Why Is Free Vuln Disclosure so Damn Difficult?

Xyberpix described how difficult it is to disclose vulnerabilities to ZDI and iDefense. But even after you sold it, the process is just beginning. Sure, the researcher gets paid and he is free to resume his work, but the work us, the vulnerability coordinator, just begins.

We recently received 2 disclosures to our SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program for Sonicwall and google vulnerabilities. We received sponsors for both vulnerabilities which means there is a commercial organization out there that was willing to pay the researcher for their efforts. That part ended well for the researchers.

Now both organizations want the vendors to patch up. Sounds easy, right? We are giving Sonicwall and google free information about security holes in their products, and want nothing in return except for them to fix it.

Well, it’s damn difficult.

Google is always difficult when it comes to security. When I reported an information disclosure vulnerability in google calendar they ignored me, then sent their PR person to say “it’s a feature”, then silently fixed it claiming it was never there. Dealing with google on security issues is like talking to a girl that speaks a foreign language. But more on that later – lets start with Sonicwall.

Wouldn’t you be expect security vendors to be more aware of security problems in their products? Well, for the last few weeks we’ve tried to bang every door, calling in personal favors to tell Sonicwall (for free, let me remind you) about a security hole in their product.
Why bang every door? Because they won’t talk to us since “we’re not Sonicwall customers”. We can’t open a support ticket and they won’t give “us” support. security@sonicwall? yeah, right. Even good friends couldn’t help. The system will not accept a report from non-customers.

I guess our only course of action is to pay Sonicwall money to let them know about their vulnerabilities. I wonder if that’s Sonicwall’s long term strategy for profit? BTW, if you work for Sonicwall and can help, please contact me – but keep in mind paying Sonicwall for telling them about their own security issues is not a part of our plan.

Back to google. The story there is simple and boring. It’s not a bug, it’s a feature. In fact, every browser has this problem, errm I mean feature. In fact, it’s been proven you can execute javascript on the chrome user’s browser so we’ll leave this open as well. If the stupid web app developers can’t solve this we certainly aren’t going to help them.
But why am I boring you with the broad strokes, go read the discussion:
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=46795. Nothing we haven’t seen with previous google security bug handling, just ask this guy.

Yes, it is 2010, and we are still talking about Vulnerability Disclosure to vendors. I guess next we’ll be arguing if heap overflows are exploitable.

Update: We were contacted by Sonicwall and the bug will be looked at. Hopefully security@sonicwall will start accepting submissions from non-customers.

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KHOBE: Say hello to my little friend(*)

Guess what? You personal firewall/IDS/Anti Virus/(insert next month’s buzzword here) isn’t going to save you from an attacker successfully executing code remotely on your machine:
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/hardware/update-new-attack-bypasses-every-windows-security-product/8268

So no, it’s not the doomsday weapon, but definitely worthy of the Scarface quote in the title.
This isn’t surprising, researchers find ways to bypass security defenses almost as soon as those defenses are implemented (remember non-executable stack?). Eliminating vulnerabilities in the first place is the way to go, guys, not trying to block attacks hoping your ‘shields’ hold up.

(*) If you’re reading this out loud you need to do so in a thick cuban accent

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T-Mobile phishing camp

Cory Doctorow shares his experience of being ‘phished’. I had a similar experience, only in reverse.

As I’m waiting to board a flight, my phone rings and someone claiming to be a T-Mobile rep is on the other side.

“You’ve been using your phone a lot” she says

Yes, I spent a week in China and the roaming charges are especially high there.

“Well, you are over $2,000 in your phone bill”

Well, thanks for letting me know. When the bill comes I will be happy to pay it.

“No, you need to pay it now; it is higher than your monthly average and we need to collect the payment outside your monthly billing cycle”

Fine. I will call the billing center once I get back to the office tomorrow

“No, you need to pay it now”

I am just about to board the plane. Call me in 3 hours when I land.

“Sorry, I need to collect a payment or we will suspend the account”

Fine. Bill me. You have my credit card details on file.

“No, we need you to provide them again as proof that you are ok’ing the billing”

Hmm… This is beginning to sound like the most unsophisticated phishing attack ever. You need my credit card details? Now? Can’t wait? Ok. Give me your number and I will call you right back and give you my CC.

