The achilles heel of the Internet

It won’t surprise you if I say the achilles heel of the Internet is passwords. But the problem is not that our passwords are too weak: in fact, the bigger problem is that our passwords are too strong.

Preventing brute force password attacks is a problem we know how to solve. The problem is that web service providers have bad habits that cause our passwords to be less secure. Remember the saying “the chain is only strong as the weakest link?” If you are strengthening an already strong link in the chain but weakening another, you are not improving security and usually decreasing the overall security of the system. Those “bad habits”, mostly of web services that require a login, are all wrapped in supposedly ‘security concerns’: meaning some security consultant fed the CSO a strict compliance document and by implementing these rigid security methods they are actually making their users less secure.

Here are some examples.

Don’t you remember who I am?
What’s the easiest way to fight phishing? Have the web site properly identify itself. When the bank calls, most people don’t ask the person on the other side of the line to prove they are really from the bank (though they really should). The reason is you assume that if they knew how to reach you, they are indeed your bank.

So why not do the same for phishing? The bank of America uses Sitekey, which is a really neat trick. But you don’t have to go that far: just remember my username and I’ll have more confidence that you are the right web site. In fact, if I see a login page that does not remember my username I’ll have to stop and think (since I typically don’t remember all the usernames) and that gives me more time to spot suspicious things about the page.

If you can tell me what my username is, there are higher chances you are the legitimate site. But some sites block my browser from remembering my username, on the excuse of increasing security. Well, they’re not.

Let me manage my passwords

This is where most financial sites really fight me – they work so hard to prevent the browser from remembering my passwords.

Why? I can see the point when I’m on a public terminal. But what if I’m using my own laptop? By letting my browser remember the password I am decreasing the chance of phishing, and in fact if I know for certain a web site will let me remember the password (rather than force to type it in) I select a strong, complicated password – since I don’t have to remember it. In some cases I even stick with the random-assigned password; I don’t care as long as my browser remembers it.

But some people are stuck with “security!=usability” equation. They are wrong; in many cases usability increases security. This is one of those cases.

Not to mention they will almost always lose the fight. If paypal won’t let firefox remember the password, I’ll find ways around it. Or maybe I’ll just write a post-it note and put it on my monitor. All of those ways are less secure than firefox’s built-in password manager.

Oh, and forcing me to choose a strong password (‘strong’ being something absurd and twisted that makes no security sense)? Good luck with that. I don’t really mind these silly efforts just because they are so easy to circumvent they are not even a bother anymore. But just remember that putting security measures in place that will be circumvented by 90% of your users means teaching them not to take your security seriously.

Stop blocking me
Next week I will have my annual conversation with the Lufthansa ‘frequent flyer’ club support people. It’s a conversation I have at least once a year (sometimes more) when my login gets blocked.

Why does my login get blocked? Because I get the password wrong too many times. What’s “too many”? I wish I knew. Since I usually pretty much know what my password is, I get it right within 4-5 tries, so I guess Lufthansa blocks me after 3 or 4. I don’t know for sure, because I also need to guess my username (long story, lets just say Lufthansa has 2 sets of usernames and passwords and you need to match them up correctly). So the bottom line is that I get routinely blocked and need to call their office in Germany to release it.

Why are they blocking me? I’m guessing to prevent brute-force password attacks, and that’s a good thing. But why not release it automatically after a day? A week? An hour? Why not authenticate me some other way (e-mail)? I bet I can guess why: Because everybody that complains is told that “it’s due to security concerns”. Nobody can argue with that, can they? After all, security is the opposite of usability. Our goal as security professionals is to make our services not work, and hence infinitely secure.

So Lufthansa is losing my web site visit, which means less advertising money, and they are making me agitated which is not the right customer retention policy. Some credit card issuers like to do this a lot, which means I can’t login to see my credit card balance and watch if there is any suspicious activity. Now that’s cutting your nose off to spite your face.

Don’t encourage me to give out my password
How many web sites have my real twitter password? Must be over half a dozen, maybe more. If you are using any twitter client, you have given them your twitter username and password. If you are using twitterpic, or any of the other hundreds of web 2.0 that automatically tweet for you, they have your login credentials. Heck, even facebook has my twitter credentials – I bet Facebook can flood twitter in an instant if they decide to fight dirty.

