YASCCL (Yet Another Stupid Computer Crime Law)

Over the years I have seen numerous attempts at addressing the serious problems in computer crime with new laws.  Well-intentioned, I know, but all too many of these attempts are flawed.  The latest is from Nova Scotia:

Bill 61
Commentary

“The definition of cyberbullying, in this particular bill, includes “any electronic communication” that ”ought reasonably be expected” to “humiliate” another person, or harm their “emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation.””

Well, all I can say is that everyone in this forum better be really careful what they say about anybody else.

(Oh, $#!+.  Did I just impugn the reputation of the Nova Scotia legislature?)

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Outsourcing, and rebranding, (national) security

I was thinking about the recent trend, in the US, for “outsourcing” and “privatization” of security functions, in order to reduce (government) costs.  For example, we know, from the Snowden debacle, that material he, ummm, “obtained,” was accessed while he was working for a contractor that was working for the NSA.  The debacle also figured in my thinking, particularly the PR fall-out and disaster.

Considering both these trends; outsourcing and PR, I see an opportunity here.  The government needs to reduce costs (or increase revenue).  At the same time, there needs to be a rebranding effort, in order to restore tarnished images.

Sports teams looking for revenue (or cost offsets) have been allowing corporate sponsors to rename, or “rebrand,” arenas.  Why not allow corporations to sponsor national security programs, and rebrand them?

For example: PRISM has become a catch-phrase for all that is wrong with surveillance of the general public.  Why not allow someone like, say, DeBeers to step in.  For a price (which would offset the millions being paid to various tech companies for “compliance”) it could be rebranded as DIAMOND, possibly with a new slogan like “A database is forever!”

(DeBeers is an obvious sponsor, given the activities of NSA personnel in regard to love interests.)

I think the possibilities are endless, and should be explored.

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Has your email been “hacked?”

I got two suspicious messages today.  They were identical, and supposedly “From” two members of my extended family, and to my most often used account, rather than the one I use as a spam trap.  I’ve had some others recently, and thought it a good opportunity to write up something on the general topic of email account phishing.

The headers are no particular help: the messages supposedly related to a Google Docs document, and do seem to come from or through Google.  (Somewhat ironically, at the time the two people listed in these messages might have been sharing information with the rest of us in the family in this manner.  Be suspicious of anything you receive over the Internet, even if you think it might relate to something you are expecting.)

The URLs/links in the message are from TinyURL (which Google wouldn’t use) and, when resolved, do not actually go to Google.  They seem to end up on a phishing site intended to steal email addresses.  It had a Google logo at the top, and asked the user to “sign in” with email addresses (and passwords) from Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, and a few other similar sites.  (The number of possible Webmail sites should be a giveaway in itself: Google would only be interested in your Google account.)

Beware of any messages you receive that look like this:

——- Forwarded message follows ——-
Subject:            Important Documents
Date sent:          Mon, 5 Aug 2013 08:54:26 -0700
From:               [a friend or relative]

*Hello,*
*
How are you doing today? Kindly view the documents i uploaded for you using
Google Docs CLICK HERE <hxxp://tinyurl.com/o2vlrxx>.
——- End of forwarded message ——-

That particular site was only up briefly: 48 hours later it was gone.  This tends to be the case: these sites change very quickly.  Incidentally, when I initially tested it with a few Web reputation systems, it was pronounced clean by all.

This is certainly not the only type of email phishing message: a few years ago there were rafts of messages warning you about virus, spam, or security problems with your email account.  Those are still around: I just got one today:

——- Forwarded message follows ——-
From:               ”Microsoft HelpDesk” <microsoft@helpdesk.com>
Subject:            Helpdesk Mail Box Warning!!!
Date sent:          Wed, 7 Aug 2013 15:56:35 -0200

Helpdesk Mail Support require you to re-validate your Microsoft outlook mail immediately by clicking: hxxp://dktxxxkgek.webs.com/

This Message is From Helpdesk. Due to our latest IP Security upgrades we have reason to believe that your Microsoft outlook mail account was accessed by a third party. Protecting the security of your Microsoft outlook mail account is our primary concern, we have limited access to sensitive Microsoft outlook mail account features.

