REVIEW – “The Florentine Deception”, Carey Nachenberg

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BKFLODEC.RVW   20150609

“The Florentine Deception”, Carey Nachenberg, 2015, 978-1-5040-0924-9,
%A   Carey Nachenberg
%C   345 Hudson Street, New York, NY   10014
%D   2015
%G   978-1-5040-0924-9 150400924X
%I   Open Road Distribution
%O   U$13.49/C$18.91
%O   Audience n+ Tech 3 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   321 p.
%T   “The Florentine Deception”

It gets depressing, after a while.  When you review a bunch of books on the basis of the quality of the technical information, books of fiction are disappointing.  No author seems interested in making sure that the technology is in any way realistic.  For every John Camp, who pays attention to the facts, there are a dozen Dan Browns who just make it up as they go along.  For every Toni Dwiggins, who knows what she is talking about, there are a hundred who don’t.

So, when someone like Carey Nachenberg, who actually works in malware research, decides to write a story using malicious software as a major plot device, you have to be interested.  (And besides, both Mikko Hypponen and Eugene Spafford, who know what they are talking about, say it is technically accurate.)

I will definitely grant that the overall “attack” is technically sound.  The forensics and anti-forensics makes sense.  I can even see young geeks with more dollars than sense continuing to play “Nancy Drew” in the face of mounting odds and attackers.  That a vulnerability can continue to go undetected for more than a decade would ordinarily raise a red flag, but Nachenberg’s premise is realistic (especially since I know of a vulnerability at that very company that went unfixed for seven years after they had been warned about it).  That a geek goes rock-climbing with a supermodel we can put down to poetic licence (although it may increase the licence rates).  I can’t find any flaws in the denouement.

But.  I *cannot* believe that, in this day and age, *anyone* with a background in malware research would knowingly stick a thumb/jump/flash/USB drive labelled “Florentine Controller” into his, her, or its computer.  (This really isn’t an objection: it would only take a couple of pages to have someone run up a test to make sure the thing was safe, but …)

Other than that, it’s a joy to read.  It’s a decent thriller, with some breaks to make it relaxing rather than exhausting (too much “one damn thing after another” gets tiring), good dialogue, and sympathetic characters.  The fact that you can trust the technology aids in the “willing suspension of disbelief.”

While it doesn’t make any difference to the quality of the book, I should mention that Carey is donating all author profits from sales of the book to charity:

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2015   BKFLODEC.RVW   20150609

REVIEW: “Security for Service Oriented Architectures”, Walter Williams

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“Security for Service Oriented Architectures”, Walter Williams, 2014,
978-1466584020, U$61.97
%A Walter Williams
%C #300 – 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
%D 2014
%G 978-1466584020 1466584025
%I CRC Press
%O U$61.97 800-272-7737
%O Audience i+ Tech 2 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P 329 p.
%T “Security for Service Oriented Architectures”

Walt Williams is one of the sporadic, but thoughtful, posting members of the international CISSP Forum. He has come up with a significant text on an important topic.

After some preface and introduction, the book starts in chapter two, defining the four kinds of architecture in computer systems: infrastructure, software, data, and security. This chapter covers foundational concepts, as well as service oriented architecture SOA), and is, alone, worth the price of the book.

Chapter three, on implementation, comprises the bulk of the space in the work, and is primarily of interest to those dealing with development, although it does have a number of points and observations of use to the manager or security practitioner. “Web 2.0” (chapter four) has some brief points on those advanced usages. A variety of additional SOA platforms are examined in chapter five. Chapter six, on the auditing of SOA applications, covers not only the how, but also notes specific types of attacks, and the most appropriate auditing tools for each case. Much the same is done, in terms of more general protection, in chapter seven. Chapter eight, simply entitled “Architecture,” finishes off with sample cases.

