malware

REVIEW – “The Florentine Deception”, Carey Nachenberg

BKFLODEC.RVW   20150609

“The Florentine Deception”, Carey Nachenberg, 2015, 978-1-5040-0924-9,
U$13.49/C$18.91
%A   Carey Nachenberg http://florentinedeception.com
%C   345 Hudson Street, New York, NY   10014
%D   2015
%G   978-1-5040-0924-9 150400924X
%I   Open Road Distribution
%O   U$13.49/C$18.91 www.openroadmedia.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/150400924X/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/150400924X/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/150400924X/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n+ Tech 3 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   321 p.
%T   “The Florentine Deception”

It gets depressing, after a while.  When you review a bunch of books on the basis of the quality of the technical information, books of fiction are disappointing.  No author seems interested in making sure that the technology is in any way realistic.  For every John Camp, who pays attention to the facts, there are a dozen Dan Browns who just make it up as they go along.  For every Toni Dwiggins, who knows what she is talking about, there are a hundred who don’t.

So, when someone like Carey Nachenberg, who actually works in malware research, decides to write a story using malicious software as a major plot device, you have to be interested.  (And besides, both Mikko Hypponen and Eugene Spafford, who know what they are talking about, say it is technically accurate.)

I will definitely grant that the overall “attack” is technically sound.  The forensics and anti-forensics makes sense.  I can even see young geeks with more dollars than sense continuing to play “Nancy Drew” in the face of mounting odds and attackers.  That a vulnerability can continue to go undetected for more than a decade would ordinarily raise a red flag, but Nachenberg’s premise is realistic (especially since I know of a vulnerability at that very company that went unfixed for seven years after they had been warned about it).  That a geek goes rock-climbing with a supermodel we can put down to poetic licence (although it may increase the licence rates).  I can’t find any flaws in the denouement.

But.  I *cannot* believe that, in this day and age, *anyone* with a background in malware research would knowingly stick a thumb/jump/flash/USB drive labelled “Florentine Controller” into his, her, or its computer.  (This really isn’t an objection: it would only take a couple of pages to have someone run up a test to make sure the thing was safe, but …)

Other than that, it’s a joy to read.  It’s a decent thriller, with some breaks to make it relaxing rather than exhausting (too much “one damn thing after another” gets tiring), good dialogue, and sympathetic characters.  The fact that you can trust the technology aids in the “willing suspension of disbelief.”

While it doesn’t make any difference to the quality of the book, I should mention that Carey is donating all author profits from sales of the book to charity:
http://florentinedeception.weebly.com/charities.html

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2015   BKFLODEC.RVW   20150609

AV is dead … again …

Antivirus software only catches 45% of malware attacks and is “dead”, according to a senior manager at Symantec.”

85.4% of statistic can be interpreted in the opposite way, and AV has been declared dead regularly since 1987.

Symantec “invented commercial antivirus software in the 1980s”?  That must come as news to the many companies, like Sophos, that I was reviewing long before Symantec bought out their first AV company.

“Dye told the Wall Street Journal that hackers increasingly use novel methods and bugs in the software of computers to perform attacks.”

There were “novel attacks” in 1986, and they got caught.  There have been novel attacks every year or so since, and they’ve been caught.  At the same time, lots of people get attacked and fail to detect it.  There’s never a horse that couldn’t be rode, and there’s never a rider that couldn’t be throwed.

“Malware has become increasingly complex in a post-Stuxnet world.”

So have computers.  Even before Stuxnet.  I think it was Grace Hopper who said that the reason it is difficult to secure complex systems is because they are complex systems.  (And she died a while back.)

CyberSec Tips: Malware – advice for the sysadmin

This is possibly a little out of line with what I’m trying to do with the series.  This advice is aimed a little higher than the home user, or small business operator with little computer experience.  Today I got these questions from someone with an advanced computer background, and solid security background, but no malware or antivirus experience.  I figured that this might apply to a number of people out there, so here was my advice:

 

> Question 1: What is the best way to obtain some good virus samples to
> experiment with in a clean-room environment?

Just look for anything large in your spam filters  :-)

> What I see doing is setting up a VM that is connected to an isolated
> network (with no connection to any other computer or the internet except
> for a computer running wireshark to monitor any traffic generated by the
> virus/malware).

VMs are handy when you are running a wholesale sample gathering and analysis operation, but for a small operation I tend not to trust them.  You might try running Windows under a Mac or Linux box, etc.  Even then, some of the stuff is getting pretty sneaky, and some specifically target VMs.  (I wonder how hard it would be to run Windows in a VM under iOS on ARM?)

> Also, any other particular recommendations as to how to set up the
> clean-room environment?

I’m particularly paranoid, especially if you haven’t had a lot of background in malware, so I’d tend to recommend a complete airgap, with floppies.  (You can still get USB 3 1/2″ floppy drives.)  CDs might be OK, but USB drives are just getting too complex to be sure.