Failure to re-validate, your e-mail will be blocked in 24 hours.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Help Desk
Microsoft outlook Team
——- End of forwarded message ——-

Do you really think that Microsoft wouldn’t capitalize its own Outlook product?

(Another giveaway on that particular one is that it didn’t come to my Outlook account, mostly because I don’t have an Outlook account.)

(That site was down less than three hours after I received the email.

OK, so far I have only been talking about things that should make you suspicious when you receive them.  But what happens if and when you actually follow through, and get hit by these tricks?  Well, to explain that, we have to ask why the bad guys would want to phish for your email account.  After all, we usually think of phishing in terms of bank accounts, and money.

The blackhats phishing for email accounts might be looking for a number of things.  First, they can use your account to send out spam, and possibly malicious spam, at that.  Second, they can harvest email addresses from your account (and, in particular, people who would not be suspicious of a message when it comes “From:” you).  Third, they might be looking for a way to infect or otherwise get into your computer, using your computer in a botnet or for some other purpose, or stealing additional information (like banking information) you might have saved.  A fourth possibility, depending upon the type of Webmail you have, is to use your account to modify or create malicious Web pages, to serve malware, or do various types of phishing.

What you have to do depends on what it was the bad guys were after in getting into your account.

If they were after email addresses, it’s probably too late.  They have already harvested the addresses.  But you should still change your password on that account, so they won’t be able to get back in.  And be less trusting in future.

The most probable thing is that they were after your account in order to use it to send spam.  Change your password so that they won’t be able to send any more.  (In a recent event, with another relative, the phishers had actually changed the password themselves.  This is unusual, but it happens.  In that case, you have to contact the Webmail provider, and get them to reset your password for you.)  The phishers have probably also sent email to all of your friends (and everyone in your contacts or address list), so you’d better send a message around, ‘fess up to the fact that you’ve been had, and tell your friends what they should do.  (You can point them at this posting.)  Possibly in an attempt to prevent you from finding out that your account has been hacked, the attackers often forward your email somewhere else.  As well as changing your password, check to see if there is any forwarding on your account, and also check to see if associated email addresses have been changed.

It’s becoming less likely that the blackhats want to infect your computer, but it’s still possible.  In that case, you need to get cleaned up.  If you are running Windows, Microsoft’s (free!) program Microsoft Security Essentials (or MSE) does a very good job.  If you aren’t, or want something different, then Avast, Avira, Eset, and Sophos have products available for free download, and for Windows, Mac, iPhone, and Android.  (If you already have some kind of antivirus program running on your machine, you might want to get these anyway, because yours isn’t working, now is it?)

(By the way, in the recent incident, both family members told me that they had clicked on the link “and by then it was too late.”  They were obviously thinking of infection, but, in fact, that particular site wasn’t set up to try and infect the computer.  When they saw the page asked for their email addresses and password, it wasn’t too late.  if they had stopped at that point, and not entered their email addresses and passwords, nothing would have happened!  Be aware, and a bit suspicious.  It’ll keep you safer.)

When changing your password, or checking to see if your Web page has been modified, be very careful, and maybe use a computer that is protected a bit better than your is.  (Avast is very good at telling you if a Web page is trying to send you something malicious, and most of the others do as well.  MSE doesn’t work as well in this regard.)  Possibly use a computer that uses a different operating system: if your computer uses Windows, then use a Mac: if your computer is a Mac, use an Android tablet or something like that.  Usually (though not always) those who set up malware pages are only after one type of computer.

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Click on everything?

You clicked on that link, didn’t you?  I’m writing a posting about malicious links in postings and email, and you click on a link in my posting.  How silly is that?