“This line is for outbound calls only. There is no direct number back to me”

No problem – I will call the t-mobile 800 number and ask for your department.

“They cannot transfer you to me”

Then how do I know you’re a real T-mobile rep and not someone out to get my credit card number?

“Well, how else would I have known your charges this month were especially high?”

At this point I burst out laughing and since boarding is about to end I give her my full credit card details. VISA will take the loss on that one, but who will save me from the embarrassment of ‘securiteam blogger falls victim to the most amateurish phishing attack in history”?
I land, and log online to my t-mobile account, and am shocked to see a bill of $2,500 that is marked as paid. It really was T-Mobile.

Somewhere in Eastern Europe some guy is telling his boss: “Sergei, you’ll never believe this. The fake training material we planted at T-Mobile are actually being used. They are teaching their customers to be phished!”.

Phishing camp indeed.

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Finally, a workable approach to web Single Sign On


In the last 20 years, practically all the large software vendors came out with Single-Sign-On (previously “PKI”) products that were supposed to give a single login that would give you access to all the resources on the network. As good as this idea sounds, in practice that almost never works. Why Single Sign On constantly fails in corporate environments is a mystery wrapped in an Enigma. But it just doesn’t.

On the web, it seems even more logical that a single login will give you access to all the resources, and yet the situation is even worse. Microsoft, google, yahoo, AOL, and now facebook have all tried their Single Sign On initiatives that ended up having users signing up to 4-5 different ‘single sign on’ services and typically just opting for the only single sign on method that works: Using the same username and password everywhere.

Before you ask, OpenID is not a single sign on solution – it’s an identification service. So with that out of the way, are we doomed to never have a workable option to web single sign on?

Well, it seems the solution was always there: in fact, most of us have been using it for a while. Your browser.

Done well, the browser can keep the username/password combination in a secure place, protected by a single password and encrypted on your hard drive. The only risk is a Trojan using your browser to log into web sites without your knowledge – but that’s a risk you have today with keylogger rootkits, so you are not worse off letting your browser save the password for you.

The only two challenges facing the browsers to truly provide an SSO experience were web sites like paypal that refused to let the browser save username/password information (though you could bypass that restriction with bookmarklets such as “Password Saver” on firefox) and the second challenge was just the convenience of needing to login instead of having the browser login for you, as you’d expect in a “real” SSO.

It seems that firefox has picked up the glove. In a recent blog post (http://hacks.mozilla.org/2010/04/account-manager-coming-to-firefox/) firefox announced an add on that will handle account management; likely not much different than what is done today, perhaps a bit more extended and automated. Facebook, google and some others won’t be happy about this move, but who cares. The best thing about this method of SSO is that you don’t need the site’s cooperation for it to work. In fact, as long as they don’t actively resist (e.g. by adding CAPTCHA’s) firefox can be the de-facto standard for account management in the not-too-far future.

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Security Seal company sued by FTC

Lets start with the proper disclosure; we provide a Web Site Security Seal service which competes with ControlScan’s. That said, I’m not about to bash ControlScan but rather the poor practices of security seal companies giving out seals to whoever pays them without the proper security checks.

Some background: The FTC sued ControlScan for $750,000 for giving out security seals while not really checking the security of the web sites. This lawsuit and its verdict are good news: It means that services that give out seals need to be responsible for their actions; no more “scanless PCI” badges: if you give out a seal (and I’m looking at all you large domain resellers) that needs to stand for something – when customers see a seal that says “secure site” they need to know the site is secure.

Before you take out the pitchforks, sure – there is no way to verify with 100% certainty that the web site is “secure”. But vulnerability scanning is at a stage today where you can run automated scans and make sure the web site is “secure enough” – meaning it does not have any known vulnerabilities, doesn’t suffer from SQL injections or cross site scripting. If there is a zero day vulnerability in apache, I doubt it will be used against an e-commerce site – it is more likely to be used against a bank or the government. Fact is, over 90% of successful attacks use known vulnerabilities that would have been detected by any competent scanner. If the site is properly scanned and no vulnerabilities are found, this is probably as good as it’s ever going to get; and is definitely better than the chances of your credit card being stolen at a brick-and-mortar store.

