On the CISSPforum we were discussing precepts for getting along and keeping the discussions meaningful.  Somebody started listing rules, so I started casting them as haikus.  That prompted a few more.

I wondered if these were only for that group, but then realized most of them were applicable to online discussions of whatever type.  So, herewith:

Create your own space
Meaningful content only
Comes to those who post.

Silence calls silence
Lurkers don’t disturb quiet
Sleep beckons as well.

The posts are boring?
Raise topic of interest
Thread starter lauded.

Forum like sewer:
What you get out of forum
Depends on input.

Being creative
Is much better than being
Tagged as complainer.

These are your colleagues.
Why are you so much  better
That they must start first?

The forum that is
Is not what must always be.
Build a better world.

Friday is not for
Building new realities.
Your colleagues would sleep.

Then some other chimed in:

I remember trust
It disappeared so quickly
I guess we were fools

Pointing to resource
Always appreciated
Who can search the whole?

Putting platitudes
into pleasing haiku
removes sting of truth

Now you’re getting it.
Format is everything.  (Well,
And maybe context 

friday gratitude
is here at last for resting
ignoring infosec

Friday at last! Time for
Bottles of overpriced wine.
Why’m I still at work???

Request not correct.
Reformat for this thread.
Please resubmit now.

UNSUBSCRPTION post
Jangles cosmic harmonies
Til balance achieved.

From various forums, mailing lists, discussions and other sources (many of which exist only in my febrile imagination), herewith a bit of a compilation of mottoes that can be used as part of a security awareness campaign:

No-one in Africa wants to GIVE anyone their money or gold.

Microsoft/Google/a Russian oil magnate/VW/BMW/etc certainly does not want to GIVE anyone money/a car/etc.

A stunning Russian blonde DOES NOT want to marry you.

If it sounds too good to be true, IT IS.

A web site, Email message, IM or tweet that tells you you need to install security software IS LYING.

Just because it’s in a Google search result or an “ad by Google” does NOT mean it is safe.

If the options seem to be “Click OK/Run/Install” or “turn off the computer”, TURN OFF THE COMPUTER.

Did your friend really send you that message?

Is your friend really as smart about computer security as you think?
A. No    B. Not at all    C. Well and truly not    D. All the above

You didn’t win the Irish lottery.

Your bank doesn’t want you to change your password.

Don’t be Phish Phood.

Pwnly Phools Phall for Phishing.

Think, THINK every click.

Need extra money?  Want to work from home?  Getting a job from a spammer is NOT A GOOD IDEA!!!

When did you last make a backup?  Do you want to do [period of time] worth of work all over again?

Report the suspicious, not the strange.

If the bank thinks your online account has been hacked, they won’t warn you by email.

Being sociable doesn’t mean being totally open. Be careful what you disclose via social media.

If someone wants/offers to make something really easy for you, there is a way that can be used against you.

Hide your ‘cheese’ (get a router).

A patch a day keeps hackers away (keep your OS and apps up to date).

Always wear a helmet (install a firewall/antivirus package).

The great unknown ain’t so great (only use software you can trust).

Use sunscreen to prevent burns (lock down your OS and apps).

Make 007 jealous (learn to use additional security tools).

“Password” is not a password (use strong passwords).

Keep your skeletons in the closet (protect your personal data).

Don’t be a dork (be smart when you’re on-line).

Keep your dukes up (stay informed and vigilant).

Infosec is like a sewer: what you get out of it, depends on what you put into it.

Some are recently from the #InfosecMotherlyAdvice tag on Twitter:

Don’t click … it’ll get infected.

Don’t take cookies from strangers.

Idle systems are a botnet’s playground.

A backup in hand is worth two in the cloud.

While you’re connected to my network you’ll live by my firewall rule.

A backup a day keeps data loss away.

We’d better get you a bigger firewall – you’ll grow into it.

Close the security holes, you’re letting all our sensitive data out.

If your system gets compromised and crashes, don’t come emailing to me.

Always encrypt your data. you never know when you’ll have an accident.

If everybody else clicked on links in emails, would you do that too?