(No, it wouldn’t have been dangerous, in this case.  I disabled the URL by “x”ing out the “tt” in http;” (which is pretty standard practice in malware circles), and further “x”ed out a couple of the letters in the URL.)

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(Photo) Copyist’s error?

Students of the classics and ancient documents are used to checking for copyist errors, but a photocopier?

And, of course, you can’t trust the machine to check the copy against the original, since it will probably make the same mistake every time.

Actually, with absolutely everything in the world going digital, this type of problem is becoming inevitable, and endemic.  Analogue systems have problems, but digital systems are subject to catastrophic collapse.

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Thoughts at the library drop slot

A couple of days ago, I happened to walk over to the library in order to return some items.  When I got there, as all too often is the case, a parent was allowing two of his children to put their returns back into the (single) drop slot.  He noticed me, and offered to take my stuff and return it when they were done.  (Parenthetically [as it were], I should note that, in the five years since the new system was put in place, this is only the second time that a parent, in such a situation, has taken any notice of the fact that they were delaying matters.  The previous one, about a year ago, asked her children to stand aside and let me through.  I digress, but not completely.)

I immediately handed over my pile (which included a recent bestseller, and a recent movie).  (We are all creatures of social convention, and social engineering is a powerful force.)  But, being a professional paranoid, as soon as I walked away I started berating myself for being so trusting.

I was also thinking that his actions were pedagogically unsound.  While he was, at least, assisting me in avoiding delay, he was, just as much as the majority of the parents at that slot, teaching his children that they need have no regard for anyone else.

(And, yes, before I left the library, I checked my account, and determined that he had, in fact, returned my items.  Auditing, you know.)

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REVIEW: “Intelligent Internal Control and Risk Management”, Matthew Leitch

BKIICARM.RVW   20121210

“Intelligent Internal Control and Risk Management”, Matthew Leitch, 2008, 978-0-566-08799-8, U$144.95
%A   Matthew Leitch
%C   Gower House, Croft Rd, Aldershot, Hampshire, GU11 3HR, England
%D   2008
%G   978-0-566-08799-8 0-566-08799-5
%I   Gower Publishing Limited
%O   U$114.95 www.gowerpub.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0566087995/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0566087995/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0566087995/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience i- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   253 p.
%T   “Intelligent Internal Control and Risk Management”

The introduction indicates that this book is written from the risk management perspective of the financial services industry, with a concentration on Sarbanes-Oxley, COSO, and related frameworks.  There is an implication that the emphasis is on designing new controls.

Part one, “The Bigger Picture,” provides a history of risk management and internal controls.  Chapter one asks how much improvement is possible through additional controls.  The author’s statement that “[w]hen an auditor, especially an external auditor, recommends an improvement control it is usually with little concern for the cost of implementing or operating that control [or improved value].  The auditor wants to feel `covered’ by having recommended something in the face of a risk that exists, at least in theory” is one that is familiar to anyone in the security field.  Leitch goes on to note that there is a disparity between providing real value and revenue assurance, and the intent of this work is increasing the value of business risk controls.  The benefits of trying quality management techniques, as well as those of quantitative risk management, are promoted in chapter two.   Chapter three appears to be a collection of somewhat random thoughts on risk.  Psychological factors in assessing risk, and the fact that controls have to be stark enough to make people aware of upcoming dangers, are discussed in chapter four.

Part two turns to a large set of controls, and examines when to use, and not to use, them.  Chapter five introduces the list, arrangement, and structure.  Controls that generate other controls (frequently management processes) are reviewed in chapter six.  For each control there is a title, example, statement of need, opening thesis, discussion, closing recommendation, and summary relating to other controls.  Most are one to three pages in length.  Audit and monitoring controls are dealt with in chapter seven.  Adaptation is the topic of chapter eight.  (There is a longer lead-in discussion to these controls, since, inherently, they deal with change, to which people, business, and control processes are highly resistant.)  Chapter nine notes issues of protection and reliability.  The corrective controls in chapter ten are conceptually related to those in chapter seven.

