Has your email been “hacked?”

I got two suspicious messages today.  They were identical, and supposedly “From” two members of my extended family, and to my most often used account, rather than the one I use as a spam trap.  I’ve had some others recently, and thought it a good opportunity to write up something on the general topic of email account phishing.

The headers are no particular help: the messages supposedly related to a Google Docs document, and do seem to come from or through Google.  (Somewhat ironically, at the time the two people listed in these messages might have been sharing information with the rest of us in the family in this manner.  Be suspicious of anything you receive over the Internet, even if you think it might relate to something you are expecting.)

The URLs/links in the message are from TinyURL (which Google wouldn’t use) and, when resolved, do not actually go to Google.  They seem to end up on a phishing site intended to steal email addresses.  It had a Google logo at the top, and asked the user to “sign in” with email addresses (and passwords) from Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, and a few other similar sites.  (The number of possible Webmail sites should be a giveaway in itself: Google would only be interested in your Google account.)

Beware of any messages you receive that look like this:

——- Forwarded message follows ——-
Subject:            Important Documents
Date sent:          Mon, 5 Aug 2013 08:54:26 -0700
From:               [a friend or relative]

*Hello,*
*
How are you doing today? Kindly view the documents i uploaded for you using
Google Docs CLICK HERE <hxxp://tinyurl.com/o2vlrxx>.
——- End of forwarded message ——-

That particular site was only up briefly: 48 hours later it was gone.  This tends to be the case: these sites change very quickly.  Incidentally, when I initially tested it with a few Web reputation systems, it was pronounced clean by all.

This is certainly not the only type of email phishing message: a few years ago there were rafts of messages warning you about virus, spam, or security problems with your email account.  Those are still around: I just got one today:

——- Forwarded message follows ——-
From:               ”Microsoft HelpDesk” <microsoft@helpdesk.com>
Subject:            Helpdesk Mail Box Warning!!!
Date sent:          Wed, 7 Aug 2013 15:56:35 -0200

Helpdesk Mail Support require you to re-validate your Microsoft outlook mail immediately by clicking: hxxp://dktxxxkgek.webs.com/

This Message is From Helpdesk. Due to our latest IP Security upgrades we have reason to believe that your Microsoft outlook mail account was accessed by a third party. Protecting the security of your Microsoft outlook mail account is our primary concern, we have limited access to sensitive Microsoft outlook mail account features.

Failure to re-validate, your e-mail will be blocked in 24 hours.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Help Desk
Microsoft outlook Team
——- End of forwarded message ——-

Do you really think that Microsoft wouldn’t capitalize its own Outlook product?

(Another giveaway on that particular one is that it didn’t come to my Outlook account, mostly because I don’t have an Outlook account.)

(That site was down less than three hours after I received the email.

OK, so far I have only been talking about things that should make you suspicious when you receive them.  But what happens if and when you actually follow through, and get hit by these tricks?  Well, to explain that, we have to ask why the bad guys would want to phish for your email account.  After all, we usually think of phishing in terms of bank accounts, and money.

The blackhats phishing for email accounts might be looking for a number of things.  First, they can use your account to send out spam, and possibly malicious spam, at that.  Second, they can harvest email addresses from your account (and, in particular, people who would not be suspicious of a message when it comes “From:” you).  Third, they might be looking for a way to infect or otherwise get into your computer, using your computer in a botnet or for some other purpose, or stealing additional information (like banking information) you might have saved.  A fourth possibility, depending upon the type of Webmail you have, is to use your account to modify or create malicious Web pages, to serve malware, or do various types of phishing.

What you have to do depends on what it was the bad guys were after in getting into your account.

If they were after email addresses, it’s probably too late.  They have already harvested the addresses.  But you should still change your password on that account, so they won’t be able to get back in.  And be less trusting in future.