> Question 2: What products are recommended for removing viruses and malware
> (i.e. is there a generic disinfector program that you recommend)?

I wouldn’t recommend a generic for disinfection.  For Windows, after the disaster of MSAV, MSE is surprisingly good, and careful–unlikely to create more problems than it solves.  I like Avast these days: even the free version gives you a lot of control, although it seems to be drifting into the “we know what’s best for you” camp.  And Sophos, of course, is solid stuff, and has been close to the top of the AV heap for over two decades.  F-Secure is good, although they may be distracted by the expansion they are doing of late.  Kaspersky is fine, though opinionated.  Eset has long had an advantage in scanning speed, but it does chew up machine cycles when operating.

Symantec/Norton, McAfee, and Trend have always had a far larger share of the market than was justified by their actual products.

As always, I recommend using multiple products for detection.

> I assume the preferred approach is to boot the suspect computer from USB
> and to run the analysis/disinfection software from the USB key (i.e. not to boot
> the infected computer until it has been disinfected).

A good plan.  Again, I might recommend CD/DVD over USB keys, but, as long as you are careful that the USB drive is clean …

> Question 3: How/when does one make the decision to wipe the hard drive and
> restore from backup rather than attempt to remove the malware?

If you have an up-to-date backup, that is always preferred when absolute security is the issue.  However, the most common malware is going to be cleanable fairly easily.  (Unless you run into some of the more nasty ransomware.)

Pushing backup, and multiple forms of backup, on all users and systems, is a great idea for all kinds of problems.  I’ve got a “set and forget” backup running to a USB drive that automatically updates any changes about every fifteen minutes.  And every couple of days I make a separate backup (and I have different USB drives I do it to) of all data files–which I then copy on to one of the laptops.  I just use an old batch file I created, which replaces any files with newer versions.  (Since it doesn’t delete anything I don’t change, it also means I have recovery possibilities if I make a mistake with deleting anything, and, by using multiple drives, I can rotate them for offsite storage, and even have possibilities of recovering old versions.)

> Question 4: Any recommended books or other guides to this subject matter?

Haven’t seen anything terrifically useful recently, unfortunately.  David Harley and I released “Viruses Revealed” as public domain a few years back, but it’s over ten years old.  (We released it about the time a vxer decided to upload it to http://vxheavens.com/lib/ars08.html  He probably thought he was hurting our sales, but we figured he was doing us a favour  :-)

CyberSec Tips: Email – Spam – Phishing – example 3 – credit checks

A lot of online security and anti-fraud checklists will tell you to check your credit rating with the credit rating reporting companies.  This is a good idea, and, under certain conditions, you can often get such reports free of charge from the ratings companies.

However, you should never get involved with the promises of credit reports that come via spam.

Oddly, these credit report spam messages have very little content, other than a URL, or possibly a URL and some extra text (which usually doesn’t display) meant only to confuse the matter and get by spam filters.  There are lots of these messages: today I got five in only one of my accounts.

I checked one out, very carefully.  The reason to be careful is that you have no idea what is at the end of that URL.  It could be a sales pitch.  It could be an attempt to defraud you.  It could be “drive-by” malware.  In the case I tested, it redirected through four different sites before finally displaying something.  Those four different sites could simply be there to make it harder to trace the spammers and fraudsters, but more likely they were each trying something: registering the fact that my email address was valid (and that there was a live “sucker” attached to it, worth attempting to defraud), installing malware, checking the software and services installed on my computer, and so forth.

It ended up at a site listing a number of financial services.  The domain was “simply-finances.com.”  One indication that this is fraudulent is that the ownership of this domain name is deeply buried.  It appears to be registered through GoDaddy, which makes it hard to check out with a normal “whois” request: you have to go to GoDaddy themselves to get any information.  Once there you find that it is registered through another company called Domains By Proxy, who exist solely to hide the ownership of domains.  Highly suspicious, and no reputable financial company would operate in such a fashion.

The credit rating link sent me to a domain called “transunion.ca.”  The .ca would indicate that this was for credit reporting in Canada, which makes sense, as that is where I live.  (One of the redirection sites probably figured that out, and passed the information along.)  However, that domain is registered to someone in Chicago.  Therefore, it’s probably fraud: why would someone in Chicago have any insight on contacts for credit reporting for Canadians?

It’s probably fraudulent in any case.  What I landed on was an offer to set me up for a service which, for $17 per month, would generate credit ratings reports.  And, of course, it’s asking for lots of information about me, definitely enough to start identity theft.  There is no way I am signing up for this service.

Again, checking out your own credit rating is probably a good idea, although it has to be done regularly, and it only really detects fraud after the fact.  But going through offers via spam is an incredibly bad idea.