Part three looks at change for improvement, rather than just for the sake of change.  Chapter eleven suggests means of promoting good behaviours.  A Risk and Uncertainty Management Assessment (RUMA) tool is presented in chapter twelve, but, frankly, I can’t see that it goes beyond thinking out alternative courses of action.  Barriers to improvement are noted in chapter thirteen.  Roles in the organization, and their relation to risk management, are outlined in chapter fourteen.  Chapter fifteen examines the special needs for innovative projects.  Ways to address restrictive ideology are mentioned in chapter sixteen.  Seven areas that Leitch advises should be explored conclude the book in chapter seventeen.

A number of interesting ideas are presented for consideration in regard to the choice and design of controls.  However, the text is not a guidebook for producing actual control systems.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2013   BKIICARM.RVW   20121210

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A virus too big to fail?

Once upon a time, many years ago, a school refused to take my advice (mediated through my brother) as to what to do about a very simple computer virus infection.  The infection in question was Stoned, which was a boot sector infector.   BSIs generally do not affect data, and (and this is the important point) are not eliminated by deleting files on the computer, and often not even by reformatting the hard disk.  (At the time there were at least a dozen simple utilities for removing Stoned, most of them free.)

The school decided to cleanse it’s entire computer network by boxing it up, shipping it back to the store, and having the store reformat everything.  Which the store did.  The school lost it’s entire database of student records, and all databases for the library.  Everything had to be re-entered.  By hand.

I’ve always thought this was the height of computer virus stupidity, and that the days when anyone would be so foolish were long gone.

I was wrong.  On both counts.

“In December 2011 the Economic Development Administration (an agency under the US Department of Commerce) was notified by the Department of Homeland Security that it had a malware infection spreading around its network.

“They isolated their department’s hardware from other government networks, cut off employee email, hired an outside security contractor, and started systematically destroying $170,000 worth of computers, cameras, mice, etc.”

The only reason they *stopped* destroying computer equipment and devices was because they ran out of money.  For the destruction process.

Malware is my field, and so I often sound like a bit of a nut, pointing out issues that most people consider minor.  However, malware, while now recognized as a threat, is a field that extremely few people, even in the information security field, study in any depth.  Most general security texts (and, believe me, I know almost all of them) touch on it only tangentially, and often provide advice that is long out of date.

With that sort of background, I can, unfortunately, see this sort of thing happening again.

 

Lest you think I exaggerate any of this, you can read the actual report.

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REVIEW: “The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications”, Michael Zalewski

BKTNGWEB.RVW   20121207

“The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications”, Michael Zalewski, 2012, 978-1-59327-388-0, U$49.95/C$52.95
%A   Michael Zalewski
%C   555 De Haro Street, Suite 250, San Francisco, CA   94107
%D   2012
%G   978-1-59327-388-0 1-59327-388-6
%I   No Starch Press
%O   U$49.95/C$52.95 415-863-9900 fax 415-863-9950 info@nostarch.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1593273886/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1593273886/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1593273886/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience a Tech 2 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   299 p.
%T   “The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications”

In the preface, the author dismisses security experts as academic, ineffectually worried, and unaware of the importance of the Web.  (Zalewski makes reference to a “confused deputy problem” being “regularly” referred to in academic security literature.  I’ve never heard of it.)  He blames them for the current insecure state of Web applications.  I suspect this is a bit unfair, given the “citizen programmer” status of huge numbers of Web projects, and the time and feature pressure this places on the rest.  It is unfortunate that some security specialists have not regarded the Web as significant, but it is critical that most security specialist don’t know how to program, and most programmers don’t care anything about security.

He also says the book is about repentance, and a step towards normalcy.  (Normalcy is not defined.

Chapter one is an introduction, both to information security, and to Web application development.  Starting off by misattributing one of Gene Spafford’s quotes, the author complains about any and all attempts to structure or define security.  (Rather inconsistently, while he derides taxonomies, he does recommend designing systems so as to deal with “classes” of bugs.  The difference between a class and a taxon is not explained.)