What will happen with ControlScan is not really important. What’s important is that security seal providers will now have to stand behind their claims – the fact that the FCC went after a case like this, which is normally way below their threshold, probably means that someone is applying pressure on them; hopefully that will help clean up the act of some online scanning vendors.

Note: Complaint, Exhibits and final judgment here.

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Google and security. Oil and Water. (Or: How to DoS google groups)

The buzz was on about google buzz sharing your list of contacts (which they then quickly fixed in their casual we-did-nothing-wrong-these-are-not-the-droids-you’re-looking-for mind trick).

Readers of this blog remember when google calendar let you see the full name behind every gmail address. At that time, google ignored, then decided there’s nothing wrong with that feature, then fixed it. Only it still works, on other google services. Of course, these aren’t the droids I’m looking for.

Well, here’s a method to DoS a google group user; it was discovered by Shachar Shemesh of lingnu about 18 months ago, who told google and was answered with a strong silence. With google the only disclosure seems to be full-disclosure, so with apologies to you google-group users out there, here is the outline of the attack below.

DoS’ing google groups
Domain-Key is a good method to prevent spam from coming in, as well as preventing unwanted emails from being handled if they are sent through “the wrong” SMTP server.

Google has taken domain-key a step further, with their Domain-Key and Google Groups combo. In this combination, if an email is sent to a Google Groups from an SMTP server who is not listed in the Domain-key record, that email will be banned from writing or accessing the Google Group in question.

The banned user will no longer be able to write or read from that group, will not be able to “undo” this change as emails to Google’s technical support regarding this appear to go unanswered.

From this background, the attack seems clear. A malicious attacker can get pretty much anyone banned from a certain Google Group.

Steps to reproduce:

  • Subscribe to a Google group.
  • Look for a victim (Anyone posting to the group from a gmail.com account is fair game).
  • Configure your email client to send emails with a “From” field that matches this email address, and use an SMTP that is not one of those authorized by the domain key. Your ISP’s SMTP servers will probably suffice.
  • Use this configurations to send an email to the group. It doesn’t really matter what the email content is, but I recommend making it look like a genuine email to make is harder to filter (and raise ‘plausible deniability’ in case someone comes asking questions).

As a result:
The victim will be automatically banned from the group.

He or She will receive no notification of that fact: not to the fact he or she was banned, and not even to the fact that the email he or she supposedly sent failed Domain key verification.

The victim will cease to receive emails from the group. They will only find out about it if they try to send an email, at which point they will receive a brief and unhelpful message saying they were banned, with no explanation why and no means to appeal.

Trying to access the group from the web site will result in a “you are banned” message, again, with no helpful information on why the ban was instated nor how to appeal. It is a curious point that even information that is publicly available without registration, such as the group’s archive or description, will be blocked. They will have to sign out of Google to be able to see it(!).

The best means to appeal she is likely to find is “Google Help”, which points to an email address where past experience shows the request email will be unceremoniously ignored, just like Shachar’s email notifying google of this vulnerability.

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Vendor response to vulnerability disclosure

My wish for 2010: I want this guide to be taught in CS classes to developers everywhere:

http://vrt-sourcefire.blogspot.com/2009/12/matts-guide-to-vendor-response.html

Happy new year everybody.

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Stop blaming us

Occasionally, I see articles like this.

Hackers don’t, as a rule, need to go to such lengths to crack passwords. That’s because most of us fail to follow good security habits. A recent article on PhysOrg cites a study that found people are the weak link in computer security.

This is silly. People don’t need to “follow good security habits” unless they have “security” somewhere in their title. Security is a means to an end, and not the target. The target is to get the job done (or surf the web, or read your emails).

Saying this is not just silly – it’s also dangerous. When experts say “people are the weakest link in computer security”, they remove all responsibility from the security industry to make security better, and easier, for users. Why work on preventing brute-force attacks on passwords? Instead lets force our users to choose a 10 character password including at least 1 number and 1 letter of each case. Oh, and lets prevent those walking security hazards from saving the password in the browser on their malware infested machines. Yeah, that’ll teach them. The article over at discovery.com suggests I use e$4WruX7 as a password – a most helpful advice if I ever saw one. Here’s a better suggestion for you Jonathan: have the system lock out for 24 hours after 3 failed tries.That will make guessing a simple 6 digit-only PIN take more than 450 years.