It is an unfortunate truism that most security professionals do not know enough about programming, and most programmers don’t care anything about security. This is nowhere truer than in service oriented architecture and “the cloud,” where speed of release and bolt-on functionality trumps every other consideration. Williams’ work is almost alone in a badly under-served field. Despite a lack of competition, it is a worthy introduction. I can recommend this book to anyone involved in either security or development, particularly those working in that nebulous concept known as “the cloud.”

copyright, Robert M. Slade 2015 BKSECSOA.RVW 20150130

REVIEW: “The Social Life of Information”, John Seely Brown/Paul Duguid

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BKSCLFIN.RVW   20130124

“The Social Life of Information”, John Seely Brown/Paul Duguid, 2000,
0-87584-762-5, U$24.95
%A   John Seely Brown
%A   Paul Duguid
%C   60 Harvard Way, Boston MA   02163
%D   2000
%G   0-87584-762-5
%I   Harvard Business School Press
%O   U$25.95 617-495-6947 617-495-6700 617-495-6117 800-545-7685
%O   Audience n+ Tech 2 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   320 p.
%T   “The Social Life of Information”

The introduction is vague, but basically notes that those who approach information in a strictly technical or business sense risk failure by ignoring the social context in which information resides.  Information does not exist of itself, but is produced and consumed by people, and thus is a construct and artifact of our social environment.

Chapter one talks about information overload.  Bots are discussed in chapter two: not the botnets (simple programs distributed over multiple computers) that everyone agrees should be eliminated, but the range of software agents that we use without thinking.  The authors note that the interactions between these bots are inherently impossible to control, and the material prophecies the recent problems in content blocking such as affected the Hugo awards and Michelle Obama.  Chapter three examines various social issues of home (or non-office) -based work.  The difference between our processes, and the way people actually work, are addressed in chapter four.  A number of interesting ideas are raised, but it is (ironically) difficult to see how to put these into practice (rather than discussion of what we should do).  Chapter five turns to learning and knowledge management.  The authors assert that learning is primarily social, and note negative effects on business if this aspect is ignored, but actually say very little about learning or information.  Chapter six explores innovation in respect to the Internet and a global economy, noting that information is difficult to control in that it is both “sticky” (resistant to change) and “leaky” (incidental disclosures of “confidential” information abound).  The “background” of information is noted in chapter seven, with the authors examining the resilience of paper in the face of a determined effort to create the “paperless” office.  They note studies showing that “printing” out email seemed to automatically give the data greater weight.  (I wonder if this might have changed in today’s marketplace: sadly, a rather large proportion of people now seem to hold that *anything* found on the Internet, regardless of how silly, must be true.)  Chapter eight, entitled “Re-education,” discusses the changing nature of universities.

There is an afterword, “Beyond Information,” touching on miscellaneous points, particularly to do with copyright.

Despite a certain lack of structure or purpose to some of the sections, the writing is both clear and entertaining.  It also has that ineffable quality of readability, meaning that the reading is enjoyable even when the authors are not delivering specifically interesting information, or making a vital point in an argument.  It’s a joy simply to consume the text.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2013   BKSCLFIN.RVW   20130124

AV is dead … again …

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Antivirus software only catches 45% of malware attacks and is “dead”, according to a senior manager at Symantec.”

85.4% of statistic can be interpreted in the opposite way, and AV has been declared dead regularly since 1987.

Symantec “invented commercial antivirus software in the 1980s”?  That must come as news to the many companies, like Sophos, that I was reviewing long before Symantec bought out their first AV company.

“Dye told the Wall Street Journal that hackers increasingly use novel methods and bugs in the software of computers to perform attacks.”

There were “novel attacks” in 1986, and they got caught.  There have been novel attacks every year or so since, and they’ve been caught.  At the same time, lots of people get attacked and fail to detect it.  There’s never a horse that couldn’t be rode, and there’s never a rider that couldn’t be throwed.

“Malware has become increasingly complex in a post-Stuxnet world.”

So have computers.  Even before Stuxnet.  I think it was Grace Hopper who said that the reason it is difficult to secure complex systems is because they are complex systems.  (And she died a while back.)