Budget and the chain of evidence

Go Public, a consumer advocacy show on CBC, has produced a show on Budget Rent-A-Car overcharging customers for minor repairs.

This rang a bell with me.

In May of 2009, I rented a car from Budget, in order to travel to give a seminar.  Having had troubles with various car rental companies before, I did my own “walk around” and made sure I got a copy of the damage report before I left.  There were two marks on the driver’s door (a small dent, and a scratch), but the Budget employee refused to make two marks in that spot of the form: he said that the one tick covered both.

When I turned in the car, I was told that the tick was only good for the one scratch, and that I would be charged $400 for the dent.  I was also told that, since I had rented the car using my American Express card, I was automatically covered, by American Express, for minor damage, so I should get them to pay for it.

Since I was neither interested in paying myself, nor in assisting in defrauding Amex, I referred to the earlier statement by the employee who had checked the car.  (I had a witness to his statement, as well.)

Thus started a months-long series of phone calls from Budget.  They kept trying to get me to agree to pay the extra $400, and get Amex to reimburse me.  I wasn’t interested.

The phone calls finally stopped when, on one call, I informed the caller (by now identifying himself as someone in the provincial head office for Budget) that I had kept the copy of the original damage report form.  The caller told me that it clearly stated that there was a scratch on the door.  When I asked him how he interpreted the tick mark as a scratch, rather than a dent, he said that the word “scratch” was written on the form.

Well, of course, it hadn’t been written on the form originally.  I guess the caller must have been reasonable high up in the corporate food chain, because he knew what that meant.  I had the original, and it proved that they had messed with their copy.  That breaks the chain of evidence: they had no case at all.

(I still have a scan of that form.  Just in case …)

Share

Hazardous materials and balancing risks

This goes back a bit, but I was reminded of it this morning:

Amazing where you can get inspiration.  I went to an electronics manufacturing trade show, just to keep up with what’s happening over in that sector.  Nothing particularly new that anyone was selling particularly relevant to security.

However, I sat in on a seminar on the new EU “Restriction of (certain) Hazardous Substances” directive.  (This comes into effect in nine days, and there is all kinds of concern over the fact that the specific regulations for compliance haven’t been promulgated yet.  Remember HIPAA, you lot?  :-)

RoHS (variously pronounced “rows,” “row-hoss,” or “rosh”) is intended to reduce or eliminate the use of various toxic materials, notably lead and mercury, from the manufacture of electronic equipment.  This would reduce the toxic waste involved in manufacturing of said equipment, and particularly the toxic materials involved in recycling (or not) old digital junk.  EU countries all have to produce legislation matching the standard, and it affects imports as well.  In addition, other countries are producing similar legislation.  (Somewhat the same as the EU privacy directive, although without the “equivalent protection” clause.)  Korea is getting something very close to RoHS, California somewhat less.  Japan is going after informational labelling only.  China, interestingly, is producing more restrictive laws, but only for items and devices for sale within China.  If you want to manufacture lead, mercury, and hexavalent chromium computers in China for sale to other countries, that is just fine with them.

There are points relevant to various domains.  In terms of Physical security, and particularly life safety, there are issues of the environmental hazards of toxic materials in the electronic devices that we use.  (This is especially true in regard to BCP: lead, for example, vaporizes at temperatures seem in building fires.)

There is a certification process for ensuring compliance with the regulations.  Unfortunately, a number of manufacturers are carefully considering whether it is worth complying with the regulations.  Even if the products are compliant in terms of hazardous materials, the documentation required for compliance certificates requires details of materials used that could, to educated engineers and others in competing businesses, give away trade secrets involved in manufacturing processes.

The certification and due diligence processes are, like SOX, recursive.  In order to prove that your products are compliant, you also have to demonstrate that your suppliers, and their products, are also compliant.