The most probable thing is that they were after your account in order to use it to send spam.  Change your password so that they won’t be able to send any more.  (In a recent event, with another relative, the phishers had actually changed the password themselves.  This is unusual, but it happens.  In that case, you have to contact the Webmail provider, and get them to reset your password for you.)  The phishers have probably also sent email to all of your friends (and everyone in your contacts or address list), so you’d better send a message around, ‘fess up to the fact that you’ve been had, and tell your friends what they should do.  (You can point them at this posting.)  Possibly in an attempt to prevent you from finding out that your account has been hacked, the attackers often forward your email somewhere else.  As well as changing your password, check to see if there is any forwarding on your account, and also check to see if associated email addresses have been changed.

It’s becoming less likely that the blackhats want to infect your computer, but it’s still possible.  In that case, you need to get cleaned up.  If you are running Windows, Microsoft’s (free!) program Microsoft Security Essentials (or MSE) does a very good job.  If you aren’t, or want something different, then Avast, Avira, Eset, and Sophos have products available for free download, and for Windows, Mac, iPhone, and Android.  (If you already have some kind of antivirus program running on your machine, you might want to get these anyway, because yours isn’t working, now is it?)

(By the way, in the recent incident, both family members told me that they had clicked on the link “and by then it was too late.”  They were obviously thinking of infection, but, in fact, that particular site wasn’t set up to try and infect the computer.  When they saw the page asked for their email addresses and password, it wasn’t too late.  if they had stopped at that point, and not entered their email addresses and passwords, nothing would have happened!  Be aware, and a bit suspicious.  It’ll keep you safer.)

When changing your password, or checking to see if your Web page has been modified, be very careful, and maybe use a computer that is protected a bit better than your is.  (Avast is very good at telling you if a Web page is trying to send you something malicious, and most of the others do as well.  MSE doesn’t work as well in this regard.)  Possibly use a computer that uses a different operating system: if your computer uses Windows, then use a Mac: if your computer is a Mac, use an Android tablet or something like that.  Usually (though not always) those who set up malware pages are only after one type of computer.

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Click on everything?

You clicked on that link, didn’t you?  I’m writing a posting about malicious links in postings and email, and you click on a link in my posting.  How silly is that?

(No, it wouldn’t have been dangerous, in this case.  I disabled the URL by “x”ing out the “tt” in http;” (which is pretty standard practice in malware circles), and further “x”ed out a couple of the letters in the URL.)

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Password reset questions

Recently therewas some discussion about “self-service” password resets.  The standard option, of course, is to have some sort of “secret question” that the true account holder should be able to answer.  You know: super-secret stuff like your pet’s name.  (Yes, Paris Hilton, I’m talking about you.)

The discussion was more detailed, turning to policy and options, and asked whether you should turn off “custom” questions, and stick to a list of prepared questions.

I would definitely allow custom questions.  The standard lists never seem to give me options that I can both a) remember, and b) that wouldn’t be immediately obvious to anyone who was able to find out some minimal information about me.

If I can make up my own question, I can ask myself what my favourite burial option would be.  The answer, “encryption,” is something I will remember to my dying day, and nobody else is ever going to guess.  (Well, those who have read the “Dictionary of Information Security” might guess that one, so I guess I won’t actually use it.)

Go ahead: try and guess what is the only pain reliever that works for me.

What sits under my desk and keeps the computers running in the case of a power failure?

What is Gloria’s favourite ice cream flavour?

Finish the following sentence: Don’t treat Rob as your _______ ___.  (This is a two-factor authentication: you also have to fill in the standard response to that statement.)

The thing is, all of these oddball questions have special meaning for Gloria and I, but for very few other people in the world.  They rely on mistakes or quirks that have become “family phrases.”  For example, what do you need before bed to get to sleep?  Answer: “warum melek,” coming from an elderly lady of our acquaintance from a northern European background.

Yeah, I like “custom questions” a lot.

