Lets start with the proper disclosure; we provide a Web Site Security Seal service which competes with ControlScan’s. That said, I’m not about to bash ControlScan but rather the poor practices of security seal companies giving out seals to whoever pays them without the proper security checks.

Some background: The FTC sued ControlScan for $750,000 for giving out security seals while not really checking the security of the web sites. This lawsuit and its verdict are good news: It means that services that give out seals need to be responsible for their actions; no more “scanless PCI” badges: if you give out a seal (and I’m looking at all you large domain resellers) that needs to stand for something - when customers see a seal that says “secure site” they need to know the site is secure.

Before you take out the pitchforks, sure - there is no way to verify with 100% certainty that the web site is “secure”. But vulnerability scanning is at a stage today where you can run automated scans and make sure the web site is “secure enough” - meaning it does not have any known vulnerabilities, doesn’t suffer from SQL injections or cross site scripting. If there is a zero day vulnerability in apache, I doubt it will be used against an e-commerce site - it is more likely to be used against a bank or the government. Fact is, over 90% of successful attacks use known vulnerabilities that would have been detected by any competent scanner. If the site is properly scanned and no vulnerabilities are found, this is probably as good as it’s ever going to get; and is definitely better than the chances of your credit card being stolen at a brick-and-mortar store.

What will happen with ControlScan is not really important. What’s important is that security seal providers will now have to stand behind their claims - the fact that the FCC went after a case like this, which is normally way below their threshold, probably means that someone is applying pressure on them; hopefully that will help clean up the act of some online scanning vendors.

Note: Complaint, Exhibits and final judgment here.

So, let me get this straight, MS was informed about this vulnerability by a security researcher (Meron Sellen) last August, and it’s sat in the Microsoft Security Response Center’s queue to be fixed until Google got hacked, and then they checked their queue to see if they knew about it?

Even though this was acknowledged in September, and MS planned to ship the patch in a cumulative IE update next month, so that’s 6 months, really? Wow, I thought that Adobe had it tough with not having enough developers to patch
This really makes me question the worlds largest OS developer, I have to say. The following questions come to mind though.

- If this was passed to them last September, do they have that many bugs in their code that they haven’t gotten around to this one yet?

- What happened to MS’s secure development program if something like this can get missed?

-  As it’s the fault of a software development house that another 33 companies were hacked, will any legal action be taken against then for this?

- Will/Could Google sue MS for damages if they do decide to pull out of China because of this hack?

Just random thoughts, but hey…

Okay, so a few days ago I found a ton of XSS vulnerabilities on various high profile web sites, and on the whole, after eventually managing to contact the relevant teams for the sites, everyone was very grateful.

When will web sites owners learn that it’s a good idea to have a security contact e-mail address on their sites!

However there was one, whose name I’m not going to mention here, that came back to me with the worst possible answer ever.

This is an online retailer, and my e-mail went to their help desk, but still!

Here’s the full e-mail trail (I’ve removed certain bits of info though so that the site or the attack vector cannot be identified.) Please also note that due the nature of what this company does they are required to be PCI DSS compliant.

===============================

—–Original Message—–
From: xyberpix [mailto:xyberpix@blahblah.com]
Sent: 05 January 2010 07:53
To: help@xxx.com
Subject: Website enquiry: General - www.xxx.com

Sent Date: 2010-01-05 07:52:58 (GMT/UTC)

Hi There,

I have discovered a security vulnerability on your web site, and would like to please disclose this to yourselves responsibly. Could you please either contact me with the name of someone who I should report this to, or could you please get someone to contact me at this e-mail address please. If this could please be treated as urgent.

Thank you
xyberpix

===================================
On 5 Jan 2010, at 16:40, XXX Support User2 wrote:

Hi Xyberpix,

Thank you for your email message.

Can I please ask you to supply the screenshot of the page so that we can look into this for you?

I look forward to your reply, upon which I will do my very best to assist you.

Kind Regards,
Alex | Customer Services Representative
Note: Please do not delete the previous correspondence if you are replying to this e-mail. This will help us to assist you better. www.xxx.com

===================================

—–Original Message—–
From: xyberpix [mailto:xyberpix@blahblah.com]
Sent: 05 January 2010 16:59
To: XXX Support User2
Subject: Re: XXX

Hi Alex,

No problem at all please find attached a screenshot.