Either you’re inside the firewall, or outside the firewall! Don’t leave it open!

Install your patches if you want your security to grow up big and strong.

Don’t put that in your browser, you don’t know where it’s been.

Someday your bluescreen will freeze like that!

It’s all fun and games until someone loses sensitive data.

Only you can prevent Internet meltdowns.

Recently, on the CISSPforum, there was some discussion of the new, third edition of the Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK (which, I note, is pretending to be available as an ebook for only ten bucks).  At the end of one post, one of the correspondents stated that he was “leaning towards buying the new book.”

First, lemme say that, for those who haven’t yet got the cert, I do recommend the “Official Guide” as my first choice.  (Harris is easier to read, but does contain *lots* of errors, and I tell my seminar candidates that I refuse to answer any question that starts out “Shon Harris says …”  

However, on the other hand … why would anyone who has the cert buy the guide?  Of course, I am speaking from the perspective of someone who does read the source literature (and I am aware that all too many of my colleagues do not).

I also recall at least two seminar attendees who actually did have the cert.  Furthermore, they were consultants, and thus going on their own dime for the course.  The reason given was the same: they charged by the hour, so any time spent upgrading was time they could not charge.  Therefore, regularly attending the seminar was the fastest, and therefore, in their situation cheapest, way to ensure they were current.

So, yes, I can see that some people would want to get the guide as a quick check.  (In that regard, I would tend to recommend ISMH instead of the guide, but …)  But I still find it kind of odd …

And in other news, Gunter Ollman joins in the debate as to whether Imperva’s quasi-testing is worth citing (just about) and, with more enthusiasm, whether AV is worth paying for or even still breathing. If you haven’t come across Ollman’s writings on the topic before, it won’t surprise you that the answer is no. If you haven’t, he’s thoughtfully included several other links to articles where he’s given us the benefit of his opinions.

If it’s free, never ever bothers me with popups, and I never need to know it’s there, then it’s not worth the effort uninstalling it and I guess it can stay…

Ollman notes:

In particular there was great annoyance that a security vendor (representing an alternative technology) used VirusTotal coverage as their basis for whether or not new malware could be detected – claiming that initial detection was only 5%.

However, he doesn’t trouble himself to explain why the anti-malware industry (and VirusTotal itself) are so annoyed, or to comment on Imperva’s squirming following those criticisms. Nor does he risk exposing any methodology of his own to similar criticism, when he claims that:

desktop antivirus detection typically hovers at 1-2% … For newly minted malware that is designed to target corporate victims, the rate is pretty much 0% and can remain that way for hundreds of days after the malware has been released in to the wild.

Apparently he knows this from his own experience, so there’s no need to justify the percentages. And by way of distraction from this sleight of hand, he introduces ‘a hunchbacked Igor’ whom he visualizes ‘bolting on an iron plate for reinforcement to the Frankenstein corpse of each antivirus product as he tries to keep it alive for just a little bit longer…’ Amusing enough, I suppose, at any rate if you don’t know how hard those non-stereotypes in real anti-malware labs work at generating proactive detections for malware we haven’t seen yet and multi-layered protection. But this is about cheap laughs at the expense of an entire industry sector that Ollman regards as reaping profits that should be going to IOActive. Consider this little exchange on Twitter.

@virusbtn
Imperva’s research on desktop anti-virus has stirred a fierce debate. @gollmann: bit.ly/XE76eS @dharleyatESET: bit.ly/13e1TJW

@gollmann
@virusbtn @dharleyatESET I don’t know about “fierce”. It’s like prodding roadkill with a stick.

What are we, 12 years old? Fortunately, other tweeters seem to be seeing through this juvenilia.

@jarnomn
@gollmann @virusbtn @dharleyatESET Again just methaphors and no data. This conversation is like trainwreck in slow motion

The comments to the blog are also notable for taking a more balanced view: Jarno succinctly points to VirusTotal’s own view on whether its service is a realistic guide to detection performance, Kurt Wismer puts his finger unerringly on the likely bias of Ollman”s nebulous methodology, and Jay suggests that Ollman lives in a slightly different (ideal) world (though he puts a little more politely than that). But no doubt the usual crop of AV haters, Microsoft haters, Mac and Linux advocates, scammers, spammers and downright barmpots will turn up sooner or later.