Twitter wants me to use all these clients because it raises my twitter activity, and that’s ok. But there are plenty of single-sign-on methods out there, that are not too complicated, and are all more secure than spreading my real username and password all over the place. Even Boxee has my twitter login, which makes me think. If I was building a web 2.0 service and asked everyone who opens an account to give me their twitter login details – how many would do that just out of habit?
Giving my credentials is not necessarily a bad thing. Services like mint and pageonce are good because they make it unnecessary for me to login to all my financial web sites; the less I login the better: assuming these sites have better security than my own computer, I’d rather have them login to my financial accounts than me. This leap of faith is not for everyone – some will ask what happens if these startups go out of business. Cybercrime experts like Richard Stiennon will argue that an insider breach in one of those companies can be devastating. And of course Noam will say that until they’ve been scanned by Beyond Security he won’t give them any sensitive information. I agree with them all, and yet I use both Mint.com and PageOnce. So I guess it boils down to a personal judgment call. I personally think there’s value in these type of services.

Stick with passwords

One thing I am almost allergic to, is the “next thing to replace passwords”. Don’t give me USB tokens or credit-card sized authentication cards. SMS me if you must, but even that’s marginal. Don’t talk to me about new ideas to revolutionize logins. A non-trivial password along with a mechanism that blocks multiple replies (blocks for a certain period of time, not forever – got that Lufthansa?) is good enough. It’s not foolproof – a keylogger will defeat all of those methods, but those keylogging Trojans are also capable of modifying traffic so no matter what off-line method you use for authentication, the transaction itself will be modified and the account will be compromised. So Trojans is a war we have lost – lets admit that and move on. Any other threat can be stopped by simple and proper login policies that do not include making the user wish he never signed up for your service.
There are other password ideas out there. Bruce Schneier suggests to have passwords be displayed while typing them. I think that makes absolutely no sense for 99% of the people out there, but I do agree that we are fighting the wrong wars when it comes to passwords, and I think fresh thinking about passwords is a good thing. The current situation is that on one hand we are preventing our users from using passwords properly, and on the other hand we leaving our services open to attack. That doesn’t help anyone.

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Why isn’t there more spam on twitter?

Here’s something that’s been bugging me for a while. Twitter is a very open platform – there are probably hundreds of “entry points” through various APIs and clients. It is also very simple – which is what makes it powerful; basically you put your text into their database, and others view it according to a search they do (either explicitly, or implicitly – by following you or monitoring for @ replies).

So given this wealth of entry points, and simplicity, why aren’t we seeing twitter flooded with spam? I’m not talking about the occasional spammer following you in hopes that you follow them back and get exposed to their spam – I’m talking about a massive spam attack including your twitter name (so it shows when you look for @ replies), including hash tags for all trending topics, and generally – flooding twitter at the rate we are seeing with email messages?

After all, the multitude of entry points makes it more difficult to block it from entering than email, and the simplicity of the protocol makes it difficult to filter or block.

I know the twitter team is putting efforts into blocking and filtering spam, but I find it hard to believe they are successfully blocking virtually all spam attacks. Spammers tend to be sophisticated, and I’m pretty sure they watch Opera, too – they must know what twitter is.

Am I missing something?

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Elance user information compromised

God bless the law that forces companies to disclose when they are hacked and customer information is compromised. Not only do we get a chance to protect ourselves but it also reminds us that this apparently happens more often then we would think.

This time it’s elance.com:

Dear (my account name),
We recently learned that certain Elance user information was accessed without authorization, including potentially yours. The data accessed was contact information — specifically name, email address, telephone number, city location and Elance login information (passwords were protected with encryption). This incident did NOT involve any credit card, bank account, social security or tax ID numbers.
We have remedied the cause of the breach and are working with appropriate authorities. We have also implemented additional security measures and have strengthened password requirements to protect all of our users.
We sincerely regret any inconvenience or disruption this may cause.
If you have any unanswered questions and for ongoing information about this matter, please visit this page in our Trust & Safety center: http://www.elance.com/p/trust/account_security.html
For information on re-setting your password, visit: http://help.elance.com/forums/30969/entries/47262
Thank you for your understanding,
Michael Culver
Vice President
Elance

What I would like to see, is what “additional security measures” are they really taking. Also (and I’ll admit I have a one-track-mind) did they do a proper security scan to ensure the servers don’t have any holes? What were the results?

