Commentary

General ideas about the world of security

CyberSec Tips: Email – Spam – check your filters

Spam filters are getting pretty good these days.  If they weren’t, we’d be inundated.

But they aren’t perfect.

It’s a good idea to check what is being filtered out, every once in a while, to make sure that you are not missing messages you should be getting.  Lots of things can falsely trigger spam filters these days.

Where and how you check will depend on what you use to read your email.  And how you report that something is or isn’t spam will depend on that, too.

If you use the Web based email systems, like Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook/Hotmail, or others, and you use their Web interface, the spam folder usually is listed with other folders, generally to the left side of the browser window.  And, when you are looking at that list, when you select one of the messages, somewhere on the screen, probably near the top, is a button to report that it isn’t spam.

It’s been a couple of weeks since I did this myself, so I checked two of my Webmail accounts this morning.  Both of them had at least one message caught in the spam trap that should have been sent through.  Spam filtering is good, but it isn’t perfect.  You have to take responsibility for your own safety.  And that means checking the things you use to keep you safe.

Review of “cloud drives” – Younited – pt 3

Yesterday I received an update for the Younited client–on the Win7 machine.  The XP machine didn’t update, nor was there any option to do so.

This morning Younited won’t accept the password on the Win7 machine: it won’t log on.  Actually, it seems to be randomly forgetting parts of the password.  As with most programs, it doesn’t show the password (nor is there any option to show it), the password is represented by dots for the characters.  But I’ll have seven characters entered (with seven dots showing), and, all of a sudden, only three dots will be showing.  Or I’ll have entered ten, and suddenly there are only two.

Review of “cloud drives” – Younited – pt 2

My major test of the Younited drive took a few days, but it finally seems to have completed.  In a less than satisfactory manner.

I “synched” a directory on my machine with the Younited drive.  As noted, the synching ran for at least two days.  (My mail and Web access was noticeably slow during that time.)  The original directory, with subdirectories, contained slightly under 7 Gigs of material (the quota for basic Younited drives is said to be 10 G) in slightly under 2,800 files.  The transfer progress now shows 5,899 files transferred, and I’m out of space.

A quick check shows that not all files are on the Younited drive.

BadBIOS

In recent days there has been much interest in the “BadBIOS” infection being reported by Dragos Ruiu.  (The best overview I’ve seen has been from Naked Security.)  But to someone who has lived through several viral myths and legends, parts of it sound strange.

  • It is said to infect the low-level system firmware of your computer, so it can’t be removed or disabled simply by rebooting.

These things, of course, have been around for a while, so that isn’t necessarily wrong.  However, BIOS infectors never became a major vector.

  • It is said to include components that work at the operating system level, so it affects the high-level operation of your computer, too.
  • It is said to be multi-platform, affecting at least Windows, OS X, and OpenBSD systems.

This sounds bit odd, but we’ve had cross-platform stuff before.  But they never became major problems either.

  • It is said to prevent infected systems being booted from CD drives.

Possible: we’ve seen similar effects over the years, both intentionally and un.

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using Software Defined Radio (SDR) program code, even with all wireless hardware removed.

OK, it’s dangerous to go out on a limb when you haven’t seen details and say something can’t happen, but I’m calling bullshit on this one.  Not that I don’t think someone couldn’t create a communications channel without the hardware: anything the hardware guys can do the software guys can emulate, and vice versa.  However, I can’t see getting an infection channel this way, at least without some kind of minimal infection first.  (It is, of course, possible that the person doing the analysis may have made a mistake in what they observed, or in the reporting of it.)

  • It is said to spread itself to new victim computers using the speakers on an infected device to talk to the microphone on an uninfected one.

As above.

  • It is said to infect simply by plugging in a USB key, with no other action required.

We’ve seen that before.

  • It is said to infect the firmware on USB sticks.

Well, a friend has built a device to blow off dangerous firmware on USB sticks, so I don’t see that this would present any problem.

  • It is said to render USB sticks unusable if they aren’t ejected cleanly; these sticks work properly again if inserted into an infected computer.

Reminds me somewhat of the old “fast infectors” of the early 90s.  They had unintended effects that actually made the infections easy to remove.

  • It is said to use TTF (font) files, apparently in large numbers, as a vector when spreading.

Don’t know details of the internals of TTF files, but they should certainly have enough space.

  • It is said to block access to Russian websites that deal with reflashing software.

Possible, and irrelevant unless we find out what is actually true.

  • It is said to render any hardware used in researching the threat useless for further testing.

Well, anything that gets reflashed is likely to become unreliable and untrustworthy …

  • It is said to have first been seen more than three years ago on a Macbook.

And it’s taken three years to get these details?  Or get a sample to competent researchers?  Or ask for help?  This I find most unbelievable.

In sum, then, I think this might be possible, but I strongly suspect that it is either a promotion for PacSec, or a promo for some presentation on social engineering.