More terror from Canada

Kalamazoo cop, on vacation, with his wife, visits Nose Hill Park in Calgary.  He feels threatened that two complete strangers feel free to try and strike up a conversation.

Writes a letter to the Calgary Herald saying how threatened he feels since he wasn’t allowed to bring his gun.

It was later confirmed that these threatening strangers were handing out free passes to the Stampede.

More details can be found in at least 13 news stories by searching the Web.

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Ignorance as a human (business?) right?

Rogers Communications Inc. is a company providing cable, cellular, and other services in Canada.

Rogers has a discount brand, Chatr, which they advertise as being “more reliable and less prone to dropped calls.”  Canada’s Competition Bureau, after what it called “an extensive review of technical data,” found no discernible difference in dropped-call rates between Rogers/Chatr and new entrants.

Apparently, Rogers will argue that the court should strike down a section in Canada’s Competition Act that requires companies to undergo “adequate and proper” tests of a product’s performance before making advertising claims about it.  In other words, Rogers is saying that forcing the company to find out if claims are true is unfair, because that means they can’t lie with a straight face.

Q: What is the difference between a computer salesman and a used-car salesman?

A: The used-car salesman knows when he’s lying to you …

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Cloudy with a chance of hacking

Following closely upon the article/confession about cloud linked accounts and devices, and the ease of hacking them (with some interesting points about authentication systems):

I noticed, this morning, that the number of phishing messages, and specifically email account phishing, had, after a couple of relatively low months, suddenly jumped again.

Excessive convenience almost always = insecurity.  I have not linked any of my socmed accounts.  Facebook doesn’t have my Twitter account password, etc.  This is somewhat inconvenient, since I have to sign on to the different accounts in order to post things.  However, it does mean that, in the case of this type of story, I can just use it as an example and move on, rather than spending time changing the passwords on all my accounts.

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REVIEW: “Young People, Ethics, and the New Digital Media”

BKYPENDM.RVW   20120125

“Young People, Ethics, and the New Digital Media: A Synthesis from the
GoodPlay Project”, Carrie James et al, 2009, 978-0-262-51363-0
%A   Carrie James
%A   Katie Davis
%A   Andrea Flores
%A   John M. Francis
%A   Lindsay Pettingill
%A   Margaret Rundle
%A   Howard Gardner
%C   55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA   02142-1399
%D   2009
%G   978-0-262-51363-0 0-262-51363-3
%I   MIT Press
%O   +1-800-356-0343 fax: +1-617-625-6660 www-mitpress.mit.edu
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262513633/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262513633/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262513633/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P
%T   “Young People, Ethics, and the New Digital Media”

It is not until more than a tenth of this book has passed before the authors admit that this is, in essence, only a proposal for a study which they hope will be carried out in future.  No actual research or interviews have been conducted, so there aren’t really any results to be reported.  The authors hypothesize that five factors are involved in “media-identity”: “privacy, ownership and authorship, credibility, and participation.”  (Yes, I agree that it looks like four factors, expressed that way.  But the authors repeatedly express it in exactly that way, and insist that it makes five.)

The authors note that social networking (or social media, or new digital media) is a frontier, and thus lacks comprehensive and well-enforced rules and regulations.  Social media permits and encourages “participatory cultures,” with relatively low barriers to artistic expression and “civic” engagement, strong support for creating and sharing creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby what is  known by the most experienced is passed along to novices.  The goals of the project are to investigate the ethical values and structures of new media and to create entities to promote ethical thinking and conduct.

The project is also to focus on “play,” with a fairly broad definition of that term, including gaming, instant messaging, social networking, participation in fan fiction groups, blogging, and content creation including video sharing.  Some of these activities may lead to employment, but are undertaken without support, rewards, and constraints of adult supervisors, and without explicit standards of conduct and quality.  “Good play” is defined as online conduct that is both meaningful and engaging to the participant and responsible to others in the community in which it is carried out.

