Privacy

Privacy and anonymity

REVIEW: Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed, Jack Nuern

BKIDTHMA.RVW   20120831

“Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed”, Jack Nuern, 2012
%A   Jack Nuern http://www.idtheftadvocates.com
%C   4901 W. 136 St., Leawood, KS, USA   66224
%D   2012
%G   ASIN: B0088IG92E
%I   Roadmap Productions
%O   fax 866-594-2771
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   128 p.
%T   “Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed”

Despite the implications of the title, this is not a primer for performing identity theft, but a guide to preventing and recovering from it.  The information, unfortunately, is fairly pedestrian, and most of it could be obtained from any magazine article on the topic.

Chapter one is a (very) basic introduction to identity theft, with a rather odd emphasis on the use of medical information.  Methods of identity theft are described in chapter two.  Unfortunately, this is where the book starts to show signs of serious disorganization, and some of the material is more sensational than helpful.  Chapter three lists some steps you can take to attempt to prevent identity theft.  The suggestions are the usual standards of not giving out any information to anyone, and the book tacitly admits that protection is not assured.

Chapter four gets to the real intent of the work: actions to take when your identity has been stolen and misused.  There is a great deal of useful content at this point, limited by two factors.  One is that everything discussed is restricted to institutions in the United States.  The other is that there is almost no discussion of what the entities mentioned can do for you or what they can’t or won’t.

As one could expect from a book written by a law firm, chapter five addresses the liability that the victim of identity theft faces.  The answer, unsurprisingly, is “it depends,” backed up with a few stories.  (Pardon me: “case studies.”)

There are some appendices (called, predictably, “Exhibits”).  Again, most of these will only be of use to those in the United States, and some, sections of related laws, will be of very little use to most.  There is a victim complaint and affidavit form which would probably be very helpful to most identity theft victims, reminding them of information to be collected and presented to firms and authorities.

The book is not particularly well written, and could certainly use some better structure and organization.  However, within its limits, it can be of use to those who are in the situation, and who frequently have nowhere to turn.  As the book notes, authorities are often unhelpful and take limited interest in identity theft cases.   And, as the book also (frequently) notes, the book is cheaper than hiring a law firm.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKIDTHMA.RVW   20120831

REVIEW: “The Quantum Thief”, Hannu Rajaniemi

BKQNTTHF.RVW   20120724

“The Quantum Thief”, Hannu Rajaniemi, 2010, 978-1-4104-3970-3
%A   Hannu Rajaniemi
%C   175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY  10010
%D   2010
%G   978-1-4104-3970-3 0765367661
%I   Tor Books/Tom Doherty Assoc.
%O   pnh@tor.com www.tor.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765367661/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765367661/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765367661/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n Tech 1 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   466 p.
%T   “The Quantum Thief”

This is the type of space opera that creates whole worlds, technologies, and languages behind it.  The language or jargon makes it hard to read.  The worlds are confusing, especially since some are real, and some aren’t.  The technologies make it way too easy to pull huge numbers of deuses ex way too many machinas, which strain the ability to follow, or even care about, the plot.  In this situation, the plot can be random, so the impetus for continued reading tends to rely on the reader’s sympathy for the characters.  Unfortunately, in this work, the characters can also have real or imagined aspects, and can change radically after an event.  It was hard to keep going.

Some of the jargon terms can be figured out fairly easily.  An agora, as it was in Greece, is a public meeting place.  Gogol wrote a book called “Dead Peasants,” so gogols are slaves.  Gevulot is the Hebrew word for borders, and has to deal with agreed-upon privacy deals.  But all of them have quirks, and a number of other terms come out of nowhere.

I was prompted to review this book since it was recommended as a piece of fiction that accurately represented some interesting aspects of information security.  Having read it, I can agree that there are some cute descriptions of significant points.  There is mention of a massive public/asymmetric key infrastructure (PKI) system.  There is reference to the importance of social engineering in breaking technical protection.  There is allusion to the increased fragility of overly complex systems.  But these are mentions only.  The asymmetric crypto system has no mention of a base algorithm, of course, but doesn’t even begin to describe the factors in the PKI itself.

If you know infosec you will recognize some of the mentions.  If you don’t, you won’t learn them.  (A specific reference to social engineering actually relates to an implementation fault.)  Otherwise, you may or may not enjoy being baffled by the pseudo-creativity of the story.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKQNTTHF.RVW   20120724

Art, hacking, privacy, and the US Secret Service

“Media artist” creates a form of spyware using Macbook webcams.  Runs it on computers in Apple Stores.  Apple calls Secret Service about the artist.  Lots more.  Some interesting and provocative concepts in the article, covering privacy, legality, search and seizure, and the fact that people show little affect when working with/on computers:

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/people-staring-at-computers/all/

Using Skype Manager? no? Expect incoming fraud

I have been using Skype ever since it came out, so I know my stuff.

I know how to write strong passwords, how to use smart security questions and how to – most importantly – avoid Phishing attempts on my Skype account.

But all that didn’t help me avoid a Skype mishap (or more bluntly as a friend said – Skype f*ckup).

It all started Saturday late at night (about 2am GMT), when I started receiving emails in Mandarin from Skype, my immediate thought was fraud, a phishing attempt, so I ignored it. But then I noticed I got also emails from Paypal with charges from Skype for 100$ 200$ 300$, and I was worried, was my account hacked?

I immediately went to PayPal and disconnected my authorization to Skype, called in Transaction Dispute on PayPal and then went on to look at my Skype account.

I looked into the recent logons to my account – nothing.

I looked into email changes, or passwords – nothing.

I couldn’t figure out how the thing got to where it was, and then I noticed, I have become a Skype Manager – wow I was promoted and I didn’t even send in my CV.

Yeah, joke aside, Skype Manager, is a service Skype gives to businesses to allow one person to buy Skype Credit and other people to use that Credit to make calls. A great idea, but the execution is poor.

The service appears to have been launched in 2012, and a few weeks after that, fraud started popping up. The how is very simple and so stupid it shameful for Skype to not have fixed this, since it was first reported (which I found) on the 21st of Jan 2012 on the Skype forum.

Apparently having this very common combinations of:
1) Auto-charge PayPal
2) Never used Skype Manager
3) Never setup a Work email for Skype

Makes it possible for someone to:
1) Setup you as a Skype Manager
2) Setup a new work email on some obscure service (mailinator was used in my case), and have all Skype emails for confirmations sent there

Yes, they don’t need to know anything BESIDE the Skype Call name of your account – which is easy to get using Skype Search.

Once you have become a Skype Manager, “you” can add users to the group you are managing – they don’t need to logon as all they need to do is use the (email) link you get to the newly assigned Work Email, yes, it doesn’t confirm the password – smart ha?

The users added to your Skype Manager can now take the Credit (its not money, it just call credits) and call anywhere they want.

Why this bug / feature not been fixed/addressed since the first time it was made public on the Skype Forum (probably was exploited before then), is anyone’s guess, talking to the Fraud department of Skype – he mainly stated that I should:
1) Change my password for Skype – yes, that would have helped nothing in this case
2) Make sure I authorize Skype only on trustworthy devices

The bottom line, Skype users, make sure:
1) You have configured your Skype Manager – if you are using Auto-Charge feature – I have disabled my Auto-Charge and PayPal authorization since then, and don’t plan on enabling it anytime (ever)
2) You have configured your Skype Work email – yes, if its unset, anyone can change it – without needing to know your current password – is this company a PCI authorized company? 😀

If you have more insight on the matter, let me know

– Noam