Enough with this.  Users are not the weakest link any more than drivers are the weakest link in driving accidents. Sure, if we remove users (or drivers) from the equation, that solves all our problems. But since we can’t do that, lets focus on making seat belts, and airbags, and warning systems. Or easier (not harder!) password systems, better protected servers and better user interface.

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Heathrow calling

Here’s a weird spam I got last night:

Hello

The route taken through Customs is mainly determined by your point of departure and whether you are bringing into the country more duty payable goods than your free allowance. For those passengers who have flown in from outside the European Community (EC), their baggage will have a white tag and they must pass through either the Red or Green channel according to the amount of duty free goods they have. Those passengers arriving from countries within the EC should use the Blue channel, and their baggage will have green-edged tag.

As part of our routine check and based on the above, we have a consignment in your name; you are advised to come to the office address below

Customs office
Terminal 3
Heathrow Airport

You are required to come with the following:
1. Your ID
2. Diplomatic Tag either white or green-edge tag.
3. Non Inspection document

Your appointment time is 10am GMT, failure to comply; we will have over the matter to Metropolitan and the FBI. I am the officer in charge of your matter.

Thomas Smith
UK Customs
Heathrow Airport

It’s weird, because it contains no advertisement, and no links. There’s nothing “encoded” in it -  it seems to be an old version of this notice.

So why would a spammer waste valuable botnet cycles on sending me the email? The only explanation I could come up with is “a boy who cried wolf” attack. You send this email a few times, and the Baysian filtering systems train themselves that this is a good email (i.e. “ham”). Most Baysian spam filtering systems have a loopback mechanism where spam email is used to train the system further, and ham email is used to teach the system what “good” email is. If this email is seen a few times and considered ham, spam filters will accept something similar to it that contains a link. That link, can be the spam or phishing attack.

Another guess is that it’s simply used to verify email addresses – you read that a scary Customs agent from Heathrow wants you in his office first thing tomorrow morning, and you quickly reply to ask what it’s about; the spammer (whose reply-to address is different than the “From”) gets a confirmation that your email address is valid, maybe with some more details like your phone number. This is a plausible explanation but it seems like too much hard work just to get some valid email addresses.
Any other guesses?