A number of questions are raised in this book, but few are answered in any way at all.  While there is some review of existing work in related areas, it is hardly comprehensive, convincing, or useful.  It is difficult to say what the intent of publishing this book was.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKYPENDM.RVW   20120125

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Censorship with a broad brush

Just in case you have been hiding under a (Higgs or non-Higgs) rock for the past few weeks, TomKat is breaking up [1].  Tom Cruise is a highly visible Scientologist.  Many people have been commenting on possible Scientology aspects of the breakup.  Scientology seems to break out in a rash whenever anyone mentions the cult.

So, someone has provided a simple means for Scientologists to try and ensure that any mention of Scientology, or the event, or anything, is removed.

The main thrust of the instruction is that everybody will have a “code of conduct” on their Website, and every code of conduct will ban anything that “defames, degrades… an individual or group,” or something similar.  So, you just blanket object to everything on that basis.

I think it should work pretty well.  I’d say that, following Lord Northcliffe’s dictum that “News is what somebody, somewhere wants to suppress.  All the rest is advertising,” any interesting posting could be seen, by someone, as defaming or degrading some individual or group …

Of course, there are many other forms of censorship.  Here in Canada, the government is using funding cuts, threats of funding cuts, and even direct diplomatic office intervention, in order to to block theatrical performances it doesn’t like.

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Security unawareness

I really don’t understand the people who keep yelling that security awareness is no good.  Here’s the latest rant.

The argument is always the same: security awareness is not 100% foolproof protection against all possible attacks, so you shouldn’t (it is morally wrong to?) even try to teach security awareness in your company.

This guys works for  a security consultancy.  He says that instead of teaching awareness, you should concentrate on audit, monitoring, protecting critical data, segmenting the network, access creep, incident response, and strong security leadership.  (If we looked into their catalogue of seminars, I wonder what we would find them selling?)

Security awareness training isn’t guaranteed to be 100% effective protection.  Neither is AV, audit, monitoring, incident response, etc.  You still use those thing even though they don’t guarantee 100% protection.  You should at least try (seriously) to teach security awareness.  Maybe more than just a single 4 hour session.  (It’s called “defence in depth.”)

Tell you what: I’ll teach security awareness in my company, and you try a social engineering attack.  You may hit some of my people: people aren’t perfect.  But I’ll bet that at least some of my people will detect and report your social engineering attack.  And your data isolation won’t.

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Citizen cyber-protectors?

Marc Goodman (who I believe is FutureCrimes on Twitter and the Web) gave a recent TED talk on trends in the use of high technology in crime.

The 20 minute talk is frightening, with very little in the way of comfort for the protection or security side.  He ends with a call for crowdsourcing of protection.

Now as a transparent society/open source/full disclosure kind of guy, I like the general idea.  But, as someone who has been involved in education, security awareness, and professional security training for some time, I see a few problems.  For crowdsourcing to work, you need a critical mass of at least minimally capable people.  When you are talking about a weather reporting app, that minimal capability isn’t much. When you are talking about detecting cyberwar or bioweapons, the capability levels are a bit different.

Just yesterday the PNWER (Pacific NorthWest Economic Region) conference became the latest to bemoan the lack of trained employees.  I rather suspect these constant complaints, since I see lots of people out of work.  But the people who are whining about employees are just looking for network admins and such.  We need people with more depth and more breadth in their backgrounds.  I get CISSP candidates in my seminars who are network admins who simply want to know a few ACLS for firewalls.  I have to keep telling them that security professionals need to know more than that.

Yes, I am privileged to be able to meet a number who *are* interested in learning everything possible in order to meet any need or problem.  But, relatively speaking, those are few.  And my sample set tends to be abnormal, in that these are people who have already shown some interest in training (even if only job related).  What Goodman is talking about is the general public.  And those of us who have actually tried security awareness know how little conceptual awareness we have to build on, let alone advanced technical knowledge.