(OK, yes, you do have to do a bit of security awareness training to indicate that “who is my sweetie poo” may not be as secret as some people seem to think …)

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REVIEW: Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed, Jack Nuern

BKIDTHMA.RVW   20120831

“Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed”, Jack Nuern, 2012
%A   Jack Nuern http://www.idtheftadvocates.com
%C   4901 W. 136 St., Leawood, KS, USA   66224
%D   2012
%G   ASIN: B0088IG92E
%I   Roadmap Productions
%O   fax 866-594-2771
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0088IG92E/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   128 p.
%T   “Identity Theft Manual: Practical Tips, Legal Hints, and Other Secrets Revealed”

Despite the implications of the title, this is not a primer for performing identity theft, but a guide to preventing and recovering from it.  The information, unfortunately, is fairly pedestrian, and most of it could be obtained from any magazine article on the topic.

Chapter one is a (very) basic introduction to identity theft, with a rather odd emphasis on the use of medical information.  Methods of identity theft are described in chapter two.  Unfortunately, this is where the book starts to show signs of serious disorganization, and some of the material is more sensational than helpful.  Chapter three lists some steps you can take to attempt to prevent identity theft.  The suggestions are the usual standards of not giving out any information to anyone, and the book tacitly admits that protection is not assured.

Chapter four gets to the real intent of the work: actions to take when your identity has been stolen and misused.  There is a great deal of useful content at this point, limited by two factors.  One is that everything discussed is restricted to institutions in the United States.  The other is that there is almost no discussion of what the entities mentioned can do for you or what they can’t or won’t.

As one could expect from a book written by a law firm, chapter five addresses the liability that the victim of identity theft faces.  The answer, unsurprisingly, is “it depends,” backed up with a few stories.  (Pardon me: “case studies.”)

There are some appendices (called, predictably, “Exhibits”).  Again, most of these will only be of use to those in the United States, and some, sections of related laws, will be of very little use to most.  There is a victim complaint and affidavit form which would probably be very helpful to most identity theft victims, reminding them of information to be collected and presented to firms and authorities.

The book is not particularly well written, and could certainly use some better structure and organization.  However, within its limits, it can be of use to those who are in the situation, and who frequently have nowhere to turn.  As the book notes, authorities are often unhelpful and take limited interest in identity theft cases.   And, as the book also (frequently) notes, the book is cheaper than hiring a law firm.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKIDTHMA.RVW   20120831

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Secure Awareness mottoes and one-liners

From various forums, mailing lists, discussions and other sources (many of which exist only in my febrile imagination), herewith a bit of a compilation of mottoes that can be used as part of a security awareness campaign:

No-one in Africa wants to GIVE anyone their money or gold.

Microsoft/Google/a Russian oil magnate/VW/BMW/etc certainly does not want to GIVE anyone money/a car/etc.

A stunning Russian blonde DOES NOT want to marry you.

If it sounds too good to be true, IT IS.

A web site, Email message, IM or tweet that tells you you need to install security software IS LYING.

Just because it’s in a Google search result or an “ad by Google” does NOT mean it is safe.

If the options seem to be “Click OK/Run/Install” or “turn off the computer”, TURN OFF THE COMPUTER.

Did your friend really send you that message?

Is your friend really as smart about computer security as you think?
A. No    B. Not at all    C. Well and truly not    D. All the above

You didn’t win the Irish lottery.

Your bank doesn’t want you to change your password.

Don’t be Phish Phood.

Pwnly Phools Phall for Phishing.

Think, THINK every click.

Need extra money?  Want to work from home?  Getting a job from a spammer is NOT A GOOD IDEA!!!

When did you last make a backup?  Do you want to do [period of time] worth of work all over again?

Report the suspicious, not the strange.

If the bank thinks your online account has been hacked, they won’t warn you by email.

Being sociable doesn’t mean being totally open. Be careful what you disclose via social media.

If someone wants/offers to make something really easy for you, there is a way that can be used against you.

Hide your ‘cheese’ (get a router).

A patch a day keeps hackers away (keep your OS and apps up to date).

Always wear a helmet (install a firewall/antivirus package).

The great unknown ain’t so great (only use software you can trust).

Use sunscreen to prevent burns (lock down your OS and apps).