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Comerica bank discovers full disclosure

Comerica bank seems to think disclosing cross site scripting vulnerabilities in the bank’s web site is illegal:

“Comerica hereby demands that the above-referenced Subject Site be shut down immediately and that the identity of the account holder be provided to the undersigned.

Comerica’s demand is based upon the fact that the Subject Site is designed to enable that subscriber and anyone else viewing the site to take actions to attempt to impersonate Comerica to its customers”

(full document here)

No Comerica, it’s not the “how to use Comerica com to phish their customers” that enables that, it’s comerica.com that enables that. But at least I finally know why I’m receiving a flood of Comerica phishing emails in the last few weeks (I haven’t even heard of the bank before then).

Needless to say, they haven’t fixed the problem. Of course, for them the problem is not that phishers can attack Comerica bank customers but that somebody is saying it out loud.

Comerica XSS

(more pictures here)

(via @lancejssc)

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Firefox 3.5 heap spray vuln

It’s nice to have milw0rm around: http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/9137.

Be careful out there, firefox 3.5 users.

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milw0rm will stay open, but needs your help

Seems like milw0rm will stay up for the near future. In an email from Str0ke, he wrote:

Way to[o] many people unhappy with me over the
idea of closing shop.  I just needed help which I have alot of people to choose from now

So the good news, is that we’ll still see milw0rm posting information. But for all of you who were disappointed by milw0rm almost closing: if you want to see it stay open, here’s your chance to help. Just write to str0ke and offer him help – managing a vulnerability database is one of the best ways to gain expertise and learn the field. Plus, you’ll be helping a valuable resource, and making friends along the way.

From a personal experience, I can very much recommend it. We started our own vulnerabilities database much like milw0rm a while back, and it gave us the expertise to build a vulnerability scanner, a fuzzer, and build a profitable business while having fun doing it. So much so, that the original SecuriTeam team is still actively working on editing and posting information.

So whether you are looking to sharpen your skills for fun or want to give a boost to your professional career, I highly recommend joining milw0rm (do it now, while str0ke is still accepting applications!)

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Bye milw0rm?

I saw a message from Jericho giving his goodbyes to str0ke, and had to see it for myself. Indeed:

Well, this is my goodbye header for milw0rm. I wish I had the time I did in the past to post exploits, I just don’t :( . For the past 3 months I have actually done a pretty crappy job of getting peoples work out fast enough to be proud of, 0 to 72 hours (taking off weekends) isn’t fair to the authors on this site. I appreciate and thank everyone for their support in the past.
Be safe, /str0ke

We all hope it’s just temporary and str0ke will bounce back. And  if that doesn’t happen, hopefully someone else will pick it up and continue. It’s a thankless job of tedious work but it gives “the good guys” a fighting chance by putting together in an organized manner things that are already know to the bad people out there.

Hopefully this is not a farewell, but if it is, milw0rm will be missed.

Readers: If you have suggestions for good exploit archives (other than this exploit archive, of course) that should go on the bookmark list where milw0rm was, please post in the comments below.

Update: Good news. As several of you noted, str0ke decided to keep on going. More information here.

Update 2: As of October 2009 they seem to be down again.

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Want vulnerability information? Pony up the cash

The startup VoIPShield is changing its disclosure policy to stop giving out VoIP bugs for free and start charging vendors for it. CEO Rick Dalmazzi writes:

Avaya doesn’t “have to” pay us for anything. We do not “require” payment from you. It’s Avaya’s choice if you want to acquire the results of years of work by VoIPshield. It’s a business decision that your company will have to make. VoIPshield has made a business decision to not give away that work for free.

I can totally see his point. While we would like to see all vulnerabilities out in the open, for free, companies and researchers that have worked hard to find security vulnerabilities should be compensated.