I think awareness, self-protection, and crowdsourcing is probably the only good way to approach the problems Goodman outlines.  I just worry that we have a long way to go.

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Trust me, I didn’t look right as I typed this …

‘Lying eyes’ are a myth – looking to the right DOESN’T mean you are fibbing.

“Many psychologists believe that when a person looks up to their right they are
likely to be telling a lie.  Glancing up to the left, on the other hand, is said to
indicate honesty.

“Co-author Dr Caroline Watt, from the University of Edinburgh, said: ‘A large
percentage of the public believes that certain eye movements are a sign of lying,
and this idea is even taught in organisational training courses. … The claimed link
between lying and eye movements is a key element of neuro-linguistic
programming.

“According to the theory, when right-handed people look up to their right they
are likely to be visualising a ‘constructed’ or imagined event.  In contrast when
they look to their left they are likely to be visualising a ‘remembered’ memory.
For this reason, when liars are constructing their own version of the truth, they
tend to look to the right.”

“Psychologist Prof Wiseman, from the University of Hertfordshire, said: ‘The
results of the first study revealed no relationship between lying and eye
movements, and the second showed that telling people about the claims made by
NLP practitioners did not improve their lie detection skills.’

However, this study raises a much more serious question.  These types of “skills” are being extensively taught (and sought) by law enforcement and other agencies.  How many investigations are being misdirected and delayed by false suppositions based on NLP “techniques”?  More disturbingly, how many people are being falsely accused, dismissed, or charged due to the same questionable “information”?  (As I keep telling my seminars, when you get sidetracked into pursuing the wrong suspect, the real culprit is getting away free.)

(I guess we’ll have to stop watching “The Mentalist” now …)

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Submarine patent torpedoed …

For some years I have been peripherally involved (hired to research prior art, etc.) in some of the submarine patent/patent troll cases in the AV world.

I’ve got plenty of prior art.  Programs demonstrating and using technologies that were granted patents years after those programs were available.  Email discussions showing that concepts were obvious and well-known years before patent applications were filed.

Of course, as the “expert” I’m not privy to the legal strategy.  Bt I can figure it out.  US patent office issues patent that never should have been granted.  Troll sues Big Firm for $100M.  BF’s lawyers go to IP law firm.  IP lawyers find me.  IP lawyers ask me for the weirdest (and generally weakest) evidence.  IP lawyers go back to BF’s lawyers.  BF’s lawyers go back to BF.  (At this point I’m not privy to the discussions, so I’m guessing.  But I suspect that …)  IP and BF lawyers advise that evidence available, but patent fight expensive.  BF offers troll $100K to go away.  Troll happy with $100K, which is all he wanted anyway.  BF lawyers happy with large (and now more secure) salaries.  IP lawyers happy with $1M fees.  BF happy to have “saved” $99M.  The only person not happy is me.

Well, Kaspersky got sued.  Kaspersky fought.  Kaspersky won.

So, today I’m happy.  (I just wish I’d been part of *this* fight …)

(By the way, patent trolls cost money …)

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Apple and “identity pollution”

Apple has obtained a patent for “identity pollution,” according to the Atlantic.

I am of not just two, but a great many minds about this.  (OK, admit it: you always knew I was schizophrenic.)

First off, I wonder how in the world they got a patent for this.  OK, maybe there isn’t much in the way of prior art, but the idea can’t possibly be called “non-obvious.”  Even before the rise of “social networking” I was prompting friends to use my “loyalty” shopping cards, even the ones that just gave discounts and didn’t get you points.  I have no idea what those stores think I buy, and I don’t much care, but I do know that they have very little about my actual shopping patterns.

In our advice to the general population in regard to Internet and online safety in general, we have frequently suggested a) don’t say too much about yourself, and b) lie.  Isn’t this (the lying part) exactly what Apple is doing?