Make 007 jealous (learn to use additional security tools).

“Password” is not a password (use strong passwords).

Keep your skeletons in the closet (protect your personal data).

Don’t be a dork (be smart when you’re on-line).

Keep your dukes up (stay informed and vigilant).

Infosec is like a sewer: what you get out of it, depends on what you put into it.

 

Some are recently from the #InfosecMotherlyAdvice tag on Twitter:

Don’t click … it’ll get infected.

Don’t take cookies from strangers.

Idle systems are a botnet’s playground.

A backup in hand is worth two in the cloud.

While you’re connected to my network you’ll live by my firewall rule.

A backup a day keeps data loss away.

We’d better get you a bigger firewall – you’ll grow into it.

Close the security holes, you’re letting all our sensitive data out.

If your system gets compromised and crashes, don’t come emailing to me.

Always encrypt your data. you never know when you’ll have an accident.

If everybody else clicked on links in emails, would you do that too?

Either you’re inside the firewall, or outside the firewall! Don’t leave it open!

Install your patches if you want your security to grow up big and strong.

Don’t put that in your browser, you don’t know where it’s been.

Someday your bluescreen will freeze like that!

It’s all fun and games until someone loses sensitive data.

Only you can prevent Internet meltdowns.

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Cloudy with a chance of hacking

Following closely upon the article/confession about cloud linked accounts and devices, and the ease of hacking them (with some interesting points about authentication systems):

I noticed, this morning, that the number of phishing messages, and specifically email account phishing, had, after a couple of relatively low months, suddenly jumped again.

Excessive convenience almost always = insecurity.  I have not linked any of my socmed accounts.  Facebook doesn’t have my Twitter account password, etc.  This is somewhat inconvenient, since I have to sign on to the different accounts in order to post things.  However, it does mean that, in the case of this type of story, I can just use it as an example and move on, rather than spending time changing the passwords on all my accounts.

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Sophos Threatsaurus

http://www.sophos.com/en-us/security-news-trends/security-trends/threatsaurus.aspx

Concentrating on malware and phishing, this is a very decent guide for “average” computer users with little or no security background or knowledge.  Three sections in a kind of dictionary or encyclopedia format: malware and threats, protection technologies, and a (very brief but still useful) history of malware (1949-2012).

Available free for download, and (unlike a great many “free” downloads I could name) you don’t even have to register for endless spam from the company.

Recommended to pass around to family, friends, and your corporate security awareness department.

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Trust me, I didn’t look right as I typed this …

‘Lying eyes’ are a myth – looking to the right DOESN’T mean you are fibbing.

“Many psychologists believe that when a person looks up to their right they are
likely to be telling a lie.  Glancing up to the left, on the other hand, is said to
indicate honesty.

“Co-author Dr Caroline Watt, from the University of Edinburgh, said: ‘A large
percentage of the public believes that certain eye movements are a sign of lying,
and this idea is even taught in organisational training courses. … The claimed link
between lying and eye movements is a key element of neuro-linguistic
programming.

“According to the theory, when right-handed people look up to their right they
are likely to be visualising a ‘constructed’ or imagined event.  In contrast when
they look to their left they are likely to be visualising a ‘remembered’ memory.
For this reason, when liars are constructing their own version of the truth, they
tend to look to the right.”

“Psychologist Prof Wiseman, from the University of Hertfordshire, said: ‘The
results of the first study revealed no relationship between lying and eye
movements, and the second showed that telling people about the claims made by
NLP practitioners did not improve their lie detection skills.’

However, this study raises a much more serious question.  These types of “skills” are being extensively taught (and sought) by law enforcement and other agencies.  How many investigations are being misdirected and delayed by false suppositions based on NLP “techniques”?  More disturbingly, how many people are being falsely accused, dismissed, or charged due to the same questionable “information”?  (As I keep telling my seminars, when you get sidetracked into pursuing the wrong suspect, the real culprit is getting away free.)

(I guess we’ll have to stop watching “The Mentalist” now …)

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LinkeDin!

