth citing (just about) and, with more enthusiasm, whether AV is worth paying for or even still breathing. If you haven’t come across Ollman’s writings on the topic before, it won’t surprise you that the answer is no. If you haven’t, he’s thoughtfully included several other links to articles where he’s given us the benefit of his opinions.

If it’s free, never ever bothers me with popups, and I never need to know it’s there, then it’s not worth the effort uninstalling it and I guess it can stay…

Ollman notes:

In particular there was great annoyance that a security vendor (representing an alternative technology) used VirusTotal coverage as their basis for whether or not new malware could be detected – claiming that initial detection was only 5%.

However, he doesn’t trouble himself to explain why the anti-malware industry (and VirusTotal itself) are so annoyed, or to comment on Imperva’s squirming following those criticisms. Nor does he risk exposing any methodology of his own to similar criticism, when he claims that:

desktop antivirus detection typically hovers at 1-2% … For newly minted malware that is designed to target corporate victims, the rate is pretty much 0% and can remain that way for hundreds of days after the malware has been released in to the wild.

Apparently he knows this from his own experience, so there’s no need to justify the percentages. And by way of distraction from this sleight of hand, he introduces ‘a hunchbacked Igor’ whom he visualizes ‘bolting on an iron plate for reinforcement to the Frankenstein corpse of each antivirus product as he tries to keep it alive for just a little bit longer…’ Amusing enough, I suppose, at any rate if you don’t know how hard those non-stereotypes in real anti-malware labs work at generating proactive detections for malware we haven’t seen yet and multi-layered protection. But this is about cheap laughs at the expense of an entire industry sector that Ollman regards as reaping profits that should be going to IOActive. Consider this little exchange on Twitter.

@virusbtn
Imperva’s research on desktop anti-virus has stirred a fierce debate. @gollmann: bit.ly/XE76eS @dharleyatESET: bit.ly/13e1TJW

@gollmann
@virusbtn @dharleyatESET I don’t know about “fierce”. It’s like prodding roadkill with a stick.

What are we, 12 years old? Fortunately, other tweeters seem to be seeing through this juvenilia.

@jarnomn
@gollmann @virusbtn @dharleyatESET Again just methaphors and no data. This conversation is like trainwreck in slow motion :)

The comments to the blog are also notable for taking a more balanced view: Jarno succinctly points to VirusTotal’s own view on whether its service is a realistic guide to detection performance, Kurt Wismer puts his finger unerringly on the likely bias of Ollman”s nebulous methodology, and Jay suggests that Ollman lives in a slightly different (ideal) world (though he puts a little more politely than that). But no doubt the usual crop of AV haters, Microsoft haters, Mac and Linux advocates, scammers, spammers and downright barmpots will turn up sooner or later.

There is, in fact, a rational debate to be held on whether AV – certainly raw AV with no multi-layering bells and whistles – should be on the point of extinction. The rate of detection for specialized, targeted malware like Stuxnet is indeed very low, with all-too-well-known instances of low-distribution but high-profile malware lying around undetected for years. (It helps if such malware is aimed at parts of the world where most commercial AV cannot legally reach.) And Gunter Ollman is quite capable of contributing a great deal of expertise and experience to it. But right now, it seems to me that he and Imperva’s Tal Be’ery are, for all their glee at the presumed death of anti-virus, a pair of petulantly twittering budgies trying to pass themselves off as vultures.

David Harley
AVIEN/Small Blue-Green World/Mac Virus/Anti-Malware Testing
ESET Senior Research Fellow