This is a ton of fun, and a great tool for learning. Enjoy!
General ideas about the world of security
General ideas about the world of security
This is a ton of fun, and a great tool for learning. Enjoy!
Michael Den Tandt’s recent column in the Vancouver Sun is rather a melange, and deserves to have a number of points addressed separately.
First, it is true that the behaviours the “cyberbullying” bill address, those of spreading malicious and false information widely, generally using anonymous or misleading identities, do sound suspiciously close to those behaviours in which politicians engage themselves. It might be ironic if the politicians got charged under the act.
Secondly, whether bill C-13 is just a thinly veiled re-introduction of the reviled C-30 is an open question. (As one who works with forensic linguistics, I’d tend to side with those who say that the changes in the bill are primarily cosmetic: minimal changes intended to address the most vociferous objections, without seriously modifying the underlying intent.)
However, Den Tandt closes with an insistence that we need to address the issue of online anonymity. Removing anonymity from the net has both good points and bad, and it may be that the evil consequences would outweigh the benefits. (I would have thought that a journalist would have been aware of the importance of anonymous sources of reporting.)
More importantly, this appeal for the banning of anonymity betrays an ignorance of the inherent nature of networked communitcation. The Internet, and related technologies, have so great an influence on our lives that it is important to know what can, and can’t, be done with it.
The Internet is not a telephone company, where the central office installs all the wires and knows at least where (and therefore likely who) a call came from. The net is based on technology whish is designed, from the ground up, in such a way that anyone, with any device, can connect to the nearest available source, and have the network, automatically, pass information to or from the relevant person or site.
The fundamental technology that connects the Internet, the Web, social media, and pretty much everything else that is seen as “digital” these days, is not a simple lookup table at a central office. It is a complex interrelationship of prototcols, servers, and programs that are built to allow anyone to communicate with anyone, without needing to prove your identity or authorization. Therefore, nobody has the ability to prevent any communication.
There are, currently, a number of proposals to “require” all communications to be identified, or all users to have an identity, or prevent anyone without an authenticated identity from using the Internet. Any such proposals will ultimately fail, since they ignore the inherent foundational nature of the net. People can voluntarily participate in such programs–but those people probably wouldn’t have engaged in cyberbullying in any case.
John Gilmore, one of the people who built the basics of the Internet, famously stated that “the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” This fact allows those under oppressive regimes to communicate with the rest of the world–but it also means that pornography and hate speech can’t be prevented. The price of reasonable commuincations is constant vigilance and taking the time to build awareness. A wish for a technical or legal shortcut that will be a magic pill and “fix” everything is doomed to fail.
BananaGlee. I just love saying that word 😉
So, was reading up on the NSA backdoors for Cisco and other OSes, http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm, and got to thinking about how the NSA might exfiltrate their data or run updates…It’s gotta be pretty stealthy, and I’m sure they have means of reflecting data to/from their Remote Operations Center (ROC) in such a way that you can’t merely look at odd destination IPs from your network.
This got me thinking about how I would find such data on a network. First off, obviously, I’d have to tap the firewall between firewall and edge router. I’d also want to tap the firewall for all internal connections. Each of these taps would be duplicated to a separate network card on a passive device.
1) eliminate all traffic that originated from one interface and went out another interface. This has to be an exact match. I would think any changes outside of TTL would be something that would have to be looked at.
2) what is left after (1) would have to be traffic originating from the firewall (although not necessarily using the firewalls IP or MAC). That’s gotta be a much smaller set of data.
3) With the data set from (2), you’ve gotta just start tracing through each one.
This would, no doubt, be tons of fun. I don’t know how often the device phones home to the ROC, what protocol they might use , etc…
If anyone has any ideas, I’d love to hear them. I find this extremely fascinating.
You close the lid of your laptop; it’s been a productive couple of days. There are a few things that could be tightened up, but overall the place isn’t doing a bad job. Exchange pleasantries with the people who have begrudgingly given up time to escort you, hand in your visitors badge and head for the door. Just as you feel the chill of outside against your skin, you hear a muffed voice in the background.
“Hey, sorry, I forgot to ask, when can we expect the report?”
Ugh, the report. Penetration testing’s least favorite cousin, but ultimately, one of the most important.
There are thousands of books written about information security and pen testing. There are hundreds of hours of training courses that cover the penetration testing process. However, I would happily wager that less than ten percent of all the material out there is dedicated to reporting. This, when you consider that you probably spend 40-50% of the total duration of a pen test engagement actually writing the report, is quite alarming.
It’s not surprising though, teaching someone how to write a report just isn’t as sexy as describing how to craft the perfect buffer overflow, or pivot round a network using Metasploit. I totally get that, even learning how the TCP packet structure works for the nineteenth time sounds like a more interesting topic.
A common occurrence amongst many pen testers. Not allowing enough time to produce a decent report.