Also the string that was used in the main search bar to prove this was the following:

‘;alert yadayadayada

Kind Regards,
xyberpix

==================================

Hi,

Thank you for contacting us and sorry for the inconvenience caused here.

May I kindly request you to clear the cache and cookies from your internet browser and then try placing your order opening a new browser.

If you have any further queries please do let us know.

Kind Regards,
Edwin | Customer Services Representative
XXX!

Note: Please do not delete the previous correspondence if you are replying to this e-mail. This will help us to assist you better.

SecuriTeam Blogs contains several FAQ documents about MS Office vulnerabilities used in targeted attacks since 2006. This time I’m not writing a FAQ. This document has answers to What this means type questions.

What an organization can make to protect?

#1 Disable JavaScript. Deploy a system to deliver this setting to all workstations. This is not the last Adobe 0-day which we will see.

What this means?

Go to Edit>Preferences menu, select item ‘JavaScript’, Uncheck “Enable Acrobat JavaScript” and to save the setting click ‘OK’.

#2 Enable DEP

Some Windows systems include Data Execution Prevention (DEP) functionality.

What this means?

If your organization is using Windows versions with DEP support the code execution can be avoided.

Adobe has confirmed these mitigation advices in security advisory APSA09-07, but as mentioned DEP method doesn’t fully prevent the exploitation.

#3 Do not open PDF documents from unknown sources AND received unexpectedly.

What this means?

If you don’t know the sender who is sending you file attachments there is always a risk that you are a victim of targeted attack. Remember that the sender can be easily spoofed as well.

#4 Switch to alternative PDF reader.

There are many free and commercial products. However, they are often affected by Adobe vulnerabilities too and a patching policy is needed when switching to another product.

What this means?

Changing the PDF reader in large organization is not an easy move. Today is a good day to start the planning project.

Let’s talk about technical details with some words. The vulnerability exists in Doc.media.newPlayer method. The Trojan in these attacks generated connections to http: // foruminspace dot com and http: // newsplaza dot net (these servers are located in Malaysia).

AV vendors use the following names when detecting the malicious PDF document:

Exploit.JS.Pdfka.atq (Kaspersky)

Exploit:W32/AdobeReader.UZ (F-Secure)

Exploit-PDF.ag (McAfee)

PDF/Pidief.NQ (CA)

Trojan.Pidief.H (Symantec)

TROJ_PIDIEF.PGS (Trend Micro)

Troj/PDFJs-FS (Sophos)

The size of the infected PDF document is 400,918 bytes. The file name varies, but it can be note200911.pdf, note_20091210.pdf or Outline of Interview.pdf.

Wikileaks has released hundreds of thousands pager messages from 11th September, 2001.

Link: 911.wikileaks.org/

Listings say that the messages are sent in networks of Arch Wireless, Metrocall, and SkyTel.

I am a bit freaked.

Last month I received an email message from American Express.  I very nearly deleted it unread: it was obviously phish, right?  (I was teaching in Toronto that week, so I had even more reason to turf it unread rather than look at it.)

However, since I do have an Amex card, I decided to at least have a look at it, and possibly try and find some way to send it to them.  So I looked at it.

And promptly freaked out.

The phishers had my card number.  (Or, at least, the last five digits of it.)  They knew the due date of my statement.  The knew the balance amount of my last statement.

(The fact that this was all happening while I am aware from home wasn’t making me feel any more comfortable with it …)

So I had a look at the headers.  And couldn’t find a single thing indicating that this wasn’t from American Express.

(I had paid my bill before I left.  Or, at least, I *thought* I had.  So I checked my bank.  Sure enough, that balance had been paid a couple of days before.  However, I guess banks never actually transfer money on the weekend or something …)

A couple of days later I got another message: Amex was telling me that my payment was received.  That’s nice of them.  They were once again sending, in an unencrypted email message, the last five digits of my card number, and the last balance paid on my account.

Well, I figured that it might have been an experiment, and that they’d probably realize the error of their ways, and I didn’t necessarily need to point this out.  Apparently I was wrong on all counts, since I got another reminder message today.

Are these people completely unaware of the existence and risk of phishing?  Are they so totally ignorant of online security that they are encouraging their customers to be looking for legitimate email from a financial institution, thus increasing the risk of deception and fraud?