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Fuzzing anything that moves

<meta content="OpenOffice.org 3.0 (Linux)" name="GENERATOR" /><br /> <style type="text/css"> <!-- @page { margin: 0.79in } P { margin-bottom: 0.08in } A:link { so-language: zxx } --></style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">I’m in New Delhi, for the local <a href="(http://www.owasp.org/index.php/SecurityByte_and_OWASP_Asia_AppSec_Conference_2009">OWASP Conference</a>. There’s a <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php/SecurityByte_and_OWASP_Asia_AppSec_Conference_2009#tab=Conference">really nice lineup</a> and if you’re in the New Delhi area I highly recommend attending.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in"> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">I’ll be speaking twice. On Tuesday about blackbox testing. The abstract can be paraphrased from the immortal words of the great fuzzing master Ice-T:</p> <blockquote> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">If you’re from Mars, and you have inputs, we will fuzz you.</p> </blockquote> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">(Look up the <a href="http://www.rhapsody.com/body-count/body-count/kkk-bitch/lyrics.html">original text</a>, I guarantee it’s worth it)</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in"> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">On Wednesday I’ll be talking a bit about breaking JSON applications, relying on the great research done by Amit Klein, Blueinfy, Jeremiah Grossman, Fortify, and many others.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in"> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in">If you spot any errors in either of my presentations let me know and I will buy you a beer. This offer does not include anything stupid I say while on a discussion panel…</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in"> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in"> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1332"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_10"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1332" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1332" dc:title="Fuzzing anything that moves" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1332/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1330"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330" rel="bookmark" title="HP buys 3COM: how will that impact ZDI?">HP buys 3COM: how will that impact ZDI?</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on November 12th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/commentary" title="View all posts in Commentary" rel="category tag">Commentary</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/culture" title="View all posts in Culture" rel="category tag">Culture</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/full-disclosure" title="View all posts in Full Disclosure" rel="category tag">Full Disclosure</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330#comments" title="Comment on HP buys 3COM: how will that impact ZDI?"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1330 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330">2 Comments »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>What happens if your job is to sell to customers information about embarrassing vendor vulnerabilities, and then your company gets bought by one of the vendors you are reporting about?</p> <p>Going back to cheesy analogies this is the age old question, can god create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift?</p> <p>The case in question is HP buying 3COM (which owns the Zero Day initiative), and as HD Moore correctly <a href="http://twitter.com/hdmoore/status/5629710613">pointed out</a> there’s bound to be some conflict there.<br /> This will be an interesting match to watch. First, the stone is very heavy. Knowing the ZDI team (*) they have been very successful at staying independent inside the huge 3com corporate, and my money would be on them succeeding to do it again.</p> <p>But when we ask if HP can lift this proverbial stone, lets remember that HP was the only large vendor to pull out the nuclear weapon of <a href="http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-947325.html?tag=mncol;txt">threatening to sue a security researcher</a> for making their flaws public. Now it’s a group within their own organization, selling information about <a href="http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/upcoming/">unfixed HP flaws</a> to paying customers, and paying the same researchers HP wanted to sue 7 years ago.</p> <p>(*) Full Disclosure: We run <a href="http://www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html">an alternative service to ZDI</a> called SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure. That doesn’t take anything from my respect to the ZDI guys and what they’ve been doing.</p> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_11"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330" dc:title="HP buys 3COM: how will that impact ZDI?" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1330/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1321"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321" rel="bookmark" title="The PCI in the Cloud Paradox">The PCI in the Cloud Paradox</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on September 15th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/commentary" title="View all posts in Commentary" rel="category tag">Commentary</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/web" title="View all posts in Web" rel="category tag">Web</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321#comments" title="Comment on The PCI in the Cloud Paradox"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1321 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321">2 Comments »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>What happens when <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irresistible_force_paradox">an irresistible force meets an immovable object</a>? We might all have a chance to find out.</p> <p>In the last <a href="http://www.baysec.net/">baysec</a> I learned that handling credit card transactions in the cloud automatically makes you non-compliant with PCI. Assuming:</p> <p>1. PCI is here to stay (“an immovable object”)</p> <p>and</p> <p>2. ‘Everything’ will move to the cloud (“an irresistible force”)</p> <p>We reach a paradox.</p> <p>Did the gods of security create a stone they cannot lift?