In similar fashion, I have created numerous socmed accounts which I never intended to use.  A number of them are simply unpopulated, but some contain false information.  I haven’t yet gone to the point of automating the process, but many others have.  So, yet another example of the US patent office being asleep (Rip-Van-Winkle-level asleep) at the technological switch.

Then there is the utility of the process.  Yes, OK, we can see that this might (we’ll come back to the “might”) help protect your confidentiality.  How can people find the “you” in all the garbage?  But what is true for advertisers, spammers, phishers, and APTers is also true for your friends.  How will the people who you actually *want* to find you, find the true you among all the false positives?

(Here is yet another example of the thre “legs” of the security triad fighting with each other.  We have endless examples of confidentiality and availability working against each other: now we have confidentiality and integrity at war.  How do you feel, in general, about Apple recommending that we creating even more garbage on the Internet than is already there?)

(Or is the fact that it is Apple that is doing this somehow appropriate?)

OK, then, will this work?  Can you protect the confidentiality of your real information with automated false information?  I can see this becoming yet another spam/anti-spam, CAPTCHA/CAPTCHA recognition, virus/anti-virus arms race.  An automated process will have identifiable signs, and those will be detected and used to ferret out the trash.  And then the “identity pollution” (a new kind of “IP”?) will be modified, and then the detection will be modified …

In th meantime, masses of bandwidth and storage will be consumed.  Socnet sites will be filled with meaningless accounts.  Users of socmed sites will be forced to spend even more time winnowing out those accounts not worth following.  Socnet companies will be forced to spend more on storage and determination of false accounts.  Also, their revenues will be cut as advertises realize that “targetted” ads will be less targetted.

Of course, Apple will be free to create a social networking site.  They already have created pieces of such.  And Apple can guarantee that Apple product users can use the site without impedance of identity pollution.  And, since Apple owns the patent, nobody else will be able to pollute identities on the Apple socnet site.

(And if Apple believes that, I have a bridge to sell them …)

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Linded-Indiots in the stock market

OK, as some of you may be aware, LinkeDin had a semi-massive leak of passwords that came to light yesterday.

How are the markets taking it?

Well, today the stock is up, slightly.

That’s because ad revenues are up.  Since everyone is loggin on today, in order to change passwords …

Sometimes I wonder why we bother …

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LinkeDin!

No!  I’m *not* asking for validation to join a security group on LinkedIn!

Apparently several million passwords have been leaked in an unsalted file, and multiple entities are working on cracking them, even as we speak.  (Type?)

So, odds are “low but significant” that your LinkedIn account password may have been cracked.  (Assuming you have a LinkedIn account.)  So you’d better change it.

And you might think about changing the password on any other accounts you have that use the same password.  (But you’re all security people, right?  You’d *never* use the same password on multiple accounts …)

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Words to leak by …

The Department of Homeland Security has been forced to release a list of keywords and phrases it uses to monitor social networking sites and online media.  (Like this one?)

This wasn’t “smart.”  Obviously some “pork” barrel project dreamed up by the DHS “authorities” “team” (“Hail” to them!) who are now “sick”ly sorry they looked into “cloud” computing “response.”  They are going to learn more than they ever wanted to know about “exercise” fanatics going through the “drill.”

Hopefully this message won’t “spillover” and “crash” their “collapse”d parsing app, possibly “strain”ing a data “leak.”  You can probably “plot” the failures at the NSA as the terms “flood” in.  They should have asked us for “help,” or at least “aid.”

Excuse, me, according to the time on my “watch,” I have to leave off working on this message, “wave” bye-bye, and get some “gas” in the car, and then get a “Subway” for the “nuclear” family’s dinner.  Afterwards, we’re playing “Twister”!

(“Dedicated denial of service”?  Really?)

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Howto: Phish HSBC credit card numbers

Like many other people, I try helping developing countries when I can. So to help boost GDP in Eastern Europe and Africa (or ‘redistribute the wealth’ if you will) here’s a quick tutorial that will help scammers get HSBC customers’ credit card numbers. All the steps below are done by the real HSBC, so you don’t even need to “fool” anyone.