There is also an interesting possibility of unintended consequences.  Outside of the glass for CRTs, the major use of lead is in solder.  Increasing the proportion of tin in the solder increases the temperature at which it melts, which is one factor.  However, another is that tin-only solder has a tendency to grow “whiskers.”  (The conditions and time for growing whiskers is not fully understood.)  Therefore, in an attempt to reduce the health risk of toxic materials, RoHS may be forcing manufacturers to produce electronic goods with shorter lifetimes, since the whiskers may become long enough to produce short circuits within electronic devices.  Indeed, these devices may have an additional risk of fire …

Share

This is [phishing] news?!?

We seem to be missing the boat on security awareness of phishing attacks: it’s not just for bank and credit card accounts anymore.  This article notes the “DHL,” “tax refund,” and similar queries.  I would have thought these were obvious, but they seem to be the most successful ways to get spear phishing and APT information.

Share

Malformed input?

Came back to the computer after some time away, to find the sun shining full on the desk and part of the screen.  And, of course, the screen has blanked from lack of input during that time.

So, I pull the drapes forward to shade the screen–and the screen pops up, even though I haven’t touched the keyboard or the mouse.

Considering this, I realize that a) it’s an optical mouse, and b) it was on the part of the desk that was in the sun, and is now shaded when I pulled the drapes.

So, being a security geek, I start to wonder:

a) how the system interpretted that light?
b) how hard it would be to figure out how to get a laser to create specific “actions” on the computer?  (And if the optical sensor’s range is wide enough that you can do it with an IR laser, so the user doesn’t realize what you are doing?)

Share

Unintended consequences

I’m not sure how far back to go, to get to the beginning.

Could be the time, a few years back, when the townhouse complex’s main water supply, after 30 years of flawless operation, was “upgraded.”  This, of course, inevitably resulted, a couple of years later, in some very odd variations in water pressure.  Some of the time we had little more than a trickle of water in the taps, and occasionally the washing machine took forever to fill.  (The “upgrade” may also have been responsible for the Great Flood of Aught-Nine, out on the main road.  But I digress.)

This year the main pressure regulator for the complex was replaced, and water was back to full pressure.  As a matter of fact, it was back to significantly higher than full pressure.  Filling the washer (or sink) is much quicker than it used to be.  You have to be careful not to turn the kitchen sink on full blast, or much of the counter around it gets sprayed.

A couple of day ago, the upstairs toilet stopped working.  Well, it would still flush, if the tank was full, but refilling slowed to a stream of drips.  (Hypothesis: the intake valve in the tank has blown from the higher water pressure.)  The manager happens to be away this weekend (of course), so we’ve been muddling through.

This morning, while attempting to refill the tank manually, I discovered that, if the tank was in the process of filling itself, and you turned on the bath tap full blast, the toilet would start filling normally.  Further experimentation determined that it had to be full blast: half or even three quarters wasn’t good enough.  (Revised hypothesis: the valve is partly damaged, and reducing the pressure allows it to function, temporarily.)

Weird.

Anyway, it reminded me: if a system as simple as a toilet, and household plumbing, can have these sorts of effects, what makes you think your incredibly complicated IT system, and its protective elements, is working as you think it should be?

Share

Security group fees …

The Cyber Security Research Alliance has just announced it’s formation.

If you want to join, it’s $60,000 for a founding membership, but a mere $15,000 if you want to be an affiliate member.

I think I’ll stick with my membership in the Vancouver Security Special Interest Group (or SecSIG).  We actually celebrate our thirtieth anniversary in January, and, for all of that time, we’ve managed to keep the annual fees to $0.

Share

Art, hacking, privacy, and the US Secret Service

“Media artist” creates a form of spyware using Macbook webcams.  Runs it on computers in Apple Stores.  Apple calls Secret Service about the artist.  Lots more.  Some interesting and provocative concepts in the article, covering privacy, legality, search and seizure, and the fact that people show little affect when working with/on computers:

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/people-staring-at-computers/all/

Share

Amazon customer service

Or: One Of The Reasons Why I’ve Never Actually Bought Any Kindle Books from Amazon, And Only Install Free Books:

Amazon closes account and wipes Kindle. Without notice. Without explanation.

