OT

Off Topic

Firewalled

Full details are not out yet, but there was a “police incident” today in NorthVancouver, which resulted in the closure of two bridges from the North Shore.

(No, the cops aren’t looking for me.  Although this is fairly near our home, and only a few blocks up the street from where embroidery and quilting guilds meet.)

If you look at the map, you will see that a) the bridges aren’t that close to each other, and b) the incident was close to neither.

By closing both bridges, the police can completely isolate the North Shore from the rest of the world.  (I assume they put checks out at the Seabus and the road up to Squamish, although whoever they were looking for would have to be pretty stupid to head that way.)  Also, by closing the bridges, the police have probably tied up all traffic everywhere on the North Shore as well, preventing the perp from going very far in any case  :-)

Although we don’t know what happened, IHT indicates a homicide, and the response indicates someone may have been kidnapped, as well.

BadBIOS

In recent days there has been much interest in the “BadBIOS” infection being reported by Dragos Ruiu.  (The best overview I’ve seen has been from Naked Security.)  But to someone who has lived through several viral myths and legends, parts of it sound strange.

  • It is said to infect the low-level system firmware of your computer, so it can’t be removed or disabled simply by rebooting.

These things, of course, have been around for a while, so that isn’t necessarily wrong.  However, BIOS infectors never became a major vector.

  • It is said to include components that work at the operating system level, so it affects the high-level operation of your computer, too.
  • It is said to be multi-platform, affecting at least Windows, OS X, and OpenBSD systems.

This sounds bit odd, but we’ve had cross-platform stuff before.  But they never became major problems either.

  • It is said to prevent infected systems being booted from CD drives.

Possible: we’ve seen similar effects over the years, both intentionally and un.

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using Software Defined Radio (SDR) program code, even with all wireless hardware removed.

OK, it’s dangerous to go out on a limb when you haven’t seen details and say something can’t happen, but I’m calling bullshit on this one.  Not that I don’t think someone couldn’t create a communications channel without the hardware: anything the hardware guys can do the software guys can emulate, and vice versa.  However, I can’t see getting an infection channel this way, at least without some kind of minimal infection first.  (It is, of course, possible that the person doing the analysis may have made a mistake in what they observed, or in the reporting of it.)

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using the speakers on an infected device to talk to the microphone on an uninfected one.

As above.

  • It is said to infect simply by plugging in a USB key, with no other action required.

We’ve seen that before.

  • It is said to infect the firmware on USB sticks.

Well, a friend has built a device to blow off dangerous firmware on USB sticks, so I don’t see that this would present any problem.

  • It is said to render USB sticks unusable if they aren’t ejected cleanly; these sticks work properly again if inserted into an infected computer.

Reminds me somewhat of the old “fast infectors” of the early 90s.  They had unintended effects that actually made the infections easy to remove.

  • It is said to use TTF (font) files, apparently in large numbers, as a vector when spreading.

Don’t know details of the internals of TTF files, but they should certainly have enough space.

  • It is said to block access to Russian websites that deal with reflashing software.

Possible, and irrelevant unless we find out what is actually true.

  • It is said to render any hardware used in researching the threat useless for further testing.

Well, anything that gets reflashed is likely to become unreliable and untrustworthy …

  • It is said to have first been seen more than three years ago on a Macbook.

And it’s taken three years to get these details?  Or get a sample to competent researchers?  Or ask for help?  This I find most unbelievable.

In sum, then, I think this might be possible, but I strongly suspect that it is either a promotion for PacSec, or a promo for some presentation on social engineering.

 

Risk management and security theatre

Bruce Schneier is often outrageous, these days, but generally worth reading.  In a piece for Forbes in late August, he made the point that, due to fear and the extra trouble casued by TSA regulations, more people were driving rather than flying, and, thus, more people were dying.

“The inconvenience of extra passenger screening and added costs at airports after 9/11 cause many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination instead, and, since airline travel is far safer than car travel, this has led to an increase of 500 U.S. traffic fatalities per year.”

So, by six years after the event, the TSA had killed more US citizens than had the terrorists.  And continues to kill them.

Given the recent NSA revelations, I suppose this will sound like more US-bashing, but I don’t see it that way.  It’s another example of the importance of *real* risk management, taking all factors into account.

“Poor” decisions in management?

I started reading this article just for the social significance.  You’ve probably seen reports of it: it’s been much in the media.

However, I wasn’t very far in before I came across a statement that seems to have a direct implication to all business management, and, in particular, the CISSP:

“The authors gathered evidence … and found that just contemplating a projected financial decision impacted performance on … reasoning tests.”

As soon as I read that, I flashed on the huge stress we place on cost/benefit analysis in the CISSP exam.  And, of course, that extends to all business decisions: everything is based on “the bottom line.”  Which would seem to imply that hugely important corporate and public policy decisions are made on the worst possible basis and in the worst possible situation.

(That *would* explain a lot about modern business, policy, and economics.  And maybe the recent insanity in the US Congress.)

Other results seem to temper that statement, and, unfortunately, seem to support wage inequality and the practice of paying obscene wages to CEOs and directors: “… low-income people asked to ponder an expensive car repair did worse on cognitive-function tests than low-income people asked to consider cheaper repairs or than higher-income people faced with either scenario.”

But it does make you think …