There is, in fact, a rational debate to be held on whether AV – certainly raw AV with no multi-layering bells and whistles – should be on the point of extinction. The rate of detection for specialized, targeted malware like Stuxnet is indeed very low, with all-too-well-known instances of low-distribution but high-profile malware lying around undetected for years. (It helps if such malware is aimed at parts of the world where most commercial AV cannot legally reach.) And Gunter Ollman is quite capable of contributing a great deal of expertise and experience to it. But right now, it seems to me that he and Imperva’s Tal Be’ery are, for all their glee at the presumed death of anti-virus, a pair of petulantly twittering budgies trying to pass themselves off as vultures.

David Harley
AVIEN/Small Blue-Green World/Mac Virus/Anti-Malware Testing
ESET Senior Research Fellow

PCAVAST7.RVW   20120727
Comparison Review

Company and product:

Company: ALWIL Software
Address: Trianon Office Bldg, Budejovicka 1518/13a, 140 00, Prague 4
Phone:   00 420 274 005 777
Fax:     00 420 274 005 888
Sales:   +42-2-782-25-47
Contact: Kristyna Maz nkov /Pavel Baudis/Michal Kovacic
Email:   mazankova@avast.com baudis@asw.cz
Other:   http://www.avast.com
Product: AVAST! antiviral

Summary: Multilayered Windows package

Cost: unknown

Rating (1-4, 1 = poor, 4 = very good)
“Friendliness”
Installation      3
Ease of use       4
Help systems      1
Compatibility           3
Company
Stability         3
Support           2
Documentation           1
Hardware required       3
Performance             3
Availability            3
Local Support           1

General Description:

Multilayered scanning, activity-monitoring, and change-detection software.  Network protection including Web and email monitoring.

Comparison of features and specifications

User Friendliness

Installation

The product is available as a commercial package, but also as a free download for home or non-commerecial use.  As previously noted in other reviews, this is highly desirable not simply as a marketing and promotional effort by the company, but because making malware protection available to the general public reduces the malware threat for the entire computing and network environment.  One important
aspect is that the free version, unlike some antivirus products which reduce available functions, appears to be complete.  Scanning, disinfection, network protection, reporting, and management functions all seem to be included in the free version, making Avast a highly recommended product among free downloads.

I downloaded the free version, and installed it with no problem.  It was compatible with Windows 7, as well as previous versions.  The basic installation and configuration provides realistic protection, even for completely naive users.

Ease of use

With ten basic, and a larger number of minor, functions now included in the program, the interface is no longer very easy to figure out.  For example, one of the first things I (as a specialist) need to do is to turn off scanning of my “zoo” directory.  I initially thought this might be under the large “Maintenance” button.  No, “maintenance” is reserved for upgrading and buying additional features.  I did finally find the function I wanted under a much smaller “Settings” tab.  However, as noted, most users will not require any additional functions, and need not worry about the operation of the program.  The default settings provide decent protection, and updating of signatures, and even the basic program, is almost automatic.  (The updates for the free version do push the user to “upgrade” to the commercial version, but it is not necessary.)

I located (eventually) some great functions in the program which I found very helpful.  Admittedly, I’m a very special case, since I research malware.  But I really appreciated the fact that not only could I turn scanning off for a particular directory (my “zoo”), and that I could pull programs out of the quarantine easily, but that I could also turn off individual network protection functions, very easily.  Not only could I turn them off, but I was presented with options to stop for 10 minutes, 1 hour, until the next reboot, or permanently.  Therefore, I could turn off the protection for a quick check, and not have to remember to turn it on again for regular work and browsing.

However, I cannot commend Avast for some of the reporting and logging functions.  Late in the review period it reported an “infected” page, but refused to tell me where/what it is.  In addition, recently Avast has been blocking some of my email, and the message that an email has been blocked is the only available information.