Share

More bad news for risk management

Overconfidence makes you successful in business.

Not just confidence, mind you, overconfidence.

Add in the Dunning-Kruger effect, and the Peter Principle, and you start to realize why all those huge banks keep failing …

Share

REVIEW: “Learning from the Octopus”, Rafe Sagarin

BKLNFOCT.RVW   20120714

“Learning from the Octopus”, Rafe Sagarin, 2012, 978-0-465-02183-3, U$26.99/C$30.00
%A   Rafe Sagarin
%C   387 Park Ave. South, New York, NY   10016-8810
%D   2012
%G   978-0-465-02183-3 0-465-02183-2
%I   Basic Books/Perseus Books Group
%O   U$26.99/C$30.00 800-810-4145 www.basicbooks.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465021832/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465021832/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465021832/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n+ Tech 1 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   284 p.
%T   “Learning from the Octopus”

The subtitle promises that we will learn “how secrets from nature can help us fight terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and disease.”  The book does fulfill that aim.  However, what it doesn’t say (up front) is that it isn’t an easy task.

The overall tone of the book is almost angry, as Sagarin takes the entire security community to task for not paying sufficient attention to the lessons of biology.  The text and examples in the work, however, do not present the reader with particularly useful insights.  The prologue drives home the fact that 350 years of fighting nation-state wars did not prepare either society or the military for the guerilla-type terrorist situations current today.  No particular surprise: it has long been known that the military is always prepared to fight the previous war, not this one.

Chapter one looks to the origins of “natural” security.  In this regard, the reader is inescapably reminded of Bruce Schneier’s “Liars and Outliers” (cf. BKLRSOTL.RVW), and Schneier’s review of evolution, sociobiology, and related factors.  But whereas Schneier built a structure and framework for examining security systems, Sagarin simply retails examples and stories, with almost no structure at all.   (Sagarin does mention a potentially interesting biology/security working group, but then is strangely reticent about it.)  In chapter two, “Tide Pool Security,” we are told that the octopus is very fit and functional, and that the US military and government did not listen to biologists in World War II.

Learning is a force of nature, we are told in chapter three, but only in regard to one type of learning (and there is no mention at all of education).  The learning force that the author lauds is that of evolution, which does tend to modify behaviours for the population over time, but tends to be rather hard on individuals.  Sagarin is also opposed to “super efficiency” (and I can agree that it leaves little margin for error), but mostly tells us to be smart and adaptable, without being too specific about how to achieve that.  Chapter four tells us that decentralization is better than centralization, but it is interesting to note that one of the examples given in the text demonstrates that over-decentralization is pretty bad, too.  Chapter five again denigrates security people for not understanding biology, but that gets a bit hard to take when so much of the material betrays a lack of understanding of security.  For example, passwords do not protect against computer viruses.  As the topics flip and change it is hard to see whether there is any central thread.  It is not clear what we are supposed to learn about Mutual Assured Destruction or fiddler crabs in chapter six.

Chapter seven is about bluffing, use  and misuse of information, and alarm systems.  Yes, we already know about false positives and false negatives, but this material does not help to find a balance.  The shared values of salmon and suicide bombers, religion, bacterial addicts, and group identity are discussed in chapter eight.  Chapter nine says that cooperation can be helpful.  We are told, in chapter ten, that “natural is better,” therefore it is ironic to note that the examples seem to pit different natural systems against each other.  Also, while Sagarin says that a natural and complex system is flexible and resilient, he fails to mention that it is difficult to verify and tune.

This book is interesting, readable, erudite, and contains many interesting and thought-provoking points.  For those in security, it may be good bedtime reading material, but it won’t be helpful on the job.  In the conclusion, the author states that his goal was to develop a framework for dealing with security problems, of whatever type.  He didn’t.  (Schneier did.)

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKLNFOCT.RVW   20120714

Share

Bridge tolling account and spam

Recently one of the bridges in my area was replaced by a new one.  The new Port Mann Bridge is, at the moment, apparently the widest in the world, and will relieve congestion on the existing bridge, which has been a huge bottleneck for years.  (Why do I keep flashing on an old saying about “traffic expands to fill anything made available for it …”?)