</p> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_12"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321" dc:title="The PCI in the Cloud Paradox" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1321/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1318"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318" rel="bookmark" title="WordPress: we are protecting your blog">WordPress: we are protecting your blog</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on September 6th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/commentary" title="View all posts in Commentary" rel="category tag">Commentary</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/culture" title="View all posts in Culture" rel="category tag">Culture</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/funny" title="View all posts in Funny" rel="category tag">Funny</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/malware" title="View all posts in malware" rel="category tag">malware</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/web" title="View all posts in Web" rel="category tag">Web</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318#comments" title="Comment on WordPress: we are protecting your blog"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1318 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318">2 Comments »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>As the WordPress team scramble around trying to resolve the latest set of security issues, and doing all the wrong things like giving their users a <a href="http://codex.wordpress.org/Upgrading_WordPress_Extended">14-step process for upgrade</a>, the following Jewel <a href="http://lorelle.wordpress.com/2009/09/04/old-wordpress-versions-under-attack/">came up</a>:</p> <blockquote><p>4. WordPress is Not Secure: WordPress is incredibly secure and monitored constantly by experts in web security. This attack was well anticipated and so far, WordPress 2.8.4 is holding. If necessary, WordPress will immediately release a update with further security improvements. WordPress is used by governments, huge corporations, and me, around the world. Millions of bloggers are using WordPress.com. Have faith they are working overtime to monitor this situation and protect your blog.</p></blockquote> <p>This is funny on so many levels.<br /> (HT: Jericho, AKA security curmudgeon)</p> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_13"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318" dc:title="WordPress: we are protecting your blog" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1318/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1317"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317" rel="bookmark" title="The achilles heel of the Internet">The achilles heel of the Internet</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on September 5th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/commentary" title="View all posts in Commentary" rel="category tag">Commentary</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/culture" title="View all posts in Culture" rel="category tag">Culture</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/insider-threat" title="View all posts in Insider Threat" rel="category tag">Insider Threat</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/phishing" title="View all posts in Phishing" rel="category tag">Phishing</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/privacy" title="View all posts in Privacy" rel="category tag">Privacy</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/web" title="View all posts in Web" rel="category tag">Web</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317#comments" title="Comment on The achilles heel of the Internet"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1317 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317">2 Comments »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>It won’t surprise you if I say the achilles heel of the Internet is passwords. But the problem is not that our passwords are too weak: in fact, the bigger problem is that our passwords are too <strong>strong</strong>.</p> <p>Preventing brute force password attacks is a problem we know how to solve. The problem is that web service providers have bad habits that cause our passwords to be less secure. Remember the saying “the chain is only strong as the weakest link?” If you are strengthening an already strong link in the chain but weakening another, you are not improving security and usually decreasing the overall security of the system. Those “bad habits”, mostly of web services that require a login, are all wrapped in supposedly ‘security concerns’: meaning some security consultant fed the CSO a strict compliance document and by implementing these rigid security methods they are actually making their users <strong>less</strong> secure.</p> <p>Here are some examples.</p> <p><strong>Don’t you remember who I am?</strong><br /> What’s the easiest way to fight phishing? Have the web site properly identify itself. When the bank calls, most people don’t ask the person on the other side of the line to prove they are really from the bank (though they really should). The reason is you assume that if they knew how to reach you, they are indeed your bank.</p> <p>So why not do the same for phishing? The bank of America uses <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/767">Sitekey</a>, which is a really neat trick. But you don’t have to go that far: just remember my username and I’ll have more confidence that you are the right web site. In fact, if I see a login page that does not remember my username I’ll have to stop and think (since I typically don’t remember all the usernames) and that gives me more time to spot suspicious things about the page.</p> <p>If you can tell me what my username is, there are higher chances you are the legitimate site. But some sites block my browser from remembering my username, on the excuse of increasing security. Well, they’re not.</p> <p><strong>Let me manage my passwords</strong></p> <p>This is where most financial sites really fight me – they work so hard to prevent the browser from remembering my passwords.</p> <p>Why? I can see the point when I’m on a public terminal. But what if I’m using my own laptop? By letting my browser remember the password I am decreasing the chance of phishing, and in fact if I know for certain a web site will let me remember the password (rather than force to type it in) I select a strong, complicated password – since I don’t have to remember it. In some cases I even stick with the random-assigned password; I don’t care as long as my browser remembers it.