Going to their Website, I notice that there is now an “Account Alerts” function.  It may have been there for a while: I don’t know, since I’ve never used it.  Since I’ve never used it, I assume it was populated by default when they created it.  It seems to, by default, send you a payment due notice a week before the deadline, a payment received notice when payment is received, and a notice when you approach your credit limit.  (Fortunately, someone had the good sense not to automatically populate the option that sends you your statement balance every week.)  These options may be useful to some people.  But they should be options: they shouldn’t be sending a bunch of information about everybody’s account, in the clear, by default.

(There are, of course, “Terms and Conditions” applicable to this service, which basically say, as usual, that Amex isn’t responsible for much of anything, have warned you, and that you take all the risks arising from this function.  I find this heavily ironic, since I knew nothing of the service, don’t want it, and got it automatically.  I never even knew the “Terms and Conditions” existed, but in order to turn the service off I’ll have to read them.)

(In trying to send a copy of this to Amex, I note that their Website only lists phone and snailmail as contact options, you aren’t supposed to be able to send them email.)

A while back I was fuzzing with Hzzp and found a remote format string vulnerability in Ipswitch’s WS_FTP. But, I couldn’t find a security contact for Ipswitch. I waited a few months and made the vulnerability public. The day afterwards, a representative from Ipswitch contacted me and I explained why I hadn’t contacted them previously. He was eager to get the vulnerability fixed and made the comment that they’ll need to do a better job publicizing the security contact information. I was happy to have had received a more professional, non-automated email from someone who seemed to care about the security of their company’s product.

I didn’t worry too much about the update process. I know it can take some companies months or even years to release new patches for vulnerabilities in their products, which most of the time is completely unreasonable. Then, a little more than two weeks later, I received an email from that same Ipswitch representative informing me that a new release of WS_FTP was available and the date in the Help->About window should say Sept 18th (10 days after we discussed the vulnerability). What an excellent example of how vendors should handle security issues within their products.

Fast response, efficient security policy, good business. Thanks Ipswitch!

God bless the law that forces companies to disclose when they are hacked and customer information is compromised. Not only do we get a chance to protect ourselves but it also reminds us that this apparently happens more often then we would think.

This time it’s elance.com:

Dear (my account name),
We recently learned that certain Elance user information was accessed without authorization, including potentially yours. The data accessed was contact information — specifically name, email address, telephone number, city location and Elance login information (passwords were protected with encryption). This incident did NOT involve any credit card, bank account, social security or tax ID numbers.
We have remedied the cause of the breach and are working with appropriate authorities. We have also implemented additional security measures and have strengthened password requirements to protect all of our users.
We sincerely regret any inconvenience or disruption this may cause.
If you have any unanswered questions and for ongoing information about this matter, please visit this page in our Trust & Safety center: http://www.elance.com/p/trust/account_security.html
For information on re-setting your password, visit: http://help.elance.com/forums/30969/entries/47262
Thank you for your understanding,
Michael Culver
Vice President
Elance

What I would like to see, is what “additional security measures” are they really taking. Also (and I’ll admit I have a one-track-mind) did they do a proper security scan to ensure the servers don’t have any holes? What were the results?

Just thought I’d bring it up since there has been prolific chatter on the lists lately…

The startup VoIPShield is changing its disclosure policy to stop giving out VoIP bugs for free and start charging vendors for it. CEO Rick Dalmazzi writes:

Avaya doesn’t “have to” pay us for anything. We do not “require” payment from you. It’s Avaya’s choice if you want to acquire the results of years of work by VoIPshield. It’s a business decision that your company will have to make. VoIPshield has made a business decision to not give away that work for free.

I can totally see his point. While we would like to see all vulnerabilities out in the open, for free, companies and researchers that have worked hard to find security vulnerabilities should be compensated.

But I do think Rick is taking the long and hard path by asking the vendors directly - there’s still a long way to go there. We’ve been helping researchers sell their research to organizations who wanted to pay for 0-day vulnerability information through our SSD (SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure) program and the main conclusions so far are that there are organizations willing to pay for this information to protect themselves, but those are not the vendors (yet).

