Posts byJuha-Matti

Security consultant from Finland

MBR rootkit – here’s some references

Prevx Blog has a good writeup located at…

SANS Internet Storm Center has released an interesting timeline story – link here.

From the post based to Verisign iDefense data:


  • Oct. 30, 2007 – Original version of MBR rootkit written and tested by attackers
  • Dec. 12, 2007 – First known attacks installing MBR code
    about 1,800 users infected in four days.

McAfee detects the Trojan as StealthMBR (DAT 5204 or above) and Symantec as Trojan.Mebroot. Sophos uses name Troj/Mbroot-A, in turn. There are names like Trojan.Win32.Agent.dsj and TROJ_AGENT.APA assigned too.

10th Jan: Trend Micro uses the name TROJ_SINOWAL.AD
12th Jan: Symantec sees the infected MBR as Boot.Mebroot. McAfee uses the name StealthMBR!rootkit too.

Facebook’s My Admirer is gone – and was there spyware at all?

My Admirer application (previously known as Secret Crush) has been removed from Facebook now. The installation process was canceled during the weekend, but now it is finally gone.

Fortinet reported about the Zango spyware installation related to this application last week. The issue was described in this SecuriTeam post.

Response from Zango Inc. is interesting to read – link to the Zango blog here.

From the post:

At no point in adding the Secret Crush widget to a Facebook profile does the widget install either spyware or Zango software, or even attempt to do so. Any suggestion that Zango software is being “secretly installed” is simply not true.

It appears that there was no automatic installation of spyware at all.

My name is Zango, I am spyware and I found Facebook applications

The first spyware spreading with Facebook application has been discovered. Security company Fortinet reports that application called Secret Crush is installing Zango (aka AdWare.Win32.180Solution) with Iframe, technically from

Shortly, this is the spreading mechanism:

In opening the request, the recipient is informed that one of his/her friends has invited him/her to find out more information by using “Secret Crush” (this happens frequently with Facebook’s Platform Application). [Figure 2] exhibits the social engineering speech employed by the malicious widget to get the user to install it.

The text included to the request entry is “One of Your Friends Might Have a Crush on You!”. Additionally, the buttons are ‘Find Out Who!’ and typical ‘Ignore’.
It appears that Secret Crush is not included to Facebook Application Directory (no log-in needed) any more. Reportedly FortiGuard Team has informed Facebook guys and probably the application has been disabled already.

Update 4th Jan: The application mentioned is located here (renamed to My Admirer), still accessible and has “50,708 daily active users i.e. 4% of total”.

The exact number of affected users is not available.

Cryptome: NSA has real-time access to Hushmail servers

A frequent source ‘A’ sending updated NSA-Affiliated IP resources to Cryptome’s Web site has reported the following new information:

Certain privacy/full session SSL email hosting services have been purchased/changed operational control by NSA and affiliates within the past few months, through private intermediary entities.

Reportedly the following services are controlled:

Hushmail – based in Canada,
Guardster – based in USA,
and – based in Israel.

Link here: NSA Controls SSL Email Hosting Services

Update 22nd Dec: Guardster Team has posted its response on 21st Dec to Cryptome:

We can assure you that we do not cooperate with the NSA or any other government agency anywhere in the world. We invite whomever is making this statement to provide proof, rather than making a baseless accusation.

Response from Team (24th Dec) is the following:

1. We never had any contacts, direct or indirect, with the NSA or any other
government agency anywhere in the world.
2. All software we use is in-house development.
3. We have never shared our technology with any other party.

Update 30th Dec: Hushmail Team has posted its response yesterday to Cryptome’s Web site:

Hush Communications Corporation, the company that provides the email service, is not owned, wholly or in part, by any government agency.

Additionally, ‘More info on industry Windows security software’ has been released:

Zone Alarm, Symantec, MacAfee: All facilitate Microsoft’s NSA-controlled remote admin access via IP/TCP ports 1024 through 1030; ie will allow access without security flag. Unknown whether or not software port forward routing by these same programs will defeat NSA access.

The post released in on 1st Nov informed about the future updates with details related to this issue and this is the first piece of information.

To the new readers: Cryptome: NSA has access to Windows Mobile smartphones

The number of unpatched QuickTime flaws is: two

The number of recent QuickTime PoC’s is remarkable large and the active exploitation has begun as well, as many of the readers know.

However, the QuickTime RTSP vulnerability reported on 23th Nov is not the only one.

It appears that WabiSabiLabi team has reported that there is another (they call it zero-day vuln) flaw in Apple’s QuickTime player too.

This is what their blog post states:

We just want to specify that the vulnerability shown on those POCs IS NOT the one present in our marketplace.

They are pointing to PoCs listed at Milw0rm etc.

And a summary:

The first issue reported by Krystian Kloskowski (aka h07) is CVE-2007-6166 – CVSS score 9.3. For workarounds see US-CERT VU#659761.

The second issue reported by unknown person is CVE-2007-6238 – CVSS score 10.0. Reportedly ‘Affected system: Windows XP’.

Fact of the week: iPhone widgets doesn’t send IMEI

I’m sure there are people not aware of the recent state of Apple iPhone IMEI case.
It was reported by UNEASYsilence blog (pointing to the older forum post of that “Stocks” and “Weather” widgets send the IMEI number to Cupertino.

I.e. like this:

The fact is, however, that the string being sent is not the International Mobile Equipment Identity code.

Reference: day after.en.html

What the widget sends is UUID code (Universally Unique Identifier).

Hey, IMEI has 15 characters (and only numbers) and UUID has 32 characters.

Mozilla still working on JAR: protocol flaw

It was 11 day ago when JAR: protocol vulnerability in Firefox was reported by pdp.

According to Bugzilla entry #369814 upcoming Firefox (tests done with Gecko/2007111504) are immune to this vulnerability.

A Mozilla Security Blog entry posted by Mozilla security chief Window Snyder has been released too.

However, as a workaround NoScript version and later may prevent this vulnerability from being exploited, as US-CERT VU#715737 states.

The fact is that the Bugzilla report mentioned was filed as security sensitive on 8th Feb already. The disclosure of Petkov made it public.