Help systems

Help is available onscreen, but it is not easy to find.  There is no help button on the main screen: you have to choose “? Support,” and then, from a list of six items choose the last one, “Program Help.”  (The standard Windows F1 key does bring up the help function.)  Most other help is only available online via the Web, although there is a downloadable PDF manual.

Compatibility

The system scores well in malware detection ratings from independent tests.  I have been running Avast for over a year, and have not seen a false positive in a scan of the computer system.  I have observed only one false positive blockage of “known good” Websites or email, although this is of some concern since it involved the updating of another malware package under test.

Company Stability

Avast has been operating (previously as Alwil Software) for over twenty years.  The program structure is thoughtful and shows mature development.

Company Support

As noted, most is via the Web.  Unfortunately, in the recent case of a false positive the company, even though I had alerted them to the details of both the review and the warning I had noted, there was no useful response.  I received email stating that someone would review the situation and get back to me, but there was no further response.

Documentation

The documentation available for download is primarily for installation and marketing.

System Requirements

The system should run on most extent Windows machines.

Performance

The antivirus system has minimal impact on the computer system.  When performing a full scan, there are other programs that run faster, but Avast runs very well unattended.

As noted above, the free version has complete and very useful functionality.

Local Support

None provided.

Support Requirements

Basic operation and scanning should be accessible to the novice or average user.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1995, 2012   PCAVAST7.RVW   20120727

In the spirit of many infosec and antivirus company “announcements” of “new threats” in the past year:

A leading (if unemployed) information security and malware researcher, today noted startling developments (which were first mentioned in 1988, but we’ll leave out that bit) in cross-platform malware.

Dubbed the “metavirus,” this threat could completely swamp the Internet, and render literally billions of computers useless.  The chief researcher at the Vancouver Institute for Research into User Security has found that these entities can be created by almost anyone, even without programming knowledge or skills.  “This doesn’t even require a malware kit,” said Rob Slade, who has “discovered” this unregarded vulnerability.

Although the number of metavirus “families” are very small, in comparison to the millions of viruses, worms, and trojans discovered yearly, they are remarkably resistant to disinfection.  Infections tend to be clustered, and can affect almost all machines in an infected company, network or group.

“This is definitely cross-platform,” said Slade.  “It doesn’t rely on a specific operating system, program, or even virtual machine, like Java.”  Infections have jumped between Windows, Mac, Linux, iPhones, Android, and even CP/M and VMS machines.  Transmission can occur via email, sneakernet, wireless, and even phone and fax.  In all cases productivity is affected as time is lost.  In one class of the threat machines can be rendered inoperable.

Rob Slade can be made available for presentations on how to deal with this enormous threat.  Anyone wanting to protect themselves can send first class airfare, proof of prepaid hotel accommodation, and a bank draft for $15,000 deposit.  (US or Canadian dollars, whichever is higher at the time 