In order to pay for it, our currently right-wing) provincial government has formed a “public/private partnership” with a shell corporation (Treo) which gets to “lease” the bridge for about fifity years and put tolls on it.

I’m not sure I’ll have a lot of use for the Port Mann Bridge when it gets tolled (except to get out to the Olive Garden, until they build one closer in).  It’s been such a bottleneck for so long that I’ve found all kinds of ways to avoid it.  (There is another tolled bridge in the area, and I’ve only traveled over it once, in the first “free” week, just to find out where it was and went.)  But I figured I’d get the decal anyway, especially since it gets you a discount, and some extra bucks (equivalent to about 20 free trips) to start off.

You’ll have heard about the debacle in regard to the phone registration, where some of the clerks were in business for themselves, and stole credit card numbers.  So I figured I’d register via the Website.  The process wasn’t too arduous, although I found it odd that American Express, which I use for most of my pre-authorized charges, wasn’t acceptable.  (I also found out that my password algorithm, while it is long, complex, and uses mixed case and non-alphabetic characters, doesn’t generate a number in all cases.  Apparently you have to have a number.)

I didn’t realize that I didn’t get a confirmation email until this morning, when I checked the spam filters.  There it was.

And, I have to agree.  If I was a spam filter, I’d have said it was spam, too.  It’s a mess.  Looking at the body, I can’t make out anything it is trying to do (other than create all kinds of buttons).  The spam report says:
0.00 NO_REAL_NAME           From: does not include a real name
0.00 BSF_SC0_MISMATCH_TO    Envelope rcpt doesn’t match header
0.00 MIME_HTML_ONLY         BODY: Message only has text/html MIME parts
0.00 URI_TRUNCATED          BODY: Message contained a URI which was truncated
0.00 HTML_MESSAGE           BODY: HTML included in message

Treo itself seems to use a system called Barracuda, and this system also scores the message as spam.  (It also seems to have an AV scanner, which appears to be turned off.  Apparently Treo is not concerned about sending viruses out to infect other people.)

So, the Treo people don’t seem to be very concerned about information security.  Which gets me thinking:

Is the bridge safe?

Share

Security Transcends Slogans … or not …

I have just got off the phone with a marketroid.  In the course of our conversation (no, I usually don’t talk to them, but this turned our to be a special case), I was explaining to her about ISC2 and the CISSP.  She was puzzled by an annotation on my file with her company, and it wasn’t making sense in terms of what I did, and what their ERM/CRM system was saying about me.

When she looked at the ISC2 Website, during our conversation, she immediately noted the “Security Transcends Technology” slogan.  I dimly recall the great fanfare when this was introduced about 9 or ten years back: our (marketing department’s) proud statement that we were not mere technologists, but covered the whole realm of security.

Well, apparently that’s not what it says to some people.  The simple existence of the “technology” word in our slogan seems to trigger an immediate pegging of us as mere techies.  All of us CISSPs are just basic firewall admins.  We are not
transcendant.

Back to the marketing board … ?

Share

Child abandonment

There are always two sides (and maybe more) to every story, but:

Police called to a scene where children were reportedly abandoned.  Police arrive to find children on a suburban street, and the mother watching from the porch.

So the police take the mother to jail.

Share

Biblical epics return!

(Sorry, nothing to do with security in this one.)

Hollywood has rediscovered the Bible as movie source material.  (Probably because it’s in the public domain, and saves costs.)

In production is “Noah,” which stars Russell Crowe as someone mumbling about God telling him to build a boat, and then beating up his neighbours when they make fun of him for it.

Steven Spielberg is supposed to direct “Gods and Kings,” about Moses.  Therefore it will star special effects, and probably have the tagline “I(sraels) C(hildren) Go Home!”

“The Redemption of Cain” is supposed to be Will Smith’s directorial debut, so Cain will probably turn Black and therefore become cool.