What we see is that organizations use this information as leverage on the vendors. Since they have information about undisclosed vulnerabilities, they can easily exercise this (better than we can, as researchers) to force the vendors to plug those holes. After a while, maybe vendors will choose to drink upstream and subscribe for this information. But that may take a while (a friend of mine that is responsible for product security for a very large vendor says that will be a cold day in hell).
In any case, good luck to VoIPShield and their new paid-disclosure program. If they are successful I think security researchers will benefit, and in the long run customers will be more protected as vendors get direct access to zero-day vulnerabilities.

0x01 Introduction
0x02 Phrack Prophile on The PaX Team
0x03 Phrack World News
0x04 Abusing the Objective C runtime
0x05 Backdooring Juniper Firewalls
0x06 Exploiting DLmalloc frees in 2009
0x07 Persistent BIOS infection
0x08 Exploiting UMA : FreeBSD kernel heap exploits
0x09 Exploiting TCP Persist Timer Infiniteness
0x0A Malloc Des-Maleficarum
0x0B A Real SMM Rootkit
0x0C Alphanumeric RISC ARM Shellcode
0x0D Power cell buffer overflow
0x0E Binary Mangling with Radare
0x0F Linux Kernel Heap Tempering Detection
0x10 Developing MacOSX Rootkits
0x11 How close are they of hacking your brain ?

You can check it out here.

Now we have something to keep us busy while the net neutrality debates are going on…

Following on from the previous 2 posts that have been put up here and here, after seeing the post about the T-Mobile hack on Full-Disclosure, and then T-Mobile admitting that it has happened, really got me thinking.

To the best of my knowledge this will be the third high profile security breach at T-Mobile in the last 4 years, the first one being Paris Hilton’s SideKick getting hacked. Now the SideKick episode was more down to user error that T-Mobile’s fault, but this one could have been prevented by using strong password complexity rules. Which I thought was something that most major organizations would have already picked up on by now, especially the big corporates. Password complexity is not complicated to implement, and it does tend to prevent these little things like brand damage from occurring.
Speaking of brand damage, now that T-Mobile have been hit a second time, where does this leave them with Companies such as Google and Apple?

T-Mobile is currently doing really well with the addition of the Google Android and Apple iPhone handsets to its portfolio, but do Google and Apple really need this sort of publicity? These are the types of incidents that make companies think twice about their partnerships.

I’m completely aware that these type of incidents happen all the time, but most people expect that mobile operators would have stronger security measures in place.

Couple this with the fact that at present T-Mobile is gearing up for a class action law suite due to charging customers termination costs, this is another company that has me wondering how long….

The T-mobile data breach that jbrown wrote about has been confirmed by T-Mobile.
I guess not everything you read on Full Disclosure is fake after all…

From the looks of it, T-Mobile has been hacked and the goods stolen.

They also seem to love running HP-UX.

Open Security Foundation’s DataLossDB has announced the winners of oldest incident contest.

One of the oldest documented issue is TRW incident from 1984, when the database of credit history of 90 million American citizen was breached.
Link here.

Update: The winner is an incident from August 1953, when SSN’s were lost.

OK, this has got nothing to do with computers (except that the SkyTrain is completely automated).

For the past three years, Cambie Street, a major thoroughfare with at least four different shopping and business areas on it, has been almost completely shut down for the construction of the RAV (Richmond-Airport-Vancouver) SkyTrain line (aka Canada Line).  (Since it is located almost dead centre in Vancouver, the city has been pretty much bisected for that time, and the traffic hassles have been enormous.)  Originally the line was supposed to be a tunnel, but that was going to take too long and cost too much, so they dug up the entire street.  For three years.

Most of the businesses along Cambie have gone bankrupt in that time: others have moved.

Now a lawsuit for damages has been won by a business owner.

This will, of course be a precedent, and will undoubtedly lead to more judgements (I think other cases are already before the courts) and more lawsuits.

I’ve got to admit to an uncharitable glee over this turn of events.  The RAV line was not prompted, but the decision to actually build it was undoubtedly influenced, by the 2010 Olympics.  The provincial government has been absolutely gaga over having the games here, and has launched a number of “vanity” projects and other measures.  (Latest on the list: for the games, security personnel won’t have to undergo the minimal training and licencing that already exists.  They can get a special certificate which seems to merely verify that they are breathing.)