No!  I’m *not* asking for validation to join a security group on LinkedIn!

Apparently several million passwords have been leaked in an unsalted file, and multiple entities are working on cracking them, even as we speak.  (Type?)

So, odds are “low but significant” that your LinkedIn account password may have been cracked.  (Assuming you have a LinkedIn account.)  So you’d better change it.

And you might think about changing the password on any other accounts you have that use the same password.  (But you’re all security people, right?  You’d *never* use the same password on multiple accounts …)

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Words to leak by …

The Department of Homeland Security has been forced to release a list of keywords and phrases it uses to monitor social networking sites and online media.  (Like this one?)

This wasn’t “smart.”  Obviously some “pork” barrel project dreamed up by the DHS “authorities” “team” (“Hail” to them!) who are now “sick”ly sorry they looked into “cloud” computing “response.”  They are going to learn more than they ever wanted to know about “exercise” fanatics going through the “drill.”

Hopefully this message won’t “spillover” and “crash” their “collapse”d parsing app, possibly “strain”ing a data “leak.”  You can probably “plot” the failures at the NSA as the terms “flood” in.  They should have asked us for “help,” or at least “aid.”

Excuse, me, according to the time on my “watch,” I have to leave off working on this message, “wave” bye-bye, and get some “gas” in the car, and then get a “Subway” for the “nuclear” family’s dinner.  Afterwards, we’re playing “Twister”!

(“Dedicated denial of service”?  Really?)

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REVIEW: “Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive”, Bruce Schneier

BKLRSOTL.RVW   20120104

“Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive”,
Bruce Schneier, 2012, 978-1-118-14330-8, U$24.95/C$29.95
%A   Bruce Schneier www.Schneier.com
%C   5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON   M9B 6H8
%D   2012
%G   978-1-118-14330-8 1-118-14330-2
%I   John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O   U$24.95/C$29.95 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448 www.wiley.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1118143302/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1118143302/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1118143302/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n+ Tech 2 Writing 3 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   365 p.
%T   “Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to
Thrive”

Chapter one is what would ordinarily constitute an introduction or preface to the book.  Schneier states that the book is about trust: the trust that we need to operate as a society.  In these terms, trust is the confidence we can have that other people will reliably behave in certain ways, and not in others.  In any group, there is a desire in having people cooperate and act in the interest of all the members of the group.  In all individuals, there is a possibility that they will defect and act against the interests of the group, either for their own competing interest, or simply in opposition to the group.  (The author notes that defection is not always negative: positive social change is generally driven by defectors.)  Actually, the text may be more about social engineering, because Schneier does a very comprehensive job of exploring how confident we can be about trust, and they ways we can increase (and sometimes inadvertantly decrease) that reliability.

Part I explores the background of trust, in both the hard and soft sciences.  Chapter two looks at biology and game theory for the basics.  Chapter three will be familiar to those who have studied sociobiology, or other evolutionary perspectives on behaviour.  A historical view of sociology and scaling makes up chapter four.  Chapter five returns to game theory to examine conflict and societal dilemmas.

Schneier says that part II develops a model of trust.  This may not be evident at a cursory reading: the model consists of moral pressures, reputational pressures, institutional pressures, and security systems, and the author is very careful to explain each part in chapters seven through ten: so careful that it is sometimes hard to follow the structure of the arguments.

Part III applies the model to the real world, examining competing interests, organizations, corporations, and institutions.  The relative utility of the four parts of the model is analyzed in respect to different scales (sizes and complexities) of society.  The author also notes, in a number of places, that distrust, and therefore excessive institutional pressures or security systems, is very expensive for individuals and society as a whole.

Part IV reviews the ways societal pressures fail, with particular emphasis on technology, and information technology.  Schneier discusses situations where carelessly chosen institutional pressures can create the opposite of the effect intended.