An HSBC customer who has gone through this process before won’t be able to distinguish between you and the real HSBC. Customer that has not been through this process certainly won’t know better anyway. In fact, you can do it to HSBC employees and they won’t know.

All you need is a toll-free number for them to call (feel free to forward it to Nigeria). The nice thing about HSBC is that the process below is identical to how the real HSBC asks customers for information. In other words: HSBC is training their customers to follow this path. I propose a new term for HSBC’s method of breeding phish: spowning (spawn+p0wn).

Step 1:

Prepare an email that looks like:

Dear :

As a service to our customers and in an effort to protect their HSBC Premier  MasterCard  account, we are attempting to confirm recent charge activity or changes to the account.

Please contact the HSBC Premier Fraud Servicing Center to validate the activity at 1-888-206-5963 within the Continental United States. If you are calling from outside the United States, please call us collect at 716-841-7755.

If the activity is unauthorized, we will be able to close the account and reissue both a new account number and cards. Please use the Subject Reference Number below, when calling.

At HSBC, the security of our customer’s accounts has always been, and will continue to be a high priority. We appreciate your business and regret any inconvenience this may have caused you.

Sincerely,

Security & Fraud Risk HSBC USA

Alert ID Number :  10917558

Note:  Emails sent to this repository will go unmonitored.  Please do not reply to this email. —————————————– ************************************************************** This e-mail is confidential. It may also be legally privileged. If you are not the addressee you may not copy, forward, disclose or use any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please delete it and all copies from your system and notify the sender immediately by return e-mail. Internet communications cannot be guaranteed to be timely, secure, error or virus-free. The sender does not accept liability for any errors or omissions. ************************************************************** “SAVE PAPER – THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT!”

Step 2:

Replace the phone numbers with your own. The above are HSBC’s.

Don’t worry about the ‘alert ID’. Just make something up. Unlike other credit cards, the caller (me, in this case) can’t use the alert ID to confirm this is really HSBC.

Step 3:

Blast this email. You’re bound to reach plenty of HSBC card holders. The rest you don’t care about anyway.

Main perk: Before the customer gets to speak to a human they need to enter full credit card number and 4 digit SSN. So even the most lazy scammer can at least get those.

For the overachieving scammers, have a human answer and ask for  Card expiration and Full name on the card before agreeing to answer any other questions from the customer. This is all standard procedure at HSBC so customers shouldn’t be suspicious.

Oh, and if the customer who happens to be a security blogger tries to authenticate you back, tell them to hang up and call the number on the back of their card. That will shut them up.

At HSBC, the security of our customer’s accounts has always been, and will continue to be a high priority.

If it really was, you wouldn’t make me such an easy target for scammers. But thanks for playing.

 

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REVIEW: “Dark Market: CyberThieves, CyberCops, and You”, Misha Glenny

BKDRKMKT.RVW 20120201

“Dark Market: CyberThieves, CyberCops, and You”, Misha Glenny, 2011,
978-0-88784-239-9, C$29.95
%A   Misha Glenny
%C   Suite 801, 110 Spadina Ave, Toronto, ON Canada  M5V 2K4
%D   2011
%G   978-0-88784-239-9 0-88784-239-9
%I   House of Anansi Press Ltd.
%O   C$29.95 416-363-4343 fax 416-363-1017 www.anansi.ca
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0887842399/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0887842399/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0887842399/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n Tech 1 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   296 p.
%T   “Dark Market: CyberThieves, CyberCops, and You”

There is no particular purpose stated for this book, other than the vague promise of the subtitle that this has something to do with bad guys and good guys in cyberspace.  In the prologue, Glenny admits that his “attempts to assess when an interviewee was lying, embellishing or fantasising and when an interviewee was earnestly telling the truth were only partially successful.”  Bear in mind that all good little blackhats know that, if you really want to get in, the easiest thing to attack is the person.  Social engineering (which is simply a fancy way of saying “lying”) is always the most effective tactic.