Part one outlines the principal concepts of the Web.  Chapter two starts us off with the URL (Uniform Resource Locator), noting some of the problems with different types of encoding.  From this point in the book, each chapter concludes with a “Security Engineering Cheat Sheet,” listing potential problems, and suggesting broad approaches (without details) to dealing with those issues.  HTTP (the HyperText Transfer Protocol) is the subject of chapter three, primarily concerning the handling of user data.  (Since the author is fond of quotes, I’ll give him one from Tony Buckland, several years before the invention of the Web: “The client interface is the boundary of trustworthiness.”)  Chapters four to eight cover HTML (HyperText Markup Language), CSS (Cascading Style Sheets), browser scripting (concentrating exclusively on JavaScript), non-HTML data (mostly XML), and plug-ins.

Part two turns to browser security features.  Chapter nine talks about isolating content, so that different sites or documents don’t interfere with each other.  Determining where and to whom a page belongs is addressed in chapter ten.  Chapter eleven expands the details of problems caused by allowing disparate documents to interact.  Other security boundaries, such as local storage, networks, ports, and cookies, are reviewed in chapter twelve.  Recognizing content, when the “Content-Type” description may be problematic, is in chapter thirteen.  Chapter fourteen suggests ways to deal with malicious scripts.  Specifically setting or raising permissions is discussed in chapter fifteen.

Part three looks ahead to Web application security issues as they may develop in the future.  New and coming security features are noted in chapters sixteen and seventeen.  Chapter eighteen reviews the all-too-common Web vulnerabilities (such as cross-site scripting and “Referer” leakage).

Absent the complaints about the rest of the security field, this is a decent and technical guide to problems which should be considered for any Web application project.  It’s not a cookbook, but provides solid advice for designers and developers.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2013   BKTNGWEB.RVW   20121207

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REVIEW: “Consent of the Networked”, Rebecca MacKinnon

BKCNSNTW.RVW   20121205

“Consent of the Networked”, Rebecca MacKinnon, 2012, 978-0-465-02442-1, U$26.99/C$30.00
%A   Rebecca MacKinnon
%C   387 Park Ave. South, New York, NY   10016-8810
%D   2012
%G   978-0-465-02442-1 0-465-02442-1
%I   Basic Books
%O   U$26.99/C$30.00 special.markets@perseusbooks.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465024421/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465024421/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0465024421/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   294 p.
%T   “Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom”

In neither the preface nor the introduction is there a clear statement of the intent of this work.  The closest comes buried towards the end of the introduction, in a sentence which states “This book is about the new realities of power, freedom, and control in the Internet Age.”  Alongside other assertions in the opening segments, one can surmise that MacKinnon is trying to point out the complexities of the use, by countries or corporations, of technologies which enhance either democracy or control, and the desirability of a vague concept which she refers to as “Internet Freedom.”

Readers may think I am opposed to the author’s ideas.  That is not the case.  However, it is very difficult to critique a text, and suggest whether it is good or bad, when there is no clear statement of intent, thesis, or terminology.

Part one is entitled “Disruptions.”  Chapter one outlines a number of stories dealing with nations or companies promising freedom, but actually censoring or taking data without informing citizens or users.  The “digital commons,” conceptually akin to open source but somewhat more nebulous (the author does, in fact, confuse open source and open systems), is promoted in chapter two.

Part two turns more directly to issues of control.  Chapter three concentrates on factors the Republic of China uses to strengthen state censorship.  Variations on this theme are mentioned in chapter four.

Part three examines challenges to democracy.  Chapter five lists recent US laws and decisions related to surveillance and repression of speech.  The tricky issue of making a distinction between repression of offensive speech on the one hand, and censorship on the other, is discussed in chapter six.  The argument made about strengthening censorship by taking actions against intellectual property infringement, in chapter seven, is weak, and particularly in light of more recent events.