</p> <p>But some people are stuck with “security!=usability” equation. They are wrong; in many cases usability increases security. This is one of those cases.</p> <p>Not to mention they will almost always lose the fight. If paypal won’t let firefox remember the password, I’ll find <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Aen-US%3Aofficial&hs=izP&q=+remember+password+firefox">ways around it</a>. Or maybe I’ll just write a post-it note and put it on my monitor. All of those ways are less secure than firefox’s built-in password manager.</p> <p>Oh, and forcing me to choose a strong password (‘strong’ being something absurd and twisted that makes no security sense)? <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/553">Good luck with that</a>. I don’t really mind these silly efforts just because they are so easy to circumvent they are not even a bother anymore. But just remember that putting security measures in place that will be circumvented by 90% of your users means teaching them not to take your security seriously.</p> <p><strong>Stop blocking me </strong><br /> Next week I will have my annual conversation with the Lufthansa ‘frequent flyer’ club support people. It’s a conversation I have at least once a year (sometimes more) when my login gets blocked.</p> <p>Why does my login get blocked? Because I get the password wrong too many times. What’s “too many”? I wish I knew. Since I usually pretty much know what my password is, I get it right within 4-5 tries, so I guess Lufthansa blocks me after 3 or 4. I don’t know for sure, because I also need to guess my username (long story, lets just say Lufthansa has 2 sets of usernames and passwords and you need to match them up correctly). So the bottom line is that I get routinely blocked and need to call their office in Germany to release it.</p> <p>Why are they blocking me? I’m guessing to prevent brute-force password attacks, and that’s a good thing. But why not release it automatically after a day? A week? An hour? Why not authenticate me some other way (e-mail)? I bet I can guess why: Because everybody that complains is told that “it’s due to security concerns”. Nobody can argue with that, can they? After all, security is the opposite of usability. Our goal as security professionals is to make our services not work, and hence infinitely secure.</p> <p>So Lufthansa is losing my web site visit, which means less advertising money, and they are making me agitated which is not the right customer retention policy. Some credit card issuers like to do this a lot, which means I can’t login to see my credit card balance and watch if there is any suspicious activity. Now that’s cutting your nose off to spite your face.</p> <p><strong>Don’t encourage me to give out my password</strong><br /> How many web sites have my real twitter password? Must be over half a dozen, maybe more. If you are using any twitter client, you have given them your twitter username and password. If you are using twitterpic, or any of the other hundreds of web 2.0 that automatically tweet for you, they have your login credentials. Heck, even facebook has my twitter credentials – I bet Facebook can flood twitter in an instant if they decide to fight dirty.</p> <p>Twitter wants me to use all these clients because it raises my twitter activity, and that’s ok. But there are plenty of single-sign-on methods out there, that are not too complicated, and are all more secure than spreading my real username and password all over the place. Even Boxee has my twitter login, which makes me think. If I was building a web 2.0 service and asked everyone who opens an account to give me their twitter login details – how many would do that just out of habit?<br /> Giving my credentials is not necessarily a bad thing. Services like <a href="http://www.mint.com">mint</a> and <a href="http://www.pageonce.com/">pageonce</a> are good because they make it unnecessary for me to login to all my financial web sites; the less I login the better: assuming these sites have better security than my own computer, I’d rather have them login to my financial accounts than me. This leap of faith is not for everyone – some will ask what happens if these startups go out of business. Cybercrime experts like Richard Stiennon will argue that an <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/threatchaos/?p=341">insider breach</a> in one of those companies can be devastating. And of course <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/noam/">Noam</a> will say that until they’ve been scanned by Beyond Security he won’t give them any sensitive information. I agree with them all, and yet I use both Mint.com and PageOnce. So I guess it boils down to a personal judgment call. I personally think there’s value in these type of services.</p> <p><strong>Stick with passwords</strong></p> <p>One thing I am almost allergic to, is the “next thing to replace passwords”. Don’t give me USB tokens or credit-card sized authentication cards. SMS me if you must, but even that’s marginal. Don’t talk to me about <a href="http://openid.net/">new ideas</a> to revolutionize logins. A non-trivial password along with a mechanism that blocks multiple replies (blocks for a certain period of time, not forever – got that Lufthansa?) is good enough. It’s not foolproof – a keylogger will defeat all of those methods, but those keylogging Trojans are also capable of modifying traffic so no matter what off-line method you use for authentication, the transaction itself will be modified and the account will be compromised. So Trojans is a war we have lost – lets admit that and move on. Any other threat can be stopped by simple and proper login policies that do not include making the user wish he never signed up for your service.<br /> There are other password ideas out there. Bruce Schneier <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/06/the_problem_wit_2.html">suggests</a> to have passwords be displayed while typing them. I think that makes absolutely no sense for 99% of the people out there, but I do agree that we are fighting the wrong wars when it comes to passwords, and I think fresh thinking about passwords is a good thing. The current situation is that on one hand we are preventing our users from using passwords properly, and on the other hand we leaving our services open to attack. That doesn’t help anyone.