First big break-in of the year

Richard Stiennon writes:

I have only one security related prediction for 2012 and that is that we are in for a year that will make 2011 look tame in terms of major targeted attacks.

He gives the 2011 examples of the break-in to Sony playstation network and an attack on Stratfor (a defense intelligence organization). Here’s one from yesterday: A saudi attacker published the details of credit cards (and other personal information such as I.D numbers and address) for hundreds of thousands Israelis.

Going to be a fun year!

Easy login into Korean Point-of-Sale device

Some things are cross-culture it seems. Especially when it comes to trivial security mishaps.
So I’m at a PoS terminal in a large department store in Seoul and while I’m waiting for the register to ring up my order, I look at the touchscreen where I will be asked for my signature in a moment. I notice a little icon that looks like ‘settings’. How can I not click on it?

Initial PoS screen
Oh, it needs a password. Must be this PCI compliance thing everybody is raving about. And no, wiseass, 1-2-3-4-5 doesn’t work.

Asking for password

…But 1-2-3-4 does.

Password

Yup. Unlocked.
Now I need to polish up my Korean to figure out what to do next. Suggestions?

Menu Screen

Sorry for the full disclosure guys. And that includes all of you that now need to change your luggage combination.

The political risks of a DDoS

In Korea, the ruling party performed a DDoS attack, and as result the chairman and most of its officials will resign. Most likely, it will be disbanded completely.
This is probably the most severe result of a cyber attack yet. Of course, the only reason they know who to blame, is because the guy responsible for the attack admitted guilt. DDoS is all fun and games until the guy you hired to do it spills the beans.

The truth behind the Opera unpatched vulnerability

How hard is it to get facts straight? I don’t expect vendors to admit they sat on a vulnerability for months without patching: it’s human nature to blame someone else:

Opera […] claims that it couldn’t replicate the issue at the time. According to the vendor, its attempts to obtain more information from the researcher at the time weren’t successful.

Of course, when dealing with vendors, it’s always “the dog ate my homework” and “I swear we couldn’t reproduce it until it became public”
But I’m puzzled on why a technical reporter would just happily accept what’s being shoveled at him. For one, he could have contacted us and asked…

Here’s what really happened: We notified Opera about this vulnerability back in May. We gave them the Proof-of-Concept, disassembly, explanation and vulnerability analysis. So saying they did not have the full information is far from the truth. We didn’t ask for anything in return (we never do) but I admit we were skeptical based on previous experience with reporting vulnerabilities to Opera.
Then came the Million dollar question; we were asked if it worked on the latest version of Opera, and we said we don’t know. Since last time I checked, no one here worked for the Opera QA team, so we didn’t feel it was our job to check it. The response was typical:
“We only fix issues that are relevant to the latest version of Opera”

Followed by the all-too-common:”the items provided only cause crashes they have no intention to fix them”.

I guess they meant “we won’t fix them unless you drop a 0-day and we get a call from a computer magazine”.The Vendors-against-full-disclosure will continue, no doubt. Tech writers, get your spines refitted please: if you’re not a part of the solution, you’re a part of the problem.