1. Mastery of an operating system. I can’t stress how important it is. So many people want to become hackers or systems security experts, without actually knowing the systems they’re supposed to be hacking or securing. It’s common knowledge that once you’re on a target/victim, you need to somewhat put on the hat of a sysadmin. After all, having root means nothing if you don’t know what to do with root. How can you cover your tracks if you don’t even know where you’ve left tracks? If you don’t know the OS in detail, how can you possibly know everywhere things are logged?
2. Good knowledge of networking and network protocols. Being able to list the OSI model DOES NOT qualify as knowing networking and network protocols. You must know TCP in and out. Not just that it stands for Transmission Control Protocol, but actually know that structure of the packet, know what’s in it, know how it works in detail. A good place to start is TCP/IP Illustrated by W. Richard Stevens (either edition works). Know the difference between TCP and UDP. Understand routing, be able to in detail describe how a packet gets from one place to another. Know how DNS works, and know it in detail. Understand ARP, how it’s used, why it’s used. Understand DHCP. What’s the process for getting an automatic IP address? What happens when you plug in? What type of traffic does your NIC generate when it’s plugged in and tries to get an automatically assigned address? Is it layer 2 traffic? Layer 3 traffic?
3. If you don’t understand the things in item 2, then you can’t possibly understand how an ARP Spoof or a MiTM attack actually works. In short how can you violate or manipulate a process, if you don’t even know how the process works, or worse, you don’t even know the process exists! Which brings me to the next point. In general you should be curious as to how things work. I’ve evaluated some awesome products in the last 10 years, and honestly, after I see it work, the first thing that comes to my mind is “how does it work”.
4. Learn some basic scripting. Start with something simple like vbs or Bash. As a matter of fact, I’ll be posting a “Using Bash Scripts to Automate Recon” video tonight. So if you don’t have anywhere else to start, you can start there! Eventually you’ll want to graduate from scripting and start learning to actually code/program or in short write basic software (hello world DOES NOT count).
5. Get yourself a basic firewall, and learn how to configure it to block/allow only what you want. Then practice defeating it. You can find cheap used routers and firewalls on ebay, or maybe ask your company for old ones. Start with simple ACL’s on a router. Learn how to scan past them using basic IP spoofing and other simple techniques. There’s not better way to understand these concepts than to apply them. Once you’re mastered this, you can move to a PIX, or ASA and start the process over again. Start experimenting with trying to push Unicode through it, and other attacks. Spend time on this site and other places to find info on doing these things. Really the point is to learn to do them.
6. Know some forensics! This will only make you better at covering your tracks. The implications should be obvious.
7. Eventually learn a programming language, then learn a few more. Don’t go and by a “How to program in C” book or anything like that. Figure out something you want to automate, or think of something simple you’d like to create. For example, a small port scanner. Grab a few other port scanners (like nmap), look at the source code, see if you can figure any of it out. Then ask questions on forums and other places. Trust me, it’ll start off REALLY shaky, but just keep chugging away!
8. Have a desire and drive to learn new stuff. This is a must; It’s probably more important than everything else listed here. You need to be willing to put in some of your own time (time you’re not getting paid for), to really get a handle on things and stay up to date.
9. Learn a little about databases, and how they work. Go download mysql, read some of the tutorials on how to create simple sample databases. I’m not saying you need to be a DB expert, but knowing the basic constructs help.
10. Always be willing to interact and share your knowledge with like minded professionals and other smart people. Some of the most amazing hackers I know have jobs like pizza delivery, janitorial, one is a marketing exec, another is actually an MD. They do this strictly because they love to. And one thing I see in them all is their excitement and willingness to share what they’ve learned with people who actually care to listen and are interested in the same.

Keatron Evans is a Senior Instructor for InfoSec Institute. InfoSec Institute is a security certification company that has trained over 15,000 people including popular CEH and CCNA certification courses.

I recently re-upped with Bell Canada for cell phone service.  I bought new phones and upgraded the plan to include “unlimited” text messaging (since that’s how the grandkids mostly communicate).  The plan I got  is supposed to include picture and video messaging.

In order to use the picture messaging I am told, by both the kiosk and telephone personnel, to turn on the cellular data (not wifi: I’ve been a communications specialist for 30 years and I know the difference) connection on the phone.  Every time I do that I am charged $5.00 for “Pay per use flex data Data Usage.”

Each time I can get it reversed, but I have to spend 20 minutes getting through to an agent on the phone in order to do so.  (All the telephone agents initially insist that this is a “mobile browsing” charge, and I have to point out that I have turned off every app on the phone every time I try this.)

I am not being given the services it stipulates on my contract.

Right now I’m on the phone with Bell’s telephone “support.”  She’s already tried to get rid of me once by claiming to call “technical support.”  When I asked to speak to a supervisor, the agent did the same thing, but eventually put me through to “Puneet.”

I have spoken with supervisor “Puneet.”  She will not answer the simple question of how to access the services I am paying for.  Her only answer is that I upgrade to a data plan.

Therefore Bell is lying in it’s contract stating that I have access to picture and video messages.

Puneet has also just told me that Bell will no longer reverse or adjust any charges for using the picture messaging.