Part four emphasizes the role that corporations play in aiding national censorship and surveillance activities.  Chapter eight starts with some instances of corporations aiding censorship, but devolves into a review of companies opposed to “network neutrality.”  Similarly, chapter nine notes corporations aiding surveillance.  Facebook and Google are big, states chapter ten, but the evil done in stories given does not inherently relate to size.

Part five asks what is to be done.  Trust but verify, says (ironically) chapter eleven: hold companies accountable.  MacKinnon mentions that this may be difficult.   Chapter twelve asks for an Internet Freedom Policy, but, since the author admits the term can have multiple meanings, the discussion is fuzzy.  Global Information Governance is a topic that makes chapter thirteen apposite in terms of the current ITU (International Telecommunications Union) summit, but the focus in the book is on the ICANN (Internet Committee on Assigned Names and Numbers) top level domain sale scandals.  The concluding chapter fourteen, on building a netizen-centric Internet is not just fuzzy, but full of warm fuzzies.

There are a great many interesting news reports, stories, and anecdotes in the book.  There is a great deal of passion, but not much structure.  This can make it difficult to follow topical threads.  This book really adds very little to the debates on these topics.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2013   BKCNSNTW.RVW   20121205

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Risk analysis, traffic analysis, and unusual factors

Canadian terrorists strike again: apparently we are responsible for taking down a major piece of transportation infrastructure, vis, the I-5 bridge over the Skagit river at Mount Vernon.

A friend in Seattle assures me that, while he is disappointed in us, he holds no grudges, and is willing to warn us if he hears of any drone strikes planned for north of the border.

(Allow me, for a moment, to examine this “oversized load” on which everyone is blaming the collapse.  Image 2 in the slide deck [if they don't change it] is this “oversized load.”  You will notice that it is basically an empty box with the two sides missing, and has, relatively, zero structural rigidity.  If a ding from that kind of load brought the bridge down [and didn't even collapse the load itself], the bridge was definitely unsafe.)

I drive that route regularly, and, when I heard that a bridge had gone down, that bridge was the first one I thought of.  I have always felt unsafe crossing it.  There is a wrongness about it you can just feel.

It’s also ugly.  And I am reminded of an essay by an engineer who said that bridges were the most beautiful products of all forms of engineering.  A properly designed bridge has curves, and those curves just feel right.  They are beautiful.

So, if you ever have questions about a bridge, and you don’t have enough facts to go on, just look at it.

If it’s ugly, don’t cross it.

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REVIEW: “Cloud Crash”, Phil Edwards

BKCLDCRS.RVW   20101009

“Cloud Crash”, Phil Edwards, 2011, 978-1466408425, U$9.99
%A   Phil Edwards PhilEdwardsInc.com philipjedwards@gmail.com
%C   Seattle, WA
%D   2011
%G   978-1466408425 1466408421
%I   CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform/Amazon
%O   U$9.99
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1466408421/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1466408421/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1466408421/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n Tech 2 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   386 p.
%T   “Cloud Crash”

To a background of the Internet crashing, and opposed by a conspiracy that has penetrated the highest levels of government, two (no, make that three … err … four … better say five …) groups of individuals race to save the world from … a stock market fraud?  hostile takeover? aliens?  (No, I’m pretty sure the aliens were a red
herring.)

The story and inconsistent characterizations could use some work, and the plot twists don’t make it very easy to follow what is going on.  It’s fairly easy to tell who the good and bad guys are: the politics and philosophy of the book are fairly simple, and one is reminded of the scifi and comics of the 30s and 40s, with heavily anti-fascist and (ironically) right-wing rhetoric.