But I do think Rick is taking the long and hard path by asking the vendors directly – there’s still a long way to go there. We’ve been helping researchers sell their research to organizations who wanted to pay for 0-day vulnerability information through our SSD (SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure) program and the main conclusions so far are that there are organizations willing to pay for this information to protect themselves, but those are not the vendors (yet).

What we see is that organizations use this information as leverage on the vendors. Since they have information about undisclosed vulnerabilities, they can easily exercise this (better than we can, as researchers) to force the vendors to plug those holes. After a while, maybe vendors will choose to drink upstream and subscribe for this information. But that may take a while (a friend of mine that is responsible for product security for a very large vendor says that will be a cold day in hell).
In any case, good luck to VoIPShield and their new paid-disclosure program. If they are successful I think security researchers will benefit, and in the long run customers will be more protected as vendors get direct access to zero-day vulnerabilities.

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The month of twitter bugs

Somebody had to do it, and I’m glad it’s Aviv Raff who finally went for it. This is just the first of what I’m sure will be many twitter-related vulnerabilities.
There’s a lot to check in twitter, and I’m sure this will be an interesting month. While Aviv is bringing home the meat, here’s a question to ask yourself in the meantime: How many web services have your twitter password? More than 5? More than 10? How many of them are still active and what happens if one of them goes bankrupt and sells the list to someone?

Update: apparently this was fixed after a few hours. The power of “Month of Bugs” I guess.

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Iraq cybersquatting Israel gov’t domains

A few years ago, the personal blog of the Iran president Ahmadinejad included a special piece of malware code that would only be displayed for Israeli IP addresses, attempting to infect Israeli machines visiting the site while preserving a seemingly harmless appearance for any western visitor that is not an Israeli. I thought that was quite a clever attack at the time.
But now the Iraqis are flexing their cyber-muscles too. According to a Hebrew article in law.co.il (this is not yet available on their English site, but may be soon), several domain names of Israeli government entities and large Israeli institutions have been registered by users outside Israel, some users having addresses in Iraq.

These domains use names with Hebrew characters, which are now available under the IDN. However, the method of typing Hebrew domain names is not in wide use and companies still prefer the English domains with the .il or .com suffix, which is why those Hebrew domains were available for purchase. Some of the domain names that were purchased include the Mossad, the Shabak (the “Shin Bet”), the IDF, Israel Police, Knesset, and several major banks.

Since the domain name is in Hebrew and contains the full name of the company or institution, it is incredibly useful for phishing attacks. law.co.il traced many of the domain names, particularly those of major ministries and public service names to a company called “ICU Agency” with a registered address in Baghdad. I’m sure there are other clever uses for such domains in war time that exceed simple phishing. With the speed in which news travel on the Internet these days, it shouldn’t be difficult to do some psychological warefare if you own “credible” domain names.

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Mysql authentication bypass

I saw a demo of Green SQL today, and during the demo Yuli showed me a cute sql-injection method for mysql that I’ve never seen before.

This will evade some IDS’s and is also a good reply for the web development if they tell you filtering the words “OR” and “AND” is enough as a generic SQL-injection protection.
It’s not “new”, but it was new to me. The idea is to place two equal signs inside the query so that the query becomes:

SELECT * FROM users WHERE column=’b’=’c’

More information and a very detailed explanation here. It seems to be specific to mysql.

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T-Mobile confirms breach

The T-mobile data breach that jbrown wrote about has been confirmed by T-Mobile.
I guess not everything you read on Full Disclosure is fake after all…

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I am carrier


The swine flu craze in Asia is almost becoming ridiculous. Flying into Beijing a doctor came on board to check everyone’s temperature before they would let us out of the plane. Before passing immigration we were checked again and filled in forms to prove we are all in top health.

Ironically, on the inbound flight to Beijing I caught the flu from the Chinese girl sitting next to me (I’m talking about the regular flu. No need to call an emergency medical team on me). I spent the week gobbling Chinese medicine herbs which did a great job in preventing me from crashing sick. But the problem is that I am about to fly out back to San Francisco through Tokyo, and I’m trying to think how to convince the Narita officials that my germs are pure and genuine Asian bodies and are were not carried with me from any American pigs (political innuendos not intended).