(Puneet did make one rather damaging admission late in the call: she did admit that, actually, Bell has no way to tell what the “Pay per use flex data Data Usage” is.  It could be updating.  It could be mobile browsing.  It could be Twitter.  It could, also, be the picture and video messaging for which I’m not supposed to be charged …)

Mom and my little sister were supposed to go on a cruise over Christmas.  The first leg of their flight to the embarkation port was cancelled when a door wouldn’t close.  The storm in the midwest, and the consequent meltdown of the North American air travel system, put paid to any chance of getting re-routed.  So they didn’t go.

The door that wouldn’t close on the first flight wasn’t an outside door, it was the cockpit door.  Mom was peeved.  Most people would have complained about the security policy that prevents takeoff without a locked cabin door.  Not Mom.  Her take was that there were lots of security guards around the airport, and that they could have just got one to stand in the doorway for the flight.

Risks of Risk Assessment in Multiple Small Illumination Sources During Winter Conditions
Robert M. Slade, version 1.0, 20121220

Testing can be used to demonstrate the presence of bugs, but never their absence.
- testing aphorism

ABSTRACT

As follow-up research to the study “Risk Assessment and Failure Analysis in Multiple Small Illumination Sources During Winter Conditions” (first published in 2003, and available in the RISKS Digest), the author has undertaken a multi-year study attempting to reduce the level and risks of failure in the illumination network required for celebration of the Northern Hemisphere Mid-Winter Party Period and Gift Giving Season.  (The nodes in this network currently stand at approximately 900 sources, and a significant portion may be noted at Twitter.)

Testing of nodes (also known as “bulbs”) and subnets (also known as “strings”) has been a major component of the risk reduction strategy.  However, recent studies have indicated that testing itself may be a contributing factor in node and subnet failures.

INTRODUCTION

In terms of risk management, it is well known that there comes a point of diminishing returns in the process.  The father of quality control, Walter Deming, noted that there was such a thing as too much quality assessment.  Despite the greater accuracy of assessment, very few enterprises engage in full quantitative risk analysis, preferring the less accurate but less costly (in terms of time and resources) qualitative risk analysis.

This study looks specifically at the testing component of the risk management process, and notes the probability that testing may contribute to total risk or failure.

TESTING IN THE LIGHT CYCLE

For details of the light sources and portions of the process, we refer readers to the earlier study.  A brief outline of the light source cycle is in order at this point.

Towards the end of September, the female members of the household, in preparation for upcoming events, start to ask the male members of the household whether any purchases or other preparation is necessary.  (This generally corresponds to the initiation phase of the cycle.)  The male members of the household point out that Canadian Tire does not start selling Christmas lights or decorations until November.  (This portion of the communication protocol is not, as many suppose, for information purposes, but to deflect discussion from the fact that the notes on necessary purchases and replacements, made last year, are packed away with the Christmas decorations, and are therefore inaccessible.  Students of security may note that this is a good illustration of the importance of all three pillars of security: the confidentiality and integrity of the information is maintained, but availability is not.)  Testing at this point in the cycle might be useful, but is, unfortunately, impossible.

At some point in November, the male members of the household will have run out of excuses for not retrieving the Christmas decorations from storage.  At this point there is usually a mass retrieval of the decorations, and assessment of any items requiring replacement or supplement, or any perishable items which must be purchased each year.  (This corresponds to the requirements phase.)  Testing of light nodes and subnets may be done at this point.

This retrieval/requirements phase is generally followed by a design/planning phase.  To many researchers, it would appear that the ultimate result varies little from year to year, and that the design and planning is not necessary.  However, mature researchers will note that, as one becomes, well, “more experienced” in these matters, one notes a failing of memory as to the exact process from previous years, and sometimes even more recent events are difficult to …

I’m sorry, where was I?

Oh, yes.

Testing and failure rectification can be undertaken during the design phase.  Some researchers feel that this assessment point can be skipped, but experienced researchers know that failed nodes will inevitably be discovered on the back of the tree in such cases.