It would be tempting to dismiss the work as a simple “jump on the latest buzzword” potboiler, were it not for the fact that the technology is fairly realistic.  Yes, right now everyone is jumping on the cloud bandwagon without much regard for real security.  Yes, if you wanted to make a big (and public) splash on the Internet, without doing too much permanent damage, taking down power supplies would still leave the data intact.  (Of course, an axe would do just as good a job as bombs …)

So, while the story isn’t great, at least the technology is less annoying than is normally the case …

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKCLDCRS.RVW   20101009

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REVIEW: “Security and Privacy for Microsoft Office 2010 Users”, Mitch Tulloch

BKSCPRO2.RVW   20121122

“Security and Privacy for Microsoft Office 2010 Users”, Mitch Tulloch,
2012, 0735668833, U$9.99
%A   Mitch Tulloch info@mtit.com www.mtit.com
%C   1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA   98052-6399
%D   2012
%G   0735668833
%I   Microsoft Press
%O   U$9.99 800-MSPRESS fax: 206-936-7329 mspinput@microsoft.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0735668833/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0735668833/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0735668833/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   100 p.
%T   “Security and Privacy for Microsoft Office 2010 Users”

Reducing the complex jargon in the introduction to its simplest terms, this book is intended to allow anyone who uses the Microsoft Office 2010 suite, or the online Office 365, to effectively employ the security functions built into the software.  Chapter one purports to present the “why” of security, but does a very poor job of it.  Company policy is presented as a kind of threat to the employee, and this does nothing to ameliorate the all-too-common perception that security is there simply to make life easier for the IT department, while it makes work harder for everyone else.

Chapter two examines the first security function, called “Protected View.”  The text addresses issues of whether or not you can trust a document created by someone else, and mentions trusted locations.  (Trusted locations seem simply to be defined as a specified directory on your hard drive, and the text does not discuss whether merely moving an unknown document into this directory will magically render it trustworthy.  Also, the reader is told how to set a trusted location, but not an area for designating untrusted files.)  Supposedly “Protected View” will automatically restrict access to, and danger from, documents you receive from unknown sources.  Unfortunately, having used Microsoft Office 2010 for a couple of years, and having received, in that time, hundreds of documents via email and from Web sources, I’ve never yet seen “Protected View,” so I’m not sure how far I can trust what the author is telling me.  (In addition, Tulloch’s discussion of viruses had numerous errors: Concept came along five years before Melissa, and some of the functions he attributes to Melissa are, in fact, from the CHRISTMA exec over a decade earlier.)

Preparation of policy is promised in chapter three, but this isn’t what most managers or security professionals would think of as policy: it is just the provision of a function for change detection or digital signatures.  It also becomes obvious, at this point, that Microsoft Office 2010 and Office 365 can have significantly different operations.  The material is quite confusing with references to a great many programs which are not part of the two (2010 and 365) MS Office suites.

Chapter four notes the possibility of encryption with a password, but the discussion of rights is unclear, and a number of steps are missing.

An appendix lists pointers to a number of references at Microsoft’s Website.

The utility of this work is compromised by the fact that it provides instructions for functions, but doesn’t really explain how, and in what situations, the functions can assist and protect the user.  Any employee using Microsoft Office will be able to access the operations, but without understanding the concepts they won’t be able to take advantage of what protection they offer.

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKSCPRO2.RVW   20121122

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Fake security can hurt you …

“Fraudster James McCormick has been jailed for 10 years for selling fake bomb detectors. … One invoice showed sales of £38m over three years to Iraq, the judge said.”

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22380368

Closer to our technical field, we know about the pure fraud of fake AV, of course.  And there are plenty of companies out there selling shoddy products.  But there are also the “consultants” out there doing desultory work, and spending more time on building a client base than doing any research or analysis.  (I recently ran into a monitoring and surveillance “expert” who had no idea about the problems with IP-connected video cameras.)  Some of them even hold CISSP certificates.

This is basically the whole reason behind the certificate: to have a standard that allows people to expect a minimal level of competence.  It’s not perfect, never will be, and there are other attempts (so far seemingly even less successful) at doing the same thing.  We need to assist the process, where we can, even if we don’t feel like pushing the ISC2 “brand.”

Do what you can to help.  Even if it is just pointing out fixable errors.

