We seem to be missing the boat on security awareness of phishing attacks: it’s not just for bank and credit card accounts anymore. This article notes the “DHL,” “tax refund,” and similar queries. I would have thought these were obvious, but they seem to be the most successful ways to get spear phishing and APT information.
“The 2012 Norton Cybercrime Report, released Wednesday, says more than 46 per cent of Canadians have reported attempts by hackers to try to obtain personal data over the past 12 months,” according to the Vancouver Sun.
Well, since I see phishing every single day, and malware a few times times per week, what this survey is *really* saying is that 54% of Canadians don’t know what phishing and malware looks like.
(And you others don’t need to gloat: apparently the same figure holds globally …)
Kinda depressing …
Following closely upon the article/confession about cloud linked accounts and devices, and the ease of hacking them (with some interesting points about authentication systems):
I noticed, this morning, that the number of phishing messages, and specifically email account phishing, had, after a couple of relatively low months, suddenly jumped again.
Excessive convenience almost always = insecurity. I have not linked any of my socmed accounts. Facebook doesn’t have my Twitter account password, etc. This is somewhat inconvenient, since I have to sign on to the different accounts in order to post things. However, it does mean that, in the case of this type of story, I can just use it as an example and move on, rather than spending time changing the passwords on all my accounts.
Concentrating on malware and phishing, this is a very decent guide for “average” computer users with little or no security background or knowledge. Three sections in a kind of dictionary or encyclopedia format: malware and threats, protection technologies, and a (very brief but still useful) history of malware (1949-2012).
Available free for download, and (unlike a great many “free” downloads I could name) you don’t even have to register for endless spam from the company.
Recommended to pass around to family, friends, and your corporate security awareness department.
I have been using Skype ever since it came out, so I know my stuff.
I know how to write strong passwords, how to use smart security questions and how to – most importantly – avoid Phishing attempts on my Skype account.
But all that didn’t help me avoid a Skype mishap (or more bluntly as a friend said – Skype f*ckup).
It all started Saturday late at night (about 2am GMT), when I started receiving emails in Mandarin from Skype, my immediate thought was fraud, a phishing attempt, so I ignored it. But then I noticed I got also emails from Paypal with charges from Skype for 100$ 200$ 300$, and I was worried, was my account hacked?
I immediately went to PayPal and disconnected my authorization to Skype, called in Transaction Dispute on PayPal and then went on to look at my Skype account.
I looked into the recent logons to my account – nothing.
I looked into email changes, or passwords – nothing.
I couldn’t figure out how the thing got to where it was, and then I noticed, I have become a Skype Manager – wow I was promoted and I didn’t even send in my CV.
Yeah, joke aside, Skype Manager, is a service Skype gives to businesses to allow one person to buy Skype Credit and other people to use that Credit to make calls. A great idea, but the execution is poor.
The service appears to have been launched in 2012, and a few weeks after that, fraud started popping up. The how is very simple and so stupid it shameful for Skype to not have fixed this, since it was first reported (which I found) on the 21st of Jan 2012 on the Skype forum.
Apparently having this very common combinations of:
1) Auto-charge PayPal
2) Never used Skype Manager
3) Never setup a Work email for Skype
Makes it possible for someone to:
1) Setup you as a Skype Manager
2) Setup a new work email on some obscure service (mailinator was used in my case), and have all Skype emails for confirmations sent there
Yes, they don’t need to know anything BESIDE the Skype Call name of your account – which is easy to get using Skype Search.
Once you have become a Skype Manager, “you” can add users to the group you are managing – they don’t need to logon as all they need to do is use the (email) link you get to the newly assigned Work Email, yes, it doesn’t confirm the password – smart ha?
The users added to your Skype Manager can now take the Credit (its not money, it just call credits) and call anywhere they want.
Why this bug / feature not been fixed/addressed since the first time it was made public on the Skype Forum (probably was exploited before then), is anyone’s guess, talking to the Fraud department of Skype – he mainly stated that I should:
1) Change my password for Skype – yes, that would have helped nothing in this case
2) Make sure I authorize Skype only on trustworthy devices
The bottom line, Skype users, make sure:
1) You have configured your Skype Manager – if you are using Auto-Charge feature – I have disabled my Auto-Charge and PayPal authorization since then, and don’t plan on enabling it anytime (ever)
2) You have configured your Skype Work email – yes, if its unset, anyone can change it – without needing to know your current password – is this company a PCI authorized company? 😀
If you have more insight on the matter, let me know
Like many other people, I try helping developing countries when I can. So to help boost GDP in Eastern Europe and Africa (or ‘redistribute the wealth’ if you will) here’s a quick tutorial that will help scammers get HSBC customers’ credit card numbers. All the steps below are done by the real HSBC, so you don’t even need to “fool” anyone.
An HSBC customer who has gone through this process before won’t be able to distinguish between you and the real HSBC. Customer that has not been through this process certainly won’t know better anyway. In fact, you can do it to HSBC employees and they won’t know.