It’s hard to have confidence in the author’s assessment of security on the Internet when he knows so little of the technology.  A VPN (Virtual Private Network) is said to be a system whereby a group of computers share a single address.  That’s not a VPN (which is a system of network management, and possibly encryption): it’s a description of NAT (Network Address Translation).  True, a VPN can, and fairly often does, use NAT in its operations, but the carelessness is concerning.

This may seem to be pedantic, but it leads to other errors.  For example, Glenny asserts that running a VPN is very difficult, but that encryption is easy, since encryption software is available on the Internet.  While it is true that the software is available, that availability is only part of the battle.  As I keep pointing out to my students, for effective protection with encryption you need to agree on what key to use, and doing that negotiation is a non-trivial task.  Yes, there is asymmetric encryption, but that requires a public key infrastructure (PKI) which is an enormously difficult proposition to get right.  Of the two, I’d rather run a VPN any day.

It is, therefore, not particularly surprising that the author finds that the best way to describe the capabilities of one group of carders was to compare them to the fictional “hacking” crew from “The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.”  The activities in the novel are not impossible, but the ability to perform them on demand is highly
unlikely.

This lack of background colours his ability to ascertain what is possible or not (in the technical areas), and what is likely (out of what he has been told).  Sticking strictly with media reports and indictment documents, Glenny does a good job, and those parts of the book are interesting and enjoyable.  The author does let his taste for mystery get the better of him: even the straight reportage parts of the book are often confusing in terms of who did what, and who actually is what.

Like Dan Verton (cf BKHCKDRY.RVW) and Suelette Dreyfus (cf. BKNDRGND.RVW) before him, Glenny is trying to give us the “inside story” of the blackhat community.  He should have read Taylor’s “Hackers” (cf BKHAKERS.RVW) first, to get a better idea of the territory.  He does a somewhat better job than Dreyfus and Verton did, since he is wise enough to seek out law enforcement accounts (possibly after reading Stiennon’s “Surviving Cyberwar,” cf. BKSRCYWR.RVW).

Overall, this work is a fairly reasonable updating of Levy’s “Hackers” (cf. BKHACKRS.RVW) of almost three decades ago.  The rise of the financial motivation and the specialization of modern fraudulent blackhat activity are well presented.  There is something of a holdover in still portraying these crooks as evil genii, but, in the main, it is a decent picture of reality, although it provides nothing new.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012    BKDRKMKT.RVW 20120201

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The speed of “social” …

I made a posting on the blog.

Then I moved on to checking news, which I do via Twitter.  And, suddenly, there in my stream was a “tweet” that, fairly obviously, referred to my posting.  By someone I didn’t know, and had never heard of.  From Indonesia.

This blog now has an RSS feed.  Apparently a few people are following that feed.  And, seemingly, every time something gets posted here, it gets copied onto their blogs.

And, in at least one case, that post gets automatically (and programmatically) posted on Twitter.

I would never have known any of this, except that the posting I had made was in reference to something I had found via those stalwarts at the Annals of Improbable Research.  I had made reference to that fact in the first line.  The application used to generate the Twitter posting copies roughly the first hundred characters of the blog post, so the Improbable Research account (pretty much automatically) retweeted the programmed tweet of the blog posting that copied my original blog posting.  I follow Improbable Research on Twitter, so I got the retweet.

This set me to a little exploration.  I found, checking trackbacks, that every one of my postings was being copied to seven different blogs.  Blogs run by people of whom I’d never heard.  (Most of whom don’t seem to have any particular interest in infosec, which is rather odd.)

Well, this blog is public, and my postings are public, so I really can’t complain when the material goes public, even if in a rather larger way than I originally thought.  But it does underline the fact that, once posted on the Internet, it is very unsafe to assume that any information is confidential.  You can’t delete data once it has passed to machines beyond your control.

And it passes very, very fast.

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