During the implementation phase, testing tends to be somewhat informal.  Since the light nodes are being placed individually, failure of a node is generally obvious.  However, if testing and rectification is not planned into the process, researchers inevitably find themselves balanced precariously on a stool at the back of the tree, with no replacement nodes, when a dead node or subnet is discovered.

The maintenance phase of the cycle generally runs from the first Sunday of Advent until January 6th (Feast of the Epiphany, last of the twelve days of Christmas).  Testing at this period is by observation.  Unfortunately, very much like testing, observation can usually tell you which nodes are shining, but not which ones are not.  As per the earlier study, it should be noted that a single node failure does not generally result in subnet failure, but that cumulative failures do.  Therefore, failure to observe and rectify individual node failures frequently result in subnet failures at some point during this phase.  Rectification following subnet failure at this point is extremely difficult, and usually impossible.

The termination phase of the cycle involves “undecorationing,” and return of items to storage.  Testing is possible at this point of the cycle, but is made problematic by a) fatigue, and b) haste in returning items to storage in order to allow for “spring cleaning.”

RESULTS OF TESTING AT DIFFERENT CYCLE PHASES

Initially, this study looked at testing by observation during the maintenance phase.  It was felt that by observation and ongoing rectification, nodes and subnets could be maintained, and would therefore be in good order upon retrieval the following year.

Unfortunately, the following year some nodes and subnets were found to be dead.  Therefore, testing at the termination phase was added.  This had the advantage of allowing notes to be taken during rectification, so that replacements could be purchased in advance, the year after.  As previously noted, this information was maintained, but was not available at a time when it would be useful.

Therefore, testing was added during the requirements phase.  All subnets were tested upon retrieval, replacements were purchased (if one could fight through the crowds at Canadian Tire), and rectification was done prior to implementation.  During implementation phase on that study, it was found that nodes and even subnets were still showing as failed.  This led to the addition of an additional testing point during the design/planning phase.

During this past cycle, all nodes and subnets were tested and rectified during the termination phase.  Upon retrieval, subnets were tested and any failures rectified.  During planning, subnets were again tested and failures rectified.  During implemenation, provision was made for rectification within the process.  So far, in the maintenance phase, failures have been rectified as soon as observed.  (One subnet failure was noted.  The attempt to rectify it was successful, but this is considered anomalous.)  Failure rates between testing points have been observed as high as 14% of total nodes.)

CONCLUSION

The results of the data collected are inescapable.  Testing results in failure.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study would not have been undertaken without the encouragement and support of Gloria J. Slade.

In respect of Schneier’s article on “feudalism” in security (pledging “fealty” to a company/platform, and relying on the manufacturer/vendor to keep you safe), I’m sitting in a seminar for an ERP product from one of the “giants.”  The speaker has stressed that you need an “easy to use” system, since your young employees won’t attend or pay attention to training (on either systems or your business): they expect things to “just work.”

We’ve also just had a promo video from a company that uses the product.  Close to the ideal of a “virtual” company: head office is in one country, manufacturing in two more, and most of the user base shops online.  It is easy for the security professional to see that this is a situation fraught with peril: online access to vital business, manufacturing, and customer information, privacy issues with a diverse customer base, legal and privacy issues with multiple jurisdictions, and the list goes on.  This is not a situation where “plug and play” and turnkey systems are going to be able to address all the problems.

But, of course, the vendor position is just “Trust us.”

Apparently it’s all our fault. Again. Not only is anti-virus useless, but we’re responsible for the evolution and dramatic increased volume of malware. According to something I read today “If it wasn’t for the security industry the malware that was written back in the 90’s might still be working today.”

I guess that’s not as dumb as it sounds: we have forced the malware industry to evolve (and vice versa). But you could just as easily say:

“The medical profession is responsible for the evolution and propagation of disease. If it wasn’t for the pharmaceutical industry illnesses that killed people X years ago might still be killing people today.”

And to an extent, it would be true. Some conditions have all but disappeared, at any rate in regions where advanced medical technology is commonplace, but other harder-to-treat conditions have appeared, or at least have achieved recognition.