All you need is a toll-free number for them to call (feel free to forward it to Nigeria). The nice thing about HSBC is that the process below is identical to how the real HSBC asks customers for information. In other words: HSBC is training their customers to follow this path. I propose a new term for HSBC’s method of breeding phish: spowning (spawn+p0wn).
Prepare an email that looks like:
As a service to our customers and in an effort to protect their HSBC Premier MasterCard account, we are attempting to confirm recent charge activity or changes to the account.
Please contact the HSBC Premier Fraud Servicing Center to validate the activity at 1-888-206-5963 within the Continental United States. If you are calling from outside the United States, please call us collect at 716-841-7755.
If the activity is unauthorized, we will be able to close the account and reissue both a new account number and cards. Please use the Subject Reference Number below, when calling.
At HSBC, the security of our customer’s accounts has always been, and will continue to be a high priority. We appreciate your business and regret any inconvenience this may have caused you.
Security & Fraud Risk HSBC USA
Alert ID Number : 10917558
Note: Emails sent to this repository will go unmonitored. Please do not reply to this email. —————————————– ************************************************************** This e-mail is confidential. It may also be legally privileged. If you are not the addressee you may not copy, forward, disclose or use any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please delete it and all copies from your system and notify the sender immediately by return e-mail. Internet communications cannot be guaranteed to be timely, secure, error or virus-free. The sender does not accept liability for any errors or omissions. ************************************************************** “SAVE PAPER – THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT!”
Replace the phone numbers with your own. The above are HSBC’s.
Don’t worry about the ‘alert ID’. Just make something up. Unlike other credit cards, the caller (me, in this case) can’t use the alert ID to confirm this is really HSBC.
Blast this email. You’re bound to reach plenty of HSBC card holders. The rest you don’t care about anyway.
Main perk: Before the customer gets to speak to a human they need to enter full credit card number and 4 digit SSN. So even the most lazy scammer can at least get those.
For the overachieving scammers, have a human answer and ask for Card expiration and Full name on the card before agreeing to answer any other questions from the customer. This is all standard procedure at HSBC so customers shouldn’t be suspicious.
Oh, and if the customer who happens to be a security blogger tries to authenticate you back, tell them to hang up and call the number on the back of their card. That will shut them up.
At HSBC, the security of our customer’s accounts has always been, and will continue to be a high priority.
If it really was, you wouldn’t make me such an easy target for scammers. But thanks for playing.
[I’ve blogged on this elsewhere, but I’m pretty sure that this will be of interest to some of the readers of this blog, so here are the details as supplied by the Anti-Phishing Working Group.]
‘Containing the Global Cybercrime Threat’ is the focus of the Counter eCrime Operations Summit (CeCOS VI) in Prague, April 25-27
The 6th annual Counter eCrime Operations Summit (CeCOS VI) will convene in Prague, Czech Republic, April 25-27, 2012, as the APWG gathers global leaders from the financial services, technology, government, law enforcement, communications sectors, and research centers to define common goals and harmonize resources to strengthen the global counter-cybercrime effort.
CeCOS VI Prague will review the development of response systems and resources available to counter-cybercrime managers and forensic professionals from around the world.
Specific goals of this high-level, multi-national conference are to identify common forensic needs, in terms of the data, tools, and communications protocols required to harmonize cybercrime response across borders and between private sector financial and industrial sector responders and public sector policy professionals and law enforcement.
Key presentations will include:
» Toward a Universal eCrime Taxonomy for Industry and Law Enforcement; by Iain Swaine, Ensequrity.
» Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Transborder Law Enforcement Access to Data; by Alexander Seger, Director of the Data Protection and Cybercrime Division of the Council of Europe.
» Adventures in Cybercrime Event Data Sharing; by Pat Cain, AWPG Resident Research Fellow.
Additional presentations about industrial policy at CeCOS VI will investigate policies that complicate the work of exploited brand holders and responders including the domain name system (DNS) registration process that is abused by phishers as part of their phishing campaigns.
ABOUT the Counter eCrime Operations Summit
CeCOS VI, the second APWG conference held in Europe, is an open conference for members of the electronic-crime fighting community, hosted by the APWG and its Conference Partner AVG, Program Partners: The Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and sponsored by AVG, Google, Microsoft, MarkMonitor, ESET, Telefonica and ICANN. The CeCOS programs are widely considered the most vital events to investigators and managers of electronic crime from across the private and public sectors.
APWG: Foy Shiver, +1 404-434-7282. email@example.com
David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP
This sums up everything that is wrong with the “password policy” theme. From the t-mobile web site:
There is no way any reasonable person can choose a password that fits this policy AND can be remembered (note how they are telling you that you CANNOT use special characters. So users now have to bend according to the lowest common denominator of their bad back-end database routine and their bad password policy).
I’m sure some high-paid consultant convinced the T-MO CSO that stricter password policy is the answer to all their security problems. Reminds me of a story about an air-force security chief that claimed 25% increase in security by making mandatory password length 10 characters instead of 8, but I digress.
Yes, I know my habitat. No security executive ever got fired for making the user’s experience more difficult. All in the name of security. Except it’s both bad security and bad usability (which, incidentally, correlate more often than not, despite what lazy security ‘experts’ might let you believe.