No matter how technically able we are as security testers, it is often a challenge to explain a deeply technical issue to someone who may not have the same level of technical skill. We are often guilty of making assumptions that everyone who works in IT has read the same books, or has the same interests as us. Learning to explain pen test findings in a clear and concise way is an art form, and one that every security professional should take the time to master. The benefits of doing so are great. You’ll develop a better relationship with your clients, who will want to make use of your services over and over again. You’ll also save time and money, trust me. I once drove a 350 mile round trip to go and explain the contents of a penetration test report to a client. I turned up, read some pages of the report aloud with added explanations and then left fifteen minutes later. Had I taken a tiny bit more time clarifying certain issues in my report, I would have saved an entire day of my time and a whole tank of gas.
Diluted: “SSH version one should be disabled as it contains high severity vulnerabilities that may allow an attacker already on the network to intercept and decrypt communications, although the risk of an attacker gaining access to the network is very low, so this reduces the severity.”
Clarified: “It is advisable to disable SSH version one on these devices, failure to do so could allow an attacker with local network access to decrypt and intercept communications.”
Why is a penetration test report so important?
Never forget, penetration testing is a scientific process, and like all scientific processes it should be repeatable by an independent party. If a client disagrees with the findings of a test, they have every right to ask for a second opinion from another tester. If your report doesn’t detail how you arrived at a conclusion, the second tester will have no idea how to repeat the steps you took to get there. This could lead to them offering a different conclusion, making you look a bit silly and worse still, leaving a potential vulnerability exposed to the world.
Bad: “Using a port scanner I detected an open TCP port”.
Better: “Using Nmap 5.50, a port scanner, I detected an open TCP port using the SYN scanning technique on a selected range of ports. The command line was: nmap –sS –p 7000-8000.”
The report is the tangible output of the testing process, and the only real evidence that a test actually took place. Chances are, senior management (who likely approved funding for the test) weren’t around when the testers came into the office, and even if they were, they probably didn’t pay a great deal of attention. So to them, the report is the only thing they have to go on when justifying the expense of the test. Having a penetration test performed isn’t like any other type of contract work. Once the contract is done there is no new system implemented, or no new pieces of code added to an application. Without the report, it’s very hard to explain to someone what exactly they’ve just paid for.
Who is the report for?
While the exact audience of the report will vary depending on the organization, it’s safe to assume that it will be viewed by at least three types of people.
Senior management, IT management and IT technical staff will all likely see the report, or at least part of it. All of these groups will want to get different snippets of information. Senior management simply doesn’t care, or doesn’t understand what it means if a payment server encrypts connections using SSL version two. All they want to know is the answer to one simple question “are we secure – yay or nay?”
IT management will be interested in the overall security of the organization, but will also want to make sure that their particular departments are not the cause of any major issues discovered during testing. I recall giving one particularly damming report to three IT managers. Upon reading it two of them turned very pale, while the third smiled and said “great, no database security issues then”.
IT staff will be the people responsible for fixing any issues found during testing. They will want to know three things. The name of the system affected, how serious the vulnerability is and how to fix it. They will also want this information presented to them in a way that is clear and organized. I find the best way is to group this information by asset and severity. So for example, “Server A” is vulnerable to “Vulnerability X, Y and Z. Vulnerability Y is the most critical”. This gives IT staff half a chance of working through the list of issues in a reasonable timeframe. There is nothing worse than having to work your way backwards and forwards through pages of report output to try and keep track of vulnerabilities and whether or not they’ve been looked at.
Of course, you could always ask your client how they would like vulnerabilities grouped. After all, the test is really for their benefit and they are the people paying! Some clients prefer to have a page detailing each vulnerability, with affected assets listed under the vulnerability title. This is useful in situations where separate teams may all have responsibilities for different areas of a single asset. For example, the systems team runs the webserver, but the development team writes the code for the application hosted on it.
Although I’ve mentioned the three most common audiences for pen test reports, this isn’t an exhaustive list. Once the report is handed over to the client, it’s up to them what they do with it. It may end up being presented to auditors, as evidence that certain controls are working. It could be presented to potential customers by the sales team. “Anyone can say their product is secure, but can they prove it? We can, look here is a pen test report”.
Reports might even end up getting shared with the whole organization. It sounds crazy, but it happens. I once performed a social engineering test, the results of which were less than ideal for the client. The enraged CEO shared the report with the whole organization, as a way of raising awareness of social engineering attacks. This was made more interesting, when I visited that same company a few weeks later to deliver some security awareness training. During my introduction, I explained that my company did security testing and was responsible for the social engineering test a few weeks back. This was greeted with angry stares and snide comments about how I’d gotten them all into trouble. My response was, as always, “better to give me your passwords than a genuine bad guy”.
What should the report contain?
Sometimes you’ll get lucky and the client will spell out exactly what they want to see in the report during the initial planning phase. This includes both content and layout. I’ve seen this happen to extreme levels of detail, such as what font size and line spacing settings should be used. However, more often than not, the client won’t know what they want and it’ll be your job to tell them.
So without further ado, here are some highly recommended sections to include in pen test reports.
A bad way to end an executive summary: “In conclusion, we have found some areas where security policy is working well, but other areas where it isn’t being followed at all. This leads to some risk, but not a critical amount of risk.”