The author lists, and proposes, a number of additional models.  There are Ostrom’s rules for managing commons (a model for self-regulating societies), Dunbar’s numbers, and other existing structures.  But Schneier has also created a categorization of reasons for defection, a new set of security control types, a set of principles for designing effective societal pressures, and an array of the relation between these control types and his trust model.  Not all of them are perfect.  His list of control types has gaps and ambiguities (but then, so does the existing military/governmental catalogue).  In his figure of the feedback loops in societal pressures, it is difficult to find a distinction between “side effects” and “unintended consequences.”  However, despite minor problems, all of these paradigms can be useful in reviewing both the human factors in security systems, and in public policy.

Schneier writes as well as he always does, and his research is extensive.  In part one, possibly too extensive.  A great many studies and results are mentioned, but few are examined in any depth.  This does not help the central thrust of the book.  After all, eventually Schneier wants to talk about the technology of trust, what works, and what doesn’t.  In laying the basic foundation, the question of the far historical origin of altruism may be of academic philosophical interest, but that does not necessarily translate into an
understanding of current moral mechanisms.  It may be that God intended us to be altruistic, and therefore gave us an ethical code to shape our behaviour.  Or, it may be that random mutation produced entities that acted altruistically and more of them survived than did others, so the population created expectations and laws to encourage that behaviour, and God to explain and enforce it.  But trying to explore which of those (and many other variant) options might be right only muddies the understanding of what options actually help us form a secure society today.

Schneier has, as with “Beyond Fear” (cf. BKBYNDFR.RVW) and “Secrets and Lies” (cf. BKSECLIE.RVW), not only made a useful addition to the security literature, but created something of value to those involved with public policy, and a fascinating philosophical tome for the general public.  Security professionals can use a number of the models to assess controls in security systems, with a view to what will work, what won’t (and what areas are just too expensive to protect).  Public policy will benefit from examination of which formal structures are likely to have a desired effect.  (As I am finishing this review the debate over SOPA and PIPA is going on: measures unlikely to protect intellectual property in any meaningful way, and guaranteed to have enormous adverse effects.)  And Schneier has brought together a wealth of ideas and research in the fields of trust and society, with his usual clarity and readability.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2011     BKLRSOTL.RVW   20120104

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New computers – Windows 7 – printers and USB

C’mon, fess up.  Who did the discovery protocol for Windows Universal Plug and Play?

Was it supposed to work for USB?

Windows has always been annoying in regard to USB.  I’ve had it “forget” mice and jump drives (sometimes never to accept them again on that port).  I’ve had a port “locked” by an Adobe picture manager (which I hadn’t realized Adobe was installing while I was trying to upgrade Reader to get rid of the latest round of vulnerabilities) so that it never recognized my camera again on *any* USB port, and insisted that every jump drive I attached was a camera.  Windows has never been willing to specifically identify any USB port even if it reports a problem.

Recently our printer (yes, a Winprinter with a USB connection: these days, can you find any other type?) has been flaky.  Not the printer itself: it’s fine.  And, yes, I did install the correct Win 7 driver, thank you very much.  Not that either Microsoft nor HP were very helpful about that.  The computer started out just fine, for a few months.  Then it started not recognizing that it had a printer.  Then it started seeing that it had something connected, but couldn’t tell what it was.  And sometimes it would cycle between these states constantly, while I was working.  (I’d hear a rising double beep as it realized it had a printer, or a falling double beep as it lost it, or couldn’t recognize it.  It got so bad that I’ve had to turn the speaker volume down given the near constant clamour of beeps.)  We tried different things: rebooting, changing to another user, power cycling the printer, power cycling the printer and waiting a while before we turned it on, turning the printer on first, not turning the printer off when once it had successfully accepted a print job.  Sometimes they worked, sometimes they didn’t.  Recently it’s gotten a lot worse.

(And, yes, I did Google it.  And AltaVistaed it  Never found anything helpful.  Even when I added profanity, as I suspected would be the case with someone who had gotten as frustrated with it as I was.)

So, at Gloria’s suggestion, today I hauled the computer out of its nook and swapped the printer to another USB port.

She was right: after I changed it the queue printed.