“Mary, Mother of Christ,” is being billed as a prequel to “The Passion of the Christ,” so will probably have the most violent Madonna ever.

Fox and Ridley Scott are working on “Exodus,” so it will probably be the most inaccurate Biblical epic ever filmed, and may star alien monsters.

(Just in case you think I’m making all of this up, it’s based on a report in the WSJ.)

Share

Hiring droids – “Would like like coffee breaks with that?”

What is true of teachers is also true for recruiters.

I am old enough to have gone through group interviews, hostile interviews, video interviews, multi-part phone interviews, questionnaire interviews, weird question interviews, “waht do you want to be when you grow up” interviews, and all the other “latest and greatest” ideas that swept through HR-land at one time or another.  I understand the intents of the various processes, and what they will and won’t tell you.  (When I do recruiting myself, I use the “prepared” interview model–know what it is you want, and how to find out if the candidate has it.)

So, apparently the next big thing in recruiting is to use technology.  Use robots.  (Well, actually just avatars and virtual game worlds.)  Use computerized questionnaires.  (They work just as well, and as badly, as paper ones.)  Use video.  (Wait.  We did that already.  Oh, I see, use videotape.)

It doesn’t take too long to see what the intent is here.  To save time and money.

And, doing it cheaper will work out just as well as doing it cheaper always has.

“There is hardly anything in the world that some man cannot make a little worse and sell a little cheaper, and the people who consider price only are this man’s lawful prey.        – John Ruskin

Share

Teacherless classrooms?

Someone has made yet another prediction that teachers will shortly be replaced by technology.  Teacherless classrooms are, apparently, the way of the future.

I recall this prediction being made, to great fanfare, thirty years ago.  I was, at the time, a public school teacher, and at a conference on science education.  The first speaker of the day took a bit of time out from his presentation to discuss the issue, and stated that any teacher who *could* be replaced by a computer, *should* be replaced by a computer.  His point was that teaching is a profession, not the push button assembly line job that many people seem to mistake it for.  Any teacher who is so repetitive, so lacking in imagination, so single dimensional, so robotic that they can be replaced by a machine or a process, should be replaced.  A teacher should be able to handle more than “do you want a diploma with that?”

(Go ahead.  Make my day.  Ask me if this is going to be on the final.)

One way or another I have been teaching for more than forty years.  I have taught (in the public school system) every grade level from kindergarten to grade twelve.  I have taught in two-year colleges, and at the post graduate level in academia.  I have taught for business and in commercial training.

I also have a rather broad experience in “distance education.”  I have participated as both director and teacher in video and audio production of teaching materials.  I have created online tutorials for computer-based courses.  I have designed and programmed interactive computer-based training.  Over twenty-five years ago I ran the telecommujnications component of the World Logo Conference, which was the first (and possibly still only) event to fully integrate onsite with online participation.  (And which also, since Logo is a “teaching” language, involved many teachers and computer educators.)

I have mentioned that I don’t like Webinars.  That isn’t because I inherently object to the very idea.  I think a good Webinar might be an interesting experience.  But, so far, nobody has figured out that that good distance education requires more work, not less.  (In the same way, publishers of textbooks haven’t yet understood that a good textbook requires better writing, not worse.)  We figured this out at the WLC more than two decades ago.  The developers of debuggy figured it out about programmed learning more than three decades ago.

There are some, few, isolated examples of individual lessons that have been done well using video, or the Web, or programmed learning, or various other forms of technology.  But they are, still, few and isolated, and drowned out in the vast sea of mediocre and wretched attempts.  Technology has uses, and good teachers know that.  It’s great for drill and practice in some areas.  The Web is a great place for discovery and research.  Letting a kid loose on the Internet without guidance is a recipe for disaster.  We are a long way, a very, VERY long way, from the use of technology to create entirely teacherless classrooms.

Yes, we can certainly use extra training for a number, possibly a very large number, of teachers who are afraid of the technology and don’t use it well.  But don’t tell me that you can replace them with droids until you can show me that you understand what teaching is all about.

Share