(When was the last time you submitted a question to the exam committee?)

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Why BC holds the record for “World’s Weirdest Politicians”

Whenever political pundits get together, they all start the competition for “our politicians are more corrupt/venal/just plain weird than yours.”  Whenever anyone from BC enters the fray, everyone else concedes.

Herewith our latest saga.

The ruling “Today’s BC Liberal Party” is finding itself polling behind the NDP.  (Do not let the word “liberal” in the party name fool you.  Whereas pretty much every other liberal party would be centre-left, the BC Liberals are, politically, somewhat to the right of Attila the Hun.)  The liberals are runing attack ads stating that, twelve years ago, the leader of the NDP backdated a memo.

(No, I’m not making this up.)

The Liberals have just released another version of the same attack ad, this time using a snippet of footage from the recent leaders debate.  Trouble is, the media consortium that ran the debate has copyright on the video of the debate, and all parties agreed that none of the material would be used for political purposes.

The Liberals, called on their use of the video, have refused to take it down.

(How old do you have to be to understand the meaning of “copyright infringement?”)

(I am eagerly awaiting the next installment of this story.  I assume the lawyers paid for by Today’s BC Liberals [or possibly by public money: that's happened before] will argue the provisions of “fair use,” and claim that the attack ads are commentary, or even educational …)

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REVIEW: “World War Hack”, Ethan Bull/Tsubasa Yozora

BKWWHACK.RVW   20121009

“World War Hack”, Ethan Bull/Tsubasa Yozora, 2012, 978-0-9833670-8-6
%A   Ethan Bull
%A   Tsubasa Yozora
%C   9400 N. MacArthur Blvd., Suite 124-215, Irving, TX   75063
%D   2012
%E   Gwendolyn Borgen
%G   978-0-9833670-8-6 0-9833670-8-6
%I   Viper Entertainment Inc./Viper Comics
%O   U$7.95 wyatt@worldwarhack.com www.worldwarhack.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0983367086/robsladesinterne
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0983367086/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0983367086/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience n- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   72 p.
%T   “World War Hack”

Someone (eventually we find out they are backed by the Chinese) has hacked into the United States military and government control systems.  Fortunately, despite being in complete control and untraceable, all they seem to want to do is make one military drone act up.

The US government immediately swings into action, and sponsors a hacking contest, to try and identify suitably talented young geniuses (genii?) to find out what is going on.

It’s hard to follow what is going on, since the artwork makes it difficult to differentiate between characters.  There are young people with bad haircuts, and there are other people with suits.  Some people are female.  After that, it gets hard to tell who’s who.  One of the hackers is a government agent, another one has a criminal record but seems to be a son of a suited government agent.

Some of the technical and hacking activity is somewhat realistic, but other aspects are bizarre, and betray a complete lack of understanding of basic technology.  For example, at different times a programming language gets “hacked” (in the sense of breaking into it), and at another time a government administrator can’t tell what computer language has been used to write a specific program.  In the real world of programming and hacking neither of these scenarios makes any sense.  Absent Ken Thompson’s famous speech nobody “hacks” a language, and generally nobody cares what language has been used to write a utility once it is operating.  (By the way, no programmer ever said LISP was a concise language, and there is no way that even a “skin” on top of LISP would look like C.)  At another point two devices “piggyback” on the same IP address, which simply does not work in networking terms.

There are aspects of this story that are realistic.  One is that, if you are not careful with your systems, someone can penetrate them and mess with you.  If there are any other useful factors in this story, I can’t think of them offhand.

(As usual, the draft of this review was submitted to the author/publisher for comment prior to publication.  I often get rude email in response, sometimes threats of physical harm, and once even a death threat.  [Yes, really.]  In this case the publisher has threatened unspecified legal action “to protect the copyright on our work.”  I would be interested to see the publisher’s reaction to counsel explaining the “commentary” aspect of the concept of “fair use.”)

copyright, Robert M. Slade   2012     BKWWHACK.RVW   20121009

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