I lost the keyboard, monitor (twice), mouse (twice).  Eventually got them back. And then the computer crashed.  I lost some bookmarks I had collected this morning, and some outbound email: don’t know what or how much.  As far as I can tell I still have access to other devices, but I got a report that the Passport drive has a problem and I’m currently running a check on it.

But the printer is still printing.  So far.

I could really get to hate Microsoft.  Very easily …

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History of crimeware?

C’mon, Infoworld, give us a break.

“There are few viable options to combat crimeware’s success in undermining today’s technologies.”

How about “don’t do dangerous stuff”?

“Crimeware: Foundation of today’s telescreens”

I’m sorry, what has “1984″ to do with the use of malware by criminal elements?

“Advancement #1: Form-grabbing for PCs running IE/Windows
Form grabbing, as its name implies, is the crimeware technique for capturing web form data within browsers.”

Can you say “login trojan”?  I knew you could.  They existed even before PCs did.

“Advancement #2: Anti-detection (also termed stealth)”

Oh, no!  Stealth!  Run!  We’re all gonna die!

Possibly the first piece of malware to use some form of stealth technology to hide itself from detection was a virus.  Perhaps you might have heard of it.  It was called BRAIN, and was written in 1986.

“Advancement #5: Source code availability/release
The source codes for Zeus and SpyEye, among the most sophisticated crimeware, were publicly released in 2010 and 2011, respectively.”

And the source code for Concept, which was, at the time, the most sophisticated macro virus (since it was the only macro virus), was released in 1995, respectively.  But wait!  The source code for the CHRISTMA exec was released in 1988!  Now how terrified are you!

“Crimeware in 2010 deployed the capability to disable anti-malware products”

And malware in 1991 deployed the capability to disable CPAV and MSAV.  With only fourteen bytes of code.  As a matter of fact, that fourteen byte string came to be used as an antivirus signature for a while, since so many viruses were included it.

“Advancement #7: Mobile device support (also termed man-in-the-mobile)”

We’ve got “man in the middle” and “meet in the middle.”  Nobody is using “man in the mobile” except you.

“Advancement #8: Anti-removal (also termed persistence)
As security solutions struggle to detect and remove crimeware from compromised PCs, malware authors are updating their code to permit it to re-emerge on PCs even after its supposed removal.”

I’ve got four words for you: “Robin Hood” and Friar Tuck.”

The author “has served with the National Security Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S. Air Force, and two Federal think tanks.”

With friends like this, who needs enemies?

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Blow your own horn

At a local conference, one presenter had a topic of “Blow Your Own Horn.”  The point was to be ready with some kind of success story (any kind of success story) ready for presentation.  Elevator pitch level stuff, except you aren’t selling anything specific, just success.

For example: “Last year you (the Board) approved purchase of a $50,000 licence fee for AV software on the email server.  This past month, records show it stopped 1 million viruses, which would otherwise have gotten through.  Had they been run, they would have cost $500 each (estimated industry average) to clean up.  Therefore, your prescient decision to spend $50,000 has returned $500,000,000 to the company.”

(OK, yes, any infosec professional knows the holes in that logic.  And you are turning it so that you are creditting the Board with what should be *your* success.  But you get the idea.)

I suggest everybody have a file in some readily accessible drawer, for scribbling down any idea you come up with along these lines, using company specific data.  One idea per page.  Any time you get called to the Boardroom (or, depending upon how many ideas you can come up with, any meeting) grab a sheet and read it in the elevator.  Whatever they asked you to talk about, walk in and start off with, “Thank you for your interest in X.  Before I begin, I’d like to let you know that, because of our investment in a $2,000 course in Ethereal, for one of the net sec admins, last April’s intrusion was detected within 5 hours, and we were able to ensure that all servers were hardened against that particular attack within only a further 12 hours, all within house.  Normally such an attack would be undetected for three days, and would have required outside help at a usual cost of $7,000.”

(Yes, this gets down into the weeds in regard to architecture, but security is a lot more about politics than technology.  And people love stories.)