It seems I’m also a carrier of something else, and again it’s not my fault. All I did was connect my USB stick to a computer on the business center in my Beijing hotel. I just wanted to print a document but didn’t bother locking the stick to ‘read only’. Apparently that was enough to have a Trojan infect the USB stick from the malware infested public computer.

Not that it would matter, really, since my machine runs Ubuntu. In fact, I wouldn’t have noticed it unless someone that borrowed the USB stick from me showed me the Virus warning that popped up as they plugged the stick into their Windows machine. I could have infected dozens of machines by the time I found out about it – all those poor Windows machine, Trojaned just for borrowing my USB stick; I really don’t need that on my conscience.

Once I know the Trojan is there, the cleanup is easy, I will ‘rm’ the files and the stick will be healthy again and stop be a carrier for defenseless Windows machines. Now if only it was that easy to recover from this damn flu.

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Smells like teen spirit

It must be the 90s again. Nirvana is on the radio, and people are finding remotely exploitable WebDAV vulnerabilities. Using unicode encoding no less – the choice of a new generation. A note to Microsoft: in the 21st century we have this new thing called “a fuzzer”. You might want to google for ‘bestorm’ or ask the SDL team about the general concept.

Another 90s thing is to publish a critical exploit without going through a broker to get paid for it (or waiting for a hacking contest). Don’t get me wrong – we offer both options: the publish your exploits for free, and publish your exploits for profit routes are both open to you. Personally – if you go on the full disclosure path more power to you, but I have to admit nowadays it’s as rare as hearing Nirvana on the radio.

Now I hear there’s a new browser out there nicknamed “mozilla”. I think I’ll check it out, they say it will kick Internet Explorer ass before Y2K…

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Revenge on the “Your Warranty is about to expire” People

Read the whole thread to see how far this attack goes.

William Gibson must be proud to see his Panther Modern in action! (BTW, Mr. Gibson – if you’re reading this, thanks for your excellent recommendation for Silicone Sealing Tape! Oh, and thank you for writing Neuromancer too).

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The new face of disaster

I remember a few years back, when I heard about the blackouts in California (oh yes, the good ol’ Enron days). It was quite shocking to hear that major dot-coms were down for hours. Even the “365 Main” facility in San Francisco with its earthquake proof infrastructure lost power, proving that no matter how equipped, no single location can withstand a big disaster.

Nowadays this is less and less a real issue – hurricanes and power failures are not an excuse to stop providing service: Amazon and google showed that you can reach close to 100% reliability (barring software bugs) by eliminating all physical single points of failure. Today in the cloud age, every web site service can get Amazon-like reliability without worrying about a power failure in its office in Mountain View or a natural disaster in its colocation farm – and all this for hundreds of dollars a month.

But as the local disaster problem is solved, there’s a new one that may shape the way we think of disaster recovery. Register.com got hit by a massive DDoS attack on its DNS servers. This attack will have many casualties – not just register.com’s users who may have their web sites unavailable if they used register.com’s DNS services but also all those hit by the collateral damage; we don’t yet have a technical information on how the attack was done, but a DDoS attack is typically logical and not geographical – if your site is somehow ‘logically’ connected to a site that is being attacked, you will be DDoS’ed and that won’t be nice. When blue security was DDoS a few years ago the attackers decided to take down Blue Security’s providers along with anything hosted there, in any of the provider’s geographical location.

A DDoS attacks the server wherever he is – if you span your server across multiple physical locations the attack will be done on all of them; there is always a limit to the number of transactions you can handle in a single second, and once the attacking botnet passes this limit your services will effectively be denied. You will then have nothing to do but lean back in your chair and wait for the attack to end, counting the lost visitors/revenue/reputation with every minute passing.

While the cloud can save you from Hurricane Katrina, if someone decides to DDoS facebook.com they only need to pay a fee; there is nothing facebook – with its massive server infrastructure – can do to stop them. In fact, we don’t know of any real way to stop DDoS (snakeoil solutions aside) and Rob is very correct in saying that probably the only solution is raising security awareness to reduce the size of botnets and make DDoS less practical (or more expensive). Until that happens, I wonder who will be the first to use DDoS to take out a competitor?

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