</p> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_14"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317" dc:title="The achilles heel of the Internet" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1317/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1316"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316" rel="bookmark" title="Why isn’t there more spam on twitter?">Why isn’t there more spam on twitter?</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on August 30th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/commentary" title="View all posts in Commentary" rel="category tag">Commentary</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/spam" title="View all posts in Spam" rel="category tag">Spam</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/web" title="View all posts in Web" rel="category tag">Web</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316#comments" title="Comment on Why isn’t there more spam on twitter?"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1316 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316">8 Comments »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>Here’s something that’s been bugging me for a while. Twitter is a very open platform – there are probably hundreds of “entry points” through various APIs and clients. It is also very simple – which is what makes it powerful; basically you put your text into their database, and others view it according to a search they do (either explicitly, or implicitly – by following you or monitoring for @ replies).</p> <p>So given this wealth of entry points, and simplicity, why aren’t we seeing twitter flooded with spam? I’m not talking about the occasional spammer following you in hopes that you follow them back and get exposed to their spam – I’m talking about a massive spam attack including your twitter name (so it shows when you look for @ replies), including hash tags for all trending topics, and generally – flooding twitter at the rate we are seeing with email messages?</p> <p>After all, the multitude of entry points makes it more difficult to block it from entering than email, and the simplicity of the protocol makes it difficult to filter or block.</p> <p>I know the twitter team is putting efforts into blocking and filtering spam, but I find it hard to believe they are successfully blocking virtually all spam attacks. Spammers tend to be sophisticated, and I’m pretty sure they watch Opera, too – they must know what twitter is.</p> <p>Am I missing something?</p> <script type='text/javascript'> <!-- //OBSTART:do_NOT_remove_this_comment var OutbrainPermaLink="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316"; if(typeof(OB_Script)!='undefined'){OutbrainStart();} else { var OB_PlugInVer="7.0.0.0_Regular";;var OB_raterMode="stars";var OB_recMode="rec";var OBITm="1330324210";var OB_Script=true;var OB_langJS="";document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='http://widgets.outbrain.com/OutbrainRater.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));} //OBEND:do_NOT_remove_this_comment //--> </script> <div class="addtoany_share_save_container"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_target addtoany_list" id="wpa2a_15"><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save"><img src="http://blogs.securiteam.com/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></div></div> <!-- <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/"> <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316" dc:identifier="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316" dc:title="Why isn’t there more spam on twitter?" trackback:ping="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1316/trackback" /> </rdf:RDF> --> </div> </div> <div class="post" id="post-1310"> <h2><a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1310" rel="bookmark" title="Elance user information compromised">Elance user information compromised</a></h2> <p class="postinfo"> Posted on July 19th, 2009 by <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/aviram" title="Posts by Aviram" rel="author">Aviram</a><br /> Filed under: <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/corporate-security" title="View all posts in Corporate Security" rel="category tag">Corporate Security</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/full-disclosure" title="View all posts in Full Disclosure" rel="category tag">Full Disclosure</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/phishing" title="View all posts in Phishing" rel="category tag">Phishing</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/privacy" title="View all posts in Privacy" rel="category tag">Privacy</a>, <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/category/web" title="View all posts in Web" rel="category tag">Web</a> | <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1310#comments" title="Comment on Elance user information compromised"><span class="dsq-postid" rel="1310 http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1310">1 Comment »</span></a> </p> <div class="entry"> <p>God bless the law that forces companies to disclose when they are hacked and customer information is compromised. Not only do we get a chance to protect ourselves but it also reminds us that this apparently happens more often then we would think.</p> <p>This time it’s elance.com:</p> <blockquote><p>Dear (my account name),<br /> We recently learned that certain Elance user information was accessed without authorization, including potentially yours. The data accessed was contact information — specifically name, email address, telephone number, city location and Elance login information (passwords were protected with encryption). This incident did NOT involve any credit card, bank account, social security or tax ID numbers.<br /> We have remedied the cause of the breach and are working with appropriate authorities. We have also implemented additional security measures and have strengthened password requirements to protect all of our users.<br /> We sincerely regret any inconvenience or disruption this may cause.<br /> If you have any unanswered questions and for ongoing information about this matter, please visit this page in our Trust & Safety center: http://www.elance.com/p/trust/account_security.html<br /> For information on re-setting your password, visit: http://help.elance.com/forums/30969/entries/47262<br /> Thank you for your understanding,<br /> Michael Culver<br /> Vice President<br /> Elance</p> </blockquote> <p>What I would like to see, is what “additional security measures” are they really taking. Also (and I’ll admit I have a one-track-mind) did they do a proper security scan to ensure the servers don’t have any holes? 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