I can think of plenty of reasons for being less than enthusiastic about the static-signature/malcode-blacklisting approach to malware deterrence, though I get tired of pointing out that commercial AV has moved a long way on from that in the last couple of decades. Even so, if pharmaceutical companies had to generate vaccines at the rate that AV labs have to generate detections (even highly generic detections) we’d all have arms like pincushions.

However, there are clear differences between ‘people’ healthcare and PC therapeutics. Most of us can’t trust ourselves as computer users (or the companies that sell and maintain operating systems and applications) to maintain a sufficiently hygienic environment to eliminate the need to ‘vaccinate’. It’s not that we’re all equally vulnerable to every one of the tens or hundreds of thousands of malicious samples that are seen by AV labs every day. Rather, it’s the fact that a tailored assessment of which malware is a likely problem for each individual system, regardless of provenance, region, and the age of the malware, is just too difficult. It’s kind of like living at the North Pole and taking prophylactic measures in case of Dengue fever, trypanosomiasis and malaria.

Fortunately, new or variant diseases tend not to proliferate at the same rate that malware variants do, and vaccines are not the only way of improving health. In fact, lots of conditions are mitigated by better hygiene, a better standard of living, health-conscious lifestyles and all sorts of more-or-less generic factors. There’s probably a moral there: commonsense computing practices and vitamin supplements – I mean, patches and updates – do reduce exposure to malicious code. It’s worth remembering, though, that even if AV had never caught on, evolving OS and application technologies would probably have reduced our susceptibility to antique boot sector viruses, macro viruses, and DOS .EXE infectors. Is it really likely that they wouldn’t have been replaced by a whole load of alternative malicious technologies?

David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP
ESET Senior Research Fellow

We got new cell phones (mobiles, for you non-North Americans) recently.  In the time since we last bought phones they have added lots of new features, like texting, cameras, email and Google Maps.

This, plus the fact that I am away on a trip right now, and Gloria has to calculate what time it is for me when we communicate (exacerbated by the fact that I never change the time zone on the laptops to local time), prompted her to ask the question above.  (She knows that I have an NTP client that updates the time on a regular basis.  She’s even got the associated clocks, on her desktop, in pink.)

Cell phones, of course, have to know where they are (or, at least, the cellular system has to know where they are) very precisely, so they can be told, by the nearest cell tower, what time it is (or, at least, what time it is for that tower).

Computers, however, have no way of knowing where they are, I explained.  And then realized that I had made an untrue statement.

Computers can find out (or somebody can find out) where a specific computer is when they are on the net.  (And you have to be on the net to get time updates.)  Some Websites use this (sometimes startlingly accurate) information in a variety of amusing (and sometimes annoying or frightening) ways.  So it is quite possible for a laptop to find out what time zone it is in, when it updates the time.

Well, if it is possible, then, in these days of open source, surely someone has done it.  Except that a quick couple of checks (with AltaVista and Google) didn’t find anything like that.  There does seem to be some interest:

http://stackoverflow.com/questions/8049912/how-can-i-get-the-network-time-from-the-automatic-setting-called-use-netw

and there seems to be an app for an Android phone:

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ru.org.amip.ClockSync&hl=en

(which seems silly since you can already get that from the phone side), but I couldn’t find an actual client or system for a computer or laptop.

So, any suggestions?

Or, anybody interested in a project?

So a friend of mine posts (on Twitter) a great shot of a clueless phishing spammer:

So I reply:
@crankypotato Were only all such phishing spammers so clueless. (Were only all users clueful enough to notice …)

So some other scammer tries it out on me:
Max Dubberly  @Maxt4dxsviida
@rslade http://t.co/(dangerous URL that I’m not going to include, obviously)

I don’t know exactly where that URL redirects, but when I tried it, in a safe browser, Avast immediately objected …

REmember “Monty Python and the Holy Grail“?

“A study conducted by scientists at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew (UK), in collaboration with scientists in Ethiopia, reports that climate change alone could lead to the extinction of wild Arabica coffee (Coffea arabica) well before the end of this century.”

Not so smug now, are you?

(I trust I do not have to explain the importance of coffee to information security …)