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New computers – Windows 7 – compatibility (3) – Epson (and hardware in general?)

Having gotten some of the software and XP Mode problems out of the way, I now need to install some of the old (and some new) hardware to the new desktop.

The HP LaserJet P1005 installed just fine as soon as it was plugged in.

I suspected that the Epson Stylus CX6400 wasn’t going to be quite so simple, since I recalled having to run the install software before I connected it the last time.  And, yes, sure enough, the installation software (once I found the old CD and instructions) didn’t run under Windows 7.

So, off to Epson.  I checked under Drivers and Support, specified my “All-in-One” (it’s get a printer, a scanner, and some memory card readers), and asked for Windows 64-bit drivers.

Now out of Epson EasyPrint v3.10, ICM Color Profile Module Update v1.20, TWAIN Driver and EPSON Scan Utility v3.04A, TWAIN Driver and EPSON Scan Utility v2.68A, and Printer Driver v5.5aAs which would you pick?  Yeah, I didn’t know either, and the descriptions weren’t an awful lot of help.  But I knew (from the dim and distant past) that TWAIN (we used to say that it stood for “Technology Without An Interesting Name) had something to do with scanners, and the v2.68A was listed for 64-bit only, so I chose that.

It ran.  After a while I got the scanner part of the Windows Fax and Scan program.  It didn’t have many options.  Epson Scan had been installed, but it insisted that it couldn’t run, and Epson Scan Settings insisted the scanner wasn’t installed.  I used the troubleshooter (seemingly provided by Epson) but it was no help.  I rebooted the computer: that was no help.  I tried help and searching on the Epson site: you guessed it, no help.

I did some Google searching.  Found a mention of device drivers, and having to uninstall the Microsoft brand, and install the proper Epson driver.

Well, thought I, I installed this with installation and setup stuff from Epson: surely Microsoft wouldn’t have messed it up in that short time.  But I had a look at Device Manager anyway.

And, lo and behold, the driver that was installed was signed by Microsoft.  Uninstalled that, searched the disk for related drivers, found two.  One was for CX6300/CX6400, and one just for the CX6400, so I installed the latter, on the theory that the more specific was more likely to be from Epson.

And now Epson Scan is happy to run.

(I also installed the original XP software from the CD within XP Mode.  That didn’t work …)

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New computers – Windows 7 – XP Mode fixes

I think I may finally be getting the hang of this XP Mode thing.  (I may also be fooling myself …)

As previously noted, XP Mode doesn’t access the “real” drive, but a virtual drive which is contained in one large file.  (Actually, seemingly a minimum of three, but only one appears to contain the drive “contents.”)  XP Mode does provide you with links to the real drives on the computer, but, while accessible from most Windows programs, since they are not mapped to drive letters, you cannot do anything with DOS programs, even though such programs run under XP Mode.

I figured I would have to create the directories, with files I wanted to work on, within the “virtual” drive, and, each time I made any modifications, remember to copy the new versions back to the “real” disk so they could be used under Win7.  Not only is this a nuisance, but it wastes disk space.  XP Mode takes up enough space as it is: starting at about 1.5 gig, by the time you get it up to speed with Windows updates, it has ballooned to 6 or 7 gig.  Any programs or file space you want come on top of that.  (And, since I no longer trust XP Mode to stay stable, I have been making backup copies as I have been doing the updating and adjusting of the virtual machine, wasting even more disk space.)  An annoyance, to say the least.

I can’t remember where I found it, but somehow I noted a reference to the actual description, within XP Mode, of the links to the real drives.  It looks just like a network reference to a shared resource.  So I tried mapping that format and creating a DOS “lettered” drive mapping (from within XP Mode).  So far it seems to work fine.

For those who’d like to try, the “network” name of the real computer seems to be TSCLIENT.  So, in order to create a link to the C: drive on the real computer, map to \\TSCLIENT\C .  (It does not seem to matter what your real machine’s name is, that name does not seem to be used in the reference.)

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