A better way: “In conclusion, we have identified areas where security policy is not being adhered to, this introduces a risk to the organization and therefore we must declare the system as insecure.”
Getting the level of detail in a report right is a tricky business. I once wrote a report that was described as “overwhelming” because it was simply too detailed, so on my next test I wrote a less detailed report. This was subsequently rejected because it “lacked detail”. Talk about moving the goalposts. The best thing to do is spend time with the client, learn exactly who the audience will be and what they want to get out of the report.
When a pilot lands an airliner, their job isn’t over. They still have to navigate the myriad of taxiways and park at the gate safely. The same is true of you and your pen test reports, just because its finished doesn’t mean you can switch off entirely. You still have to get the report out to the client, and you have to do so securely. Electronic distribution using public key cryptography is probably the best option, but not always possible. If symmetric encryption is to be used, a strong key should be used and must be transmitted out of band. Under no circumstances should a report be transmitted unencrypted. It all sounds like common sense, but all too often people fall down at the final hurdle.
A lot of online security and anti-fraud checklists will tell you to check your credit rating with the credit rating reporting companies. This is a good idea, and, under certain conditions, you can often get such reports free of charge from the ratings companies.
However, you should never get involved with the promises of credit reports that come via spam.
Oddly, these credit report spam messages have very little content, other than a URL, or possibly a URL and some extra text (which usually doesn’t display) meant only to confuse the matter and get by spam filters. There are lots of these messages: today I got five in only one of my accounts.
I checked one out, very carefully. The reason to be careful is that you have no idea what is at the end of that URL. It could be a sales pitch. It could be an attempt to defraud you. It could be “drive-by” malware. In the case I tested, it redirected through four different sites before finally displaying something. Those four different sites could simply be there to make it harder to trace the spammers and fraudsters, but more likely they were each trying something: registering the fact that my email address was valid (and that there was a live “sucker” attached to it, worth attempting to defraud), installing malware, checking the software and services installed on my computer, and so forth.
It ended up at a site listing a number of financial services. The domain was “simply-finances.com.” One indication that this is fraudulent is that the ownership of this domain name is deeply buried. It appears to be registered through GoDaddy, which makes it hard to check out with a normal “whois” request: you have to go to GoDaddy themselves to get any information. Once there you find that it is registered through another company called Domains By Proxy, who exist solely to hide the ownership of domains. Highly suspicious, and no reputable financial company would operate in such a fashion.
The credit rating link sent me to a domain called “transunion.ca.” The .ca would indicate that this was for credit reporting in Canada, which makes sense, as that is where I live. (One of the redirection sites probably figured that out, and passed the information along.) However, that domain is registered to someone in Chicago. Therefore, it’s probably fraud: why would someone in Chicago have any insight on contacts for credit reporting for Canadians?
It’s probably fraudulent in any case. What I landed on was an offer to set me up for a service which, for $17 per month, would generate credit ratings reports. And, of course, it’s asking for lots of information about me, definitely enough to start identity theft. There is no way I am signing up for this service.
Again, checking out your own credit rating is probably a good idea, although it has to be done regularly, and it only really detects fraud after the fact. But going through offers via spam is an incredibly bad idea.
Spam filters are getting pretty good these days. If they weren’t, we’d be inundated.
But they aren’t perfect.
It’s a good idea to check what is being filtered out, every once in a while, to make sure that you are not missing messages you should be getting. Lots of things can falsely trigger spam filters these days.
Where and how you check will depend on what you use to read your email. And how you report that something is or isn’t spam will depend on that, too.
If you use the Web based email systems, like Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook/Hotmail, or others, and you use their Web interface, the spam folder usually is listed with other folders, generally to the left side of the browser window. And, when you are looking at that list, when you select one of the messages, somewhere on the screen, probably near the top, is a button to report that it isn’t spam.
It’s been a couple of weeks since I did this myself, so I checked two of my Webmail accounts this morning. Both of them had at least one message caught in the spam trap that should have been sent through. Spam filtering is good, but it isn’t perfect. You have to take responsibility for your own safety. And that means checking the things you use to keep you safe.
Yesterday I received an update for the Younited client–on the Win7 machine. The XP machine didn’t update, nor was there any option to do so.
This morning Younited won’t accept the password on the Win7 machine: it won’t log on. Actually, it seems to be randomly forgetting parts of the password. As with most programs, it doesn’t show the password (nor is there any option to show it), the password is represented by dots for the characters. But I’ll have seven characters entered (with seven dots showing), and, all of a sudden, only three dots will be showing. Or I’ll have entered ten, and suddenly there are only two.
My major test of the Younited drive took a few days, but it finally seems to have completed. In a less than satisfactory manner.
I “synched” a directory on my machine with the Younited drive. As noted, the synching ran for at least two days. (My mail and Web access was noticeably slow during that time.) The original directory, with subdirectories, contained slightly under 7 Gigs of material (the quota for basic Younited drives is said to be 10 G) in slightly under 2,800 files. The transfer progress now shows 5,899 files transferred, and I’m out of space.
A quick